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Abstract 
Vietnam has achieved remarkable development outcomes since reforms in 1986. 
However, there are concerns about the inclusiveness and sustainability of the country’s 
development. The share of agriculture in GDP keeps decreasing but employment in 
agriculture remains high, reflecting the sector’s low labour productivity. The high and 
rising incremental capital output ratio is a signal of inefficient investment, which is most 
obvious in the state sector. And the wage increase ahead of productivity deteriorates 
Vietnam’s competitiveness.  
Government policies have contributed to these problems. The agriculture sector plays an 
important role in food security, job creation, and is a major exporter, but receives 
relatively little investment. Meanwhile, the state sector accounts for a large share of total 
investment despite recent attempts at privatization. Restrictions in rural-urban migration 
hinder labour moving out of agriculture and contributing to higher labour costs in urban 
areas.  
I extend the 1-2-3 computational general equilibrium model of Devarajan et al. (1997) to 
include the agricultural sector, then simulate a shift in investment and government 
spending toward agriculture. This shift is evaluated against the stimulus package in the 
context of the global financial crisis in 2009. The results suggest that the stimulus package 
helps improve total welfare at the cost of government savings. However, the poor in the 
agricultural sector would have been better off if the investment policy had boosted 
demand for agricultural products.  
To assess the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), I estimate firm-level 
production functions using a dynamic panel estimator on enterprise survey data over 
2000-2010. The results show that SOEs have significantly lower output elasticity of 
capital than non-state enterprises in the three industries that SOEs have the largest market 
share: agriculture, mining and utilities, and financial intermediation. Within types of 
SOEs, the 100 per cent SOEs generally have lower output elasticity of capital than the 
ones having non-state investment. This implies transferring capital away from the 100 per 
cent SOEs and from SOEs in the three mentioned industries will help improve overall 
investment efficiency. 
I model the migration restrictions through the urban-rural wage gap. Using the enterprise 
survey data, I show that the urban-rural wage gap is significant even after controlling for 
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labour qualifications. The results from my simple CGE model indicate that narrowing the 
wedge in urban and rural wage by relaxing migration restrictions help improve Vietnam’s 
competitiveness through lowering the average wage and raising labour productivity. It 
also helps to withdraw a sizable amount of labour out of agriculture and brings about a 
large welfare gain. Especially, this relatively low cost policy option seems to bring about 
much greater impacts than an ambitious labour skill upgrade program. 
The case studies show the misallocation of capital and labour due to inefficient policies 
that have been implemented since the central planning period, and their consequences as 
well. Alleviating such misallocation across industries, sectors and regions could help 
improve overall productivity and contribute to an inclusive and sustainable growth. 
Results from this thesis could provide suggestions for building a roadmap to implement 
the announced structural reform in Vietnam. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Allocating scarce resources efficiently could help countries develop their potential. 
However, it is not always the case that resources are channelled to the most productive 
users. After modelling resource misallocation among heterogeneous firms, Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) concluded that the aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) in 
manufacturing would increase by at least 30 per cent in China and 40 per cent in India if 
these countries had allocated capital and labour as efficiently as the United States.  
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) took a similar approach of modelling growth accounting 
for resource allocation among heterogeneous firms. They estimated that distortions 
leading to capital and labour misallocation in the United States could reduce the country’s 
output and TFP from 30 to 50 per cent, whether assuming total capital accumulation 
constant or not. While focusing on modelling distortions through taxes and subsidies, 
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) reviewed various sources of misallocation in the 
literature, for example non-competitive banking systems, government contracts to a group 
of firms, subsidies for public enterprises, labour market regulations, corruption, trade 
barriers, etc.  
This work considers three sources of misallocation in Vietnam: the unbalanced public 
investment, the preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises, and the obstacles to 
rural-urban labour migration.  
Vietnam is chosen as a case study for two reasons. First, Vietnam is a developing country 
in transition from a low- to a middle-income country. Whether it can thrive in the future 
depends much on its policy choices at present. An analysis of Vietnam’s case of resource 
misallocation might be useful to other developing countries at the similar stage of 
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development.1 Second, the three mentioned sources of misallocation are highly relevant 
in Vietnam. The country’s leadership has pressed the need for structural reform, in which 
public investment and state-owned enterprises are two out of three prioritized subjects for 
restructuring.2 And the household registration system that has separated urban and rural 
areas could only be seen in countries with the history of central planning, most notably 
Vietnam and China. 
Public investment and state-owned enterprises were among the key targets of the 
economic reform in the 1980s (known as Doi Moi) (Rama 2008, p. 22). They are again 
key targets of present restructuring efforts (Government of Vietnam, 2013). This might 
reflect the side effects of the comprehensive nature of Doi Moi, which led to reform in 
some fields lagging behind reform in others as warned by Rama (2008, p. 23). What is 
needed now is a roadmap for reform in each sector, which is the focus of this thesis.  
Vietnam also has a gradual approach in relaxing rural-urban migration restrictions. 
However, applying the “regulatory approach focused on control” as criticized by Porter 
(2010) in labour management has restricted the labour mobility, raising labour cost, and 
contributed to the urban-rural division. This is of particular interest in the context of rising 
wages along with relatively low labour productivity. 
Vietnam has achieved remarkable development outcomes since the reform in 1986. The 
GDP per capita in real terms increased by about four-fold during the period 1986-2013.3 
The poverty rate using the poverty line based on basic needs reduced sharply, from 58 
per cent in 1993 (World Bank 2013) to 13.5 per cent in 2014 (World Bank 2017).4  
                                                 
1 Tran (2014) argues that efficient resource allocation is essential for lower middle income countries, 
including Vietnam, to reach higher income level. This is different from high middle income countries, like 
Malaysia and Thailand, who should focus on “innovation-intensive” production. 
2 The other sector prioritized for restructuring is the financial sector. This sector is closely related to state-
owned enterprises. The biggest commercial banks are state-owned (To and Nguyen 2013, p. 74). There is 
also cross-ownership between large state-owned enterprises and banks. Hence, Leung (2013) stresses the 
need for parallel restructuring of state-owned enterprises and the banking sector. 
3 Author’s calculation using data from GSO (2014a), GSO (2014b), and ADB (2013). 
4 World Bank (2013) suggests caution in interpreting these numbers due to the systematic errors in the 
construction of regional price deflators and the changes in the consumption module of household surveys 
of which data is used to calculate poverty rates. Notetably, McCaig et al. (2014) uses the distribution of real 
income per capita from household surveys in Vietnam to show the robust poverty reduction from 2002 to 
2012, regardless of the poverty line used. 
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Sustaining growth as high as in the past is challenging. The targeted GDP growth rate for 
2011-2020 period is 7 - 8 per cent (Communist Party of Vietnam 2011). However, the 
growth rates in 2011-2016 are less than 7 per cent (GSO 2017). The growth rates in 2017-
2018 were predicted to be around 6.5 - 6.7 per cent (Asian Development Bank 2017).  
The high and rising incremental capital output ratio is a signal of inefficient investment, 
which is the most obvious in the state sector. The ratio of investment per GDP of Vietnam 
in the period 2004-2010 is the top ten per cent highest in the world (World Bank 2014b).5 
The likelihood of Vietnam maintaining this exceptionally high rate of investment seems 
unlikely for two reasons. First, the capital market in Vietnam depends heavily on the 
banking system. Meanwhile, the banking sector has suffered from the burden of non-
performing loans following the strong credit expansion. The rate of non-performing loans 
was recorded to be very high in 2012, threatening national macroeconomic stability (To 
2013). Thus, it is hard to push up investment through domestic credit. Second, Vietnam’s 
access to international financial markets has been hurt by macroeconomic instability and 
the default of Vinasin - a state-owned shipbuilder, not to mention the alarming public 
debt.6 Thus, improving investment efficiency is a must for the sustainable growth in the 
future. As I argue later in this thesis, concentrating on reforming state-owned enterprises 
in specific industries would help improve the overall efficiency. 
Vietnam aims to become an industrialized country by 2020 (the Communist Party of 
Vietnam 2011). However, there are many challenges ahead. If using the poverty line of 
US$2.26 per person per day, the poverty headcount in Vietnam is still high, about 21 per 
cent in 2010 (World Bank 2013).7 There are also concerns about the inclusiveness and 
sustainability of the country’s development. The increasing Gini index is a measure of 
widening inequality.8 The Gini index of income inequality was 0.40 in 2004 and rose to 
                                                 
5 Among 138 countries with available data in 2006-2010. 
6 Vinashin (Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group), one of the largest state-owned enterprises, defaulted in 
2010 with more than US$4 billion in debt. Inflation rates in 2010 and 2011 were 9 and 18 per cent (GSO 
2012). On account of these deteriorations, Standard & Poor‘s and Moody‘s downgraded Vietnam‘s 
sovereign rating to BB- and B1, respectively (World Bank 2011a). Moody’s continued to lower its rating 
for Vietnam to B2 in 2012 and just upgraded it back to B1 in July 2014 (Moody’s 2012, Moody’s 2014). 
7 The poverty rate using the official poverty line in 2010 is 14.2 per cent (GSO 2014a) 
8 A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 1 implies perfect inequality (World Bank 
2012b). 
 16 
 
0.43 in 2010 (World Bank 2013).9 This level of inequality is approaching that of China 
and higher than those of India and Indonesia (World Bank 2012a) (Table 1).10  
Table 1.1 GDP per capita and Gini index in 2010 
 GDP per capita (current US dollar) GINI index 
India 1417 0.34 
Indonesia 2947 0.36 
Chinaa 4433 0.42 
Vietnam 1334 0.39 
Note: It is not clear whether these coefficients are based on consumption or income per capita. However, 
the Gini coefficient of Vietnam from the World Development Indicator is lower than the coefficient 
reported by World Bank (2013), which is based on income per capita.  
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014). 
Most of the poor in Vietnam lives in rural areas and earn their living from agriculture 
(World Bank 2014). Thus, the restructuring of state investment to agriculture and the 
removal of the artificial separation between urban and rural areas to boost agricultural 
and rural productivity might help alleviate inequality and poverty.  
1.2 Research questions and methodology 
The three possible sources of resource misallocation mentioned above have their origins 
from the time of central planning. First, the allocation of investment in favour of industry 
has matched with the industrialization goal. The national development strategy initially 
targeted heavy industries, such as iron and steel and shipbuilding, then manufacturing and 
agriculture since the reform in 1986. In 2008, the Party issued the Resolution 26-NQ/TW 
on agricultural, farmer and rural development, assigning a strategic role to the sector (Ho 
2008b). However, investment in the agriculture sector has not matched with the target set 
in the Resolution.  
Vietnam has been an agrarian country with the majority of population living from 
agriculture. In 2016, 42 per cent of total employed labour force was in agriculture sector 
(GSO 2017). Vietnam has been among the world’s top exporters of rice, coffee, rubber, 
                                                 
9 There are different estimations of Gini coefficients. However, more updated calculations using the 2012 
household living standard survey (GSO 2013b and McCaig et al. 2014) show a reduction in Gini coefficient 
in 2012 in comparison with the level in 2010. 
10 The index announced by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics is much higher, in the range of 0.47-
0.49 for the period of 2008-2012 (Yao and Wang 2013). 
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pepper, tea, cashew nut, and fish, showing its competitiveness in agricultural products.11 
According to Porter (2010), out of the four products of Vietnam that established a position 
on the global market, there are two agricultural products: coffee and seafood. The 
agriculture sector has been recognized as being “important for socio-economic 
development with sustainability, political stability and assurance of national defence and 
security, bringing into play cultural identities and protection of eco-environment of the 
country” (Ho 2008b). 
However, the share of gross national investment and state investment in agriculture are 
on the downward trend, much lower than agriculture's share in GDP. In 2016, the share 
of agriculture in gross investment and in the state investment was about 5 per cent, while 
agriculture contributed 16 per cent of GDP and 18 per cent of total export value (GSO 
2017). Lack of capital might threaten the sector’s sustainable development and 
livelihoods of people who depend upon agriculture, especially the poor. 
The Resolution 26-NQ/TW set to double state investment in agriculture and rural 
development in each five years, starting 2009 (Communist Party of Vietnam 2008). 
However, the state investment in agriculture in 2009-2011 was just 11 per cent higher 
than that in 2006-2008 (evaluated at constant prices). At the same time, the total state 
investment increased 26 per cent (GSO 2010d, GSO 2011c, and GSO 2012c).  
The first question is what the impacts of increasing the share of agriculture in the budget 
expenditure are. In chapter 2, I extend the 1-2-3 computational general equilibrium (CGE) 
model of Devarajan et al. (1997) to include the agricultural sector. The extended model 
is then used to simulate a shift in budget expenditure toward agriculture and assess its 
possible effects on the economy structure and total wealth. The simulated shift in budget 
expenditure is evaluated against the stimulus package in the context of the global financial 
crisis in 2009. 
Second, Vietnam has a large state sector, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
which has maintained its relative size since the reunification in 1976. The share of the 
state sector in GDP and in gross investment fluctuates around 35 and 40 per cent 
respectively (GSO 2014a). This is in contrast to China who also had a large but rapidly 
                                                 
11 According to the UN Comtrade Database, in 2012, Vietnam was the world’s largest pepper exporter, 
second largest coffee and cashew nut exporter, third largest rice exporter, fourth largest tea and fish 
exporter, and fifth largest rubber exporter in terms of export trade value (United Nations 2014). 
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shrinking state sector owing to efforts to privatize their large state-owned enterprises 
(Sjöholm 2006). 
In spite of state support and easy access to credit, the performance of SOEs was poor. In 
2010, SOEs accounted for 70 per cent of gross national investment, 50 per cent of state 
investment, 60 per cent of total bank loans, and 70 per cent of official development aid 
(ODA), while contributing to 38 per cent of GDP (Ministry of Finance 2011).  
The second group of questions is how efficient the state-owned enterprises are in using 
capital compared with their counterparts in the non-state sector, and whether SOEs are 
heterogeneous in terms of capital use. Separating out the most inefficient SOEs would 
help sharpening the restructuring efforts. 
The difficulty is that the available annual statistics do not separate SOEs from the whole 
state sector (GSO 2014). It prevents a conclusive assessment of SOEs’ capital efficiency 
using the readily available statistics. In chapter 3, I employ the dynamic panel estimator 
on enterprise survey data over 2000-2010 to estimate firm-level production functions, 
then compare the return on capital between types of enterprises in different industries. 
Another source of resource misallocation discussed in this thesis is the household 
registration system. "Vietnam’s household registration system presents a systemic 
institutional barrier for internal migrants in accessing both basic and specialized 
government services, contrary to the rights provided to them and all other citizens under 
the Constitution of Vietnam” (United Nations 2010). Especially, rural-urban migration 
restrictions lead to the labour segmentation and the wage gap between urban and rural 
areas.  
The third question is how the removal of migration restrictions will influence the national 
economic development and the distribution of output among households in rural and 
urban areas. In chapter 4, I model the migration restrictions through the urban-rural wage 
gap and employ a simple general equilibrium model to simulate the impact of narrowing 
this gap. 
Implications from the results of the three above core chapters are then discussed in 
chapter 5, given the inter-connected issues that limit the improvement of the total labour 
productivity, thus deteriorating the national competitiveness. 
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1.3 Thesis structure and contributions to knowledge 
This thesis includes five chapters. This first chapter sets up the context and research 
questions. The following chapters deal with resource misallocation between agriculture 
and other industries, between state and non-state sectors, and between rural and urban 
areas. The final chapter looks at policy implications, limitations of the analysis and 
avenues for further research. 
Chapter 2 – Capital misallocation in Vietnam: Implications of increasing the share of the 
agriculture sector in the state investment in the context of the global financial crisis. 
Vietnam launched a stimulus package to cope with a large fall in total export demand and 
foreign direct investment due to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. I extend the 1-
2-3 model (Devarajan et al. 1997) to include the agriculture sector, in effect creating a 1-
4-6 model with one country, four producing sectors, and six goods. This is the minimalist 
approach providing an insightful answer to the research question. It requires adding a 
utility function and turning the problem into a maximization one, among other 
modifications. 
The simulated results from the extended model suggest that, in the short run at least, the 
stimulus package contributed to an improvement in welfare. However, the poor in the 
agricultural sector could be better off if the investment policy were to boost demand for 
agricultural products. Furthermore, the risk of inflation could undermine national 
competitiveness. 
Chapter 3 – Capital misallocation: The case of state-owned enterprises in Vietnam. 
The Vietnamese government provides state-owned enterprises (SOEs) favourable access 
to capital, including land. However, SOEs are not efficient capital users. On average, 
SOEs had lower revenue per capital than the domestic private enterprises. I compile a 
large panel dataset that tracks enterprises for 11 consecutive years and use the dynamic 
panel estimator to estimate firm-level production functions, then compare the return on 
capital between various types of enterprises in different industries. 
The estimated firm-level production functions show that SOEs have significantly lower 
output elasticity of capital than non-state enterprises in the three industries that SOEs have 
the largest market share: agriculture, mining and utility, and financial intermediation. 
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Within types of SOEs, central and local SOEs generally have lower output elasticity of 
capital than the ones having non-state investment. This implies transferring capital away 
from the 100 per cent state-owned enterprises and SOEs in agriculture, mining and 
utilities, and financial intermediation industries might help improve the overall 
investment efficiency. 
Chapter 4 - Labour misallocation: Implications of the possible removal of migration 
restriction in Vietnam 
Rural-urban migration has contributed to Vietnam’s economic development since 
reforms in 1986. However, the household registration system restricts migration from 
rural to urban areas. This contributes to Vietnam’s high share of labour force in 
agriculture, despite the sector’s low share in total value added and low productivity. I use 
enterprise survey data with a rural/urban indicator to estimate the gap between average 
wages in urban and rural areas, which partly reflect the segmented labour market. To 
simulate the impact of policy options to improve connectivity of rural-urban labour 
markets, I build a simple CGE model called DUAL, using neoclassical assumptions 
similar to Hosoe (2010). Input into the model is the two social accounting matrix for 
urban and rural areas that I estimate with the cross entropy method based on the national 
social accounting matrix developed by Arndt et al. (2010), district-level socio economic 
data, rural, agricultural and fishery census, enterprise surveys, and labour force survey. 
The results from the DUAL model show that narrowing the wage gap between rural and 
urban areas, possibly by relaxing migration restrictions and improving rural-urban 
connectivity, help accelerate labour transformation, increase total output and agricultural 
output, and increase social welfare. As the productivity in agriculture and rural area is 
expected to go up remarkably, the policy likely contributes to poverty alleviation and 
narrowing urban-rural inequality. Notably, relaxing migration restrictions does not 
require a budget as large as the training program to upgrade labour skills, which has a 
much more limited impact. 
Chapter 5 Conclusions 
Misallocation of key resources – capital (including land) and labour - has created 
inefficiencies and contributed to inequality. Government policies have made the situation 
worse. The three case studies show the misallocation due to misguided policies that have 
their roots in the central planning period, and their consequences as well. Vietnam has 
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raised the need of structural reform, but a roadmap is needed to secure success. I propose 
prioritized changes in policies to alleviate resource misallocation and improve growth and 
equality. Importantly, given Vietnam has been increasingly integrated in a fast changing 
world, prompt action is a must, as missed opportunities could be costly. 
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Chapter 2 - Capital misallocation in 
Vietnam: Implications of increasing 
investment in agriculture in the context 
of the global financial crisis 
 
Abstract 
The global financial crisis in 2008-2009 affected almost all countries. Vietnam was hit 
by a large fall in export demand and foreign direct investment. Many governments 
quickly prescribed stimulus packages and Vietnam was no exception. It reduced taxes 
and increased government spending, mainly by subsidizing loans to state-owned 
enterprises. The question is what the stimulated impact is, if any, and whether a better 
outcome could have been achieved by a different mix of policies. In this paper, I use a 
simple general equilibrium model extended from the 1-2-3 model (Devarajan et al. 1997) 
to quantify the impact of the various components of the stimulus package on the whole 
economy as well as on the agricultural sector. The results suggest that, in the short run at 
least, the stimulus package helps improve total welfare at the cost of government savings. 
The poor in the agricultural sector could be better off if fiscal policies were to boost 
demand for agricultural products. However, the risk of inflation could undermine the 
national competitiveness. 
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2.1 Introduction12 
The great recession of 2008-2009 negatively affected almost all countries. Vietnam, a 
small open developing country, was hit by a fall in export demand and foreign direct 
investment in late 2008 and 2009. Many governments quickly prescribed stimulus 
packages and Vietnam was no exception. The question is what the stimulated impact was, 
if any.  
To answer the question, I extend the 1-2-3 CGE model of Devarajan et al. (1997) to 
include the agricultural sector, which plays an important role in developing countries. In 
its original form, the model has one country, two sectors, and three goods. The extended 
model has one country, four sectors, and six goods.  
In Vietnam, almost half of the labour force is employed in agriculture. Most of Vietnam’s 
poor are living in rural areas and earning their living from agriculture. Therefore the 
results of the extended model have implications for the policy impact on inequality and 
poverty reduction.  
The results suggest that, in the short run at least, the stimulus package helps improve total 
welfare at the cost of government savings. The poor in the agricultural sector could be 
better off if fiscal policies were to boost demand for agricultural products, possibly 
through investment in industries having strong backward linkages with agriculture. 
However, the risk of inflation and real exchange rate appreciation could undermine 
national competitiveness. 
Thanks to its simplicity, the extended model could be mobilized in the future when policy 
makers need a quick assessment of a potential policy impact. Estimated results from the 
model could also be used as inputs for further research using micro models of household-
level impact assessment with household survey data. 
The following section provides the overview of the Vietnamese economy before and 
during the crisis. Section 3 examines the reasoning for the stimulus intervention 
theoretically, then describes the 1-2-3 model and its extension, together with data sources 
                                                 
12 An earlier version of this chapter has been presented at the 55th Annual Conference of the Australian 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Society (AARES), Melbourne, Victoria, February 2011, accessible 
at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/agsaare11/100722.htm. The main differences from the current version 
are the closure which deviates from the standard neo-classical one, and the explicit constraint on investment 
and saving.  
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for applying the model in Vietnam. Section 4 discusses the simulation results and section 
5 concludes. 
2.2 Vietnam before and during the crisis 
The extended model is applied to the case study of Vietnam, an agricultural-based 
economy. At the time of the global financial crisis, the agricultural sector in Vietnam 
employed more than half of the total labour force but produced only one fifth of the total 
GDP (GSO 2010d). One fifth of total population lived on less than one US dollar a day, 
and most of these were in rural areas and earn their living from agricultural production 
(MARD 2009). 
The country is in the transition from a central planned to a market-based economy. 
Vietnam is increasingly integrated into the international economy, marked by its 
accession into the World Trade Organization in 2007. The total trade volume was up to 
170 per cent of GDP in 2007. Nonetheless, the financial sector is less open to the rest of 
the world. As a result, Vietnam was immunized against the sub-prime crisis beginning in 
2007. However, it could not avoid the impact of the global crisis through export and 
foreign investment channels. In 2009, for the first time since the 1997 Asian crisis, total 
exports and agricultural exports as well as implemented FDI fell. The growth rates of total 
exports and agricultural exports were down from 29 per cent and 27 per cent per year in 
2008 to -9 per cent and -7 per cent per year in 2009 respectively (Figure 2.2).  
The implemented foreign direct investment kept falling in 2008 and 2009 from the peak 
in 2007 when Vietnam became a member of the World Trade Organization. However, 
domestic investment increased in 2009, possibly in response to the government’s loan 
subsidy and loose monetary policy (Figure 2.3). 
The concern is that in 2009, the growth rate of total investment increased due to 
improvement in domestic investment, while that of investment in agriculture decreased 
(Figure 2.4). Thus the share of agriculture in investment kept being reduced from an 
already low level (6 per cent) compared with its contribution to GDP (20 per cent) (GSO 
2011). This is likely to hurt the poor who mostly earn their living from agriculture. 
To cope with the unfavourable shocks, in late 2008 and 2009 the Vietnam government 
quickly announced a relatively large stimulus package of about US$6 billion (seven per 
cent of GDP in 2008). This includes a short term (only in 2009) intervention of one per 
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cent of GDP covering a credit subsidy, tax cuts, a one-time transfer to the poor; and a 
long term investment in infrastructure, trade promotion, etc. However, there was no 
official announcement detailing the distribution and source of such huge expenditures. 
Therefore, I calculate the size of the stimulus from the fiscal balances reported by the 
Ministry of Finance. Figure 2.5 shows a reduction in tax revenue and increases in 
expenditure, mostly capital expenditure in 2009 compared with 2008.  
In Vietnam, the stimulus package helped the economy reach an overall growth rate of 
5.32 per cent and agricultural growth rate of 1.83 per cent in 2009, despite of negative 
external shocks as the result of the global financial crisis. These growth rates were lower 
than those in 2008 but quite high compared with other countries in the region. The 
concern is that the reduction in agricultural sector growth is much deeper than that for the 
whole economy (Figure 2.6). This highlights the limited, if any, impact of the package on 
inequality and growth inclusiveness. 
2.3 The stimulus package, the 1-2-3 model, and its extension 
2.3.1 Theoretical base of the stimulus package 
The justification for government intervention in times of crisis dates back to Keynes. 
Stiglitz (2009) argues that the problem of the recent global crisis is an organizational one. 
Human and physical resources are available just as before the crisis, but there is a failure 
in organizing these resources to produce output.  
Stiglitz (2009) mentions two schools of Keynesian thought explaining the root cause of 
crises. One claims wage rigidities, while the other attributes the lack of aggregate demand 
as sources of the market failure. However, large wage falls during crises undermines the 
former argument (Stiglitz 2009). Keynes stated that in the Great Depression, wage 
decreases led to income reduction and therefore demand shortage. 
Nonetheless, there are different explanations of the demand fall. Stiglitz (2009) argues 
that the aggregate demand insufficiency at the global level is caused by: (i) the 
accumulated increase in inequality, transferring money to the rich who spend a lesser part 
of their income; and (ii) “the massive build-up of reserves” as countries learn from and 
respond to the 1997 financial crisis. On the other hand, Willenbockel and Robinson 
(2009) attribute the declines in the rich countries’ demand for export from developing 
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countries and changes in term of trade unfavourable to primary product exporters are 
major causes of crisis in developing countries. 
According to this line of thinking, government intervention is needed to address the fall 
in global aggregate demand. Monetary policy was used first but with limited impact as it 
could not stimulate demand. Therefore the G-20 countries choose to use fiscal measures 
to boost demand (Prasad and Sorkin 2009).  
There is a positive correlation between stimulus intervention and the growth recovery in 
G-20 countries. The bigger the stimulus package (as percentage of GDP), the lesser the 
decrease in growth rate between 2007 and 2009. However, the correlation is not so strong 
without Saudi Arabia. The questions are whether there is a causal relationship between 
stimulus intervention and total income, and whether such impact, if any, has a trickle-
down effect.  
2.3.2 The stylized model of one country, two sectors, and three goods 
(1-2-3 model) 
In order to quantify the stimulus effect, it is essential to separate the impact of the crisis 
from the observed national economic performance. The computational general 
equilibrium (CGE) model is a natural tool for such policy analysis as it allows the 
introduction of one shock at a time, like a “laboratory that supports individual, controlled 
experiments” (Devarajan and Robinson 2002).  
Taking the Occam’s Razor approach of “use the simplest model adequate to the task at 
hand” (Devarajan and Robinson 2002), the one-country, two-sector, three-good model 
(the 1-2-3 model) is a good start. This model was developed by Devarajan et al. (1997) 
to analyze the interaction between the external shocks and economic policies and the 
economy. The model is for one country with two sectors (producing tradable and non-
tradables) and three goods (exported good, domestically consumed good and imported 
good). There are three actors (a household, a producer, and the rest of the world). 
The model assumes a small country, facing fixed world prices. Output is a combination 
of export and domestic goods, assuming a constant elasticity of transformation. There is 
imperfect substitution between imports and domestically consumed goods with a constant 
elasticity of substitution.  
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Devarajan et al. (1997) also assumes fixed output, implying full employment of all 
resources. Other exogenous variables include tax rate, transfers, savings rate, government 
consumption and the trade balance. Several parameters (elasticities) are taken from 
available literature. 
The main advantages of the model are the “modest data requirement” and the ability to 
run in Excel using Solver, an optimization feature. Excel is easier to learn and use than 
other programming tools.  
2.3.3 Extension of the 1-2-3 model to include agricultural sector 
The 1-2-3 model is useful for analysing the impact of external shocks and policy 
packages, but cannot evaluate the extent of such impact on the poor. Our solution is to 
separate both tradable and non-tradable sectors into agricultural and non-agricultural 
components. Export goods, domestic goods and import goods are also separated 
accordingly. This is of particular interest for Vietnam, an agrarian economy where some 
of the poorest people are self-subsistent farmers. The extended model, hence, has four 
sectors and six goods. 
In the extended model, expenditure is allocated between agriculture and non-agriculture 
goods to maximize utility.13 I assume government demand and investment are exogenous. 
The allocations of government expenditure and investment in two sectors follow fixed 
ratios.  
There are 41 equations (Appendix 2.2), which are the direct extension from the 19 
equations in the 1-2-3 model. Equation 2.1 defines the fixed total output. Equations 2.2 
and 2.3 are domestic production possibility frontiers for agricultural and non-agricultural 
productions. Equations 2.4 and 2.5 are the supplies of agricultural and non-agricultural 
composite commodities. Equation 2.6 and 2.7 calculate the demand for the composite 
agricultural and non-agricultural goods. Equations 2.8 and 2.9 describe the efficient ratios 
of exports to domestic output in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Equations 2.10 
and 2.11 are ratios of desired import to domestic goods in two sectors. Equation 2.12 
describes tax revenue as a composite of revenue from tariffs, direct and indirect taxes. 
Equation 2.13 defines the sources of household income. Equation 2.14 describes 
                                                 
13 In the original 1-2-3 model, there is one composite good and consumption of this good represents utility. 
The problem turns into maximize consumption then. 
 28 
 
aggregate saving as the total of household saving, government saving and trade account 
balance. Equation 2.15 defines aggregate consumption and equation 2.16 calculates it as 
the difference between disposable household income and savings.  
Equations from 2.17 to 2.29 describe prices, where the real exchange rate is chosen as the 
numeraire. Equations 2.30 to 2.34 are market clearing equilibrium conditions. Equation 
2.35 defines government demand, and equation 2.36 estimates government demand for 
agricultural goods as a fixed share of total government demand. Equation 2.37 is the state 
budget balance. Equation 2.38 defines total investment and equation 2.36 estimates 
investment in agriculture as a fixed share of total investment.  
Equation 2.40 defines utility as a function of agricultural and non-agricultural 
consumption. Equation 2.41 specifies the optimized allocation of expenditure among two 
composite goods.  Notably, the saving-investment identity is dropped as superfluous 
thanks to Walras’ Law. Thus there are 41 equations, solved as a utility maximization 
problem for 42 endogenous variables listed in Appendix 2.1. 
From a small open developing country’s perspective, external shocks in a crisis include 
reductions in exports and foreign investment. As export is endogenous in the model, a 
decrease in exports is represented by a decrease in the world price of exports. A reduction 
in foreign investment is proxied by a reduction in foreign remittances.   
2.4 Simulated results using the extended model 
2.4.1 Calibration and scenarios 
Vietnam is a good case study as it is a small open developing country suffering from the 
global crisis and quickly launches a sizable stimulus package. The major data input of the 
model is the Input-Output Table (I0 table) for the year 2007 (GSO 2009). The 138 
commodities in the original IO table are aggregated into two groups: agriculture and non-
agriculture. The agriculture group includes the first 16 commodities (paddy, sugarcane, 
other crops, raw rubber, coffee beans, processed tea, other perennial plants, buffaloes and 
cows, pig, poultry, other livestock, agricultural service and other agricultural products, 
timber, other forestry products and forestry service, fishery, and fish farming). The non-
agriculture group includes all remaining commodities. Fiscal account data is from the 
annual state budget (Ministry of Finance 2010). The balance of payments is from Asian 
Development Bank (2010).  
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Parameters for elasticities of substitution are taken from the Cameroon CGE model 
(Condon et al. 1987). Although not ideal, this country shares many characteristics with 
Vietnam, including being a small open agrarian economy with the share of agriculture in 
total GDP of approximately 20 per cent. The agricultural sector in Cameroon is also the 
country’s engine for growth, maintaining a sectoral growth rate of nearly four per cent 
since 1988 (World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009b).  
Vietnam’s economy is assumed to be at equilibrium in 2007, which is used as the baseline 
(column 2 of Table 2.1). In order to analyse the impact of the stimulus package in 
Vietnam, crisis shocks and policy interventions are then added one by one from the 
baseline. I consider five scenarios in 2009: the external trade shocks (S1), the FDI shock 
(S2), the crisis scenario (S3), the stimulus scenario (S4), and the restructuring scenario 
(S5).14 The corresponding shocks are in column 3 to 7 of Table 2.1.  
The model does not allow a direct shock of exports, imports or FDI. Instead, I model an 
external trade shock as shocks to world prices. And shock to FDI is represented by shock 
to foreign remittances. The stimulus scenario is established by adding policy shocks in 
2009 to the crisis scenario. The policy shocks include the increases in government 
spending, indirect tax and import tariff, and the reduction in direct tax. The combined 
shocks in the stimulus scenario are in column 6 of Table 2.1. The differences between the 
stimulus scenario (S4) and the crisis scenario (S3) represent the impacts of the stimulus 
package.  
The stimulus impact is then compared with the outcome in the case of a different 
government intervention with more investment and government spending in the 
agricultural sector (S5). In this scenario of restructuring, share of agriculture in 
investment and government spending is assumed to increase by 20 per cent; other shocks 
are as in S4. Details of the corresponding shocks are in the last column of Table 2.1. The 
differences between the scenario of restructuring (S5) and the crisis scenario (S3) 
represent the impacts of the assumed stimulus package that focuses more on boosting 
demand for agricultural goods. 
                                                 
14 I restrict to the main scenarios to five due to the scope of the paper. To assess the impact of separated 
shocks (for example to consider the impact of government spending distinguished from tax cut), more 
detailed scenarios are included in the working version of this paper.   
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Table 2.1 Scenarios  
  2007 2009 
  S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
  Baseline 
Export 
(E) FDI 
E 
+FDI 
E+FDI+
G+tax 
+tariff 
E+FDI+G 
+tax+tariff 
+shift in 
investment 
and G 
World price of 
agriculture export  1 0.88 1 0.88 0.88 0.88 
World price of non-
agriculture export 1 0.89 1 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Government spending 1 1 1 1 1.04 1.04 
Foreign remittances 1 1 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Direct tax 1 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 
Indirect tax 1 1 1 1 1.12 1.12 
Import tariff 1 1 1 1 1.35 1.35 
Share of agriculture in 
government spending 1 1 1 1 1 1.20 
Share of agriculture in 
investment 1 1 1 1 1 1.20 
 
Note: S0 - the baseline scenario, S3 - the crisis scenario, S4 - the stimulus scenario, S5 - the restructuring 
scenario. 
Source: Author’s calculations using GSO, ADB, MOF data. 
2.4.2 Results 
Table 2.2 compares outcome changes of scenarios S4 and S5 from those of scenario S3, 
in percentage changes. Impacts of the stimulus package are shown by comparing 
outcomes of S4 with S3. Similarly, the impact of a supposed package in favour of 
agriculture is shown by comparing S5 with S3.  
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Table 2.2 Impact of the stimulus package and the assumed shift in investment and 
government spending to agriculture (per cent) 
Variables 
ΔS4/S3 ΔS5/S3 
Policy 
interventions to 
cope with crisis 
Assumed shift in investment 
and government spending 
to boost demand for 
agricultural products 
Total utility 2.61 2.73 
Total income 0.11 0.47 
Agricultural output 0.14 8.21 
Non-agricultural output -0.03 -1.79 
Total consumption 2.60 2.71 
Total import -0.03 0.00 
Total saving -5.13 -4.87 
Government saving -14.40 -14.04 
Agricultural sale price 0.52 0.38 
Non-agricultural sale price 0.99 1.34 
Domestic pricea 1.73 1.98 
Note: aThe exchange rate is the numeraire in this model, thus the changes in domestic price reflect the 
changes in real exchange rate. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Column 2 of Table 2.2 shows that the stimulus spending could help improve income and 
welfare at the cost of government saving. The package is more helpful to agricultural 
producers than their non-agricultural counterparts, reflected by the opposing movements 
of agricultural and non-agricultural output.  
There is also a small threat of inflation, which could undermine the economy’s 
competitiveness and reduce the efficiency of monetary policies.15 The consumer price is 
expected to rise 1.73 to 1.98 per cent compared with the crisis scenario (with no policy 
intervention).  
Column 3 of Table 2.2 describes the impacts of a stimulus package with investment and 
government spending restructured toward industries with strong backward linkages to 
agriculture, such as the food processing industry, to boost demand for agricultural 
products. This hypothetical package brings higher positive impacts on welfare, income 
and agricultural output. However, the cost of inflation and real exchange rate appreciation 
is a bit higher.  
                                                 
15 Vietnam devaluated the dong four times in one year from November 2009. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
The 1-2-3 model is a useful tool to analyse the impact of government intervention in the 
economic crisis. It could be extended by including primary production and trade to trace 
the impact of government intervention on the poor. The Vietnam case study illustrates 
that the stimulus package had a positive effect on total welfare and distribution, but at the 
cost of government spending. 
In terms of growth inclusiveness, Vietnam might consider policies to boost the demand 
for agricultural products. These include but are not limited to diversifying and expanding 
the market for Vietnam’s agricultural export, investing in food processing industries, 
developing the system of quality control for agricultural products, etc. 
The extended model used in this chapter is static. It does not allow further assessment of 
how the government would pay for the stimulus package. Next steps might be the 
inclusion of factor markets, the expansion into a recursive dynamic model by adding 
equations for updating capital and labour stocks to capture the longer term effects of 
government interventions, and taking into account the expected future increase in tax and 
national debt. Elasticities could also be calibrated from micro-based data. 
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Figure 2.1 Correlation between stimulus size and GDP growth rate 
 
Source: Prasad and Sorkin (2009), World Bank (2011). 
Figure 2.2 The annual growth rates of total export and agricultural export (per cent) 
 
Source: GSO (2011). 
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Figure 2.3 Annual growth rate of investment by ownership (per cent) 
 
Source: GSO (2011). 
Figure 2.4 Annual growth rate of total investment and agricultural investment (per 
cent) 
 
Source: GSO (2011). 
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Figure 2.5 Tax revenue and government expenditure in 1994 prices (trillion VND) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2010), GSO (2010d). 
Figure 2.6 Annual growth rates of total GDP and agricultural GDP (per cent) 
 
Source: GSO (2011). 
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Appendix 2.1 Variables and parameters 
Endogenous variables 
XA: Aggregate agricultural output 
XN: Aggregate non-agricultural output 
EA: Agricultural export good 
EN: Non-agricultural export good 
MA: Agricultural import good 
MN: Non-agricultural import good 
DAS: Supply of domestic agricultural good 
DNS: Supply of domestic non-agricultural good 
DAD: Demand for domestic agricultural good 
DND: Demand for domestic non-agricultural good 
QAS: Supply of composite agricultural good 
QNS: Supply of composite non-agricultural good 
QAD: Demand for composite agricultural good 
QND: Demand for composite non-agricultural good 
PeA: Domestic price of agricultural export good 
PeN: Domestic price of non-agricultural export good 
PmA: Domestic price of agricultural import good 
PmN: Domestic price of non-agricultural import good 
PdA: Producer price of domestic agricultural good 
PdN: Producer price of domestic non-agricultural good 
Pt: Sale price of composite good 
PtA: Sale price of composite agricultural good 
PtN: Sale price of composite non-agricultural good 
PxA: Price of aggregate agricultural output 
PxN: Price of aggregate non-agricultural output 
Pq: Price of composite output 
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PqA: Price of composite agricultural output 
PqN: Price of composite non-agricultural output 
R: Exchange rate 
T: Tax revenue 
Sg: Government saving 
Y: Total income 
C: Aggregate consumption 
CA: Aggregate consumption in agricultural good 
CN: Aggregate consumption in non-agricultural good 
Z: Aggregate real investment  
ZA: Aggregate real investment in agriculture 
ZN: Aggregate real investment in non-agriculture 
GA: Real government demand for agriculture good 
GN: Real government demand for non-agriculture goodS: Aggregate savings 
U: Utility 
Exogenous Variables 
pweA: World price of agricultural export good 
pweN: World price of non-agricultural export good 
pwmA: World price of agricultural import good 
pwmN: World price of non-agricultural import good 
tmA: Agricultural tariff rate 
tmN: Non-agricultural tariff rate 
teA: Agricultural export duty rate 
teN: Non-agricultural export duty rate 
ts: Sales/ excise/ value-added tax rate 
tsA: Sales/ excise/ value-added tax rate in agriculture 
tsN: Sales/ excise/ value-added tax rate in non-agriculture 
ty: Direct tax rate 
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tr: Government transfers 
ft: Foreign transfers to government 
re: Foreign remittances to private sector 
s: Average saving rate 
G: Real government demand 
Xഥ: Total output 
bG: Share of government demand in agriculture good 
bZ: Share of investment in agriculture good 
B: Foreign savings 
Parameters 
A୲୅: Scale parameter of agricultural CET production function 
A୲୒: Scale parameter of non-agricultural CET production function 
A୯୅: Scale parameter of agricultural CES supply function 
A୯୒: Scale parameter of non-agricultural CES supply function 
AU: Scale parameter of utility function 
b୲୅: Share parameter of agricultural CET production function 
b୲୒: Share parameter of non-agricultural CET production function 
b୯୅: Share parameter of agricultural CES supply function 
b୯୒: Share parameter of non-agricultural CES supply function 
bU: Share parameter of utility function 
r୲୅: Exponent parameter of agricultural CET production function 
r୲୒: Exponent parameter of non-agricultural CET production function 
r୯୅: Exponent parameter of agricultural CES supply function 
r୯୒: Exponent parameter of non-agricultural CES supply function 
rU: Exponent parameter of utility function 
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Appendix 2.2 Equations 
Xഥ = XA+XN (2.1) 
XA = A୲୅[b୲୅EA୰౪
ఽ  + (1 - b୲୅)DAୗ୰౪
ఽ]ଵ/୰౪ఽ (2.2) 
XN = A୲୒[b୲୒EN୰౪
ొ  + (1 - b୲୒)DNୗ୰౪
ొ]ଵ/୰౪ొ  (2.3) 
QAS = A୯୅[b୯୅MA୰౧
ఽ  + (1 - b୯୅)DAୗ୰౧
ఽ]ଵ/୰౧ఽ (2.4) 
QNS = A୯୒[b୯୒MN୰౧
ొ  + (1 - b୯୒)DNୗ୰౧
ొ]ଵ/୰౧ొ (2.5) 
QAD = CA + ZA + GA (2.6) 
QND = CN + ZN + GN (2.7) 
EA = DAS൤൫ଵିୠ౪
ఽ൯୔౛ఽ
ୠ౪ఽ୔ౚఽ
൨
ଵ/൫୰౪ఽିଵ൯
 (2.8) 
EN = DNS൤൫ଵିୠ౪
ొ൯୔౛ొ
ୠ౪ొ୔ౚొ
൨
ଵ/൫୰౪ొିଵ൯
 (2.9) 
MA = DAD൤ ୠ౧
ఽ୔ౚఽ
൫ଵିୠ౧ఽ൯୔ౣఽ
൨
ଵ/൫ଵି୰౧ఽ൯
 (2.10) 
MN = DND൤ ୠ౧
ొ୔ౚొ
൫ଵିୠ౧ొ൯୔ౣొ
൨
ଵ/൫ଵି୰౧ొ൯
 (2.11) 
T = (tmApwmAMA+tmNpwmNMN)R + teAPeAEA+teNPeNEN + tsAPqAQAD + 
tsNPqNQND +  tyY 
(2.12) 
Y = PxAXA + PxNXN + trPq + reR (2.13) 
S = sY + Sg + RB  (2.14) 
C = CA + CN (2.15) 
CPt = (1 – s – ty)Y (2.16) 
PmA = pwmAR(1 + tmA) (2.17) 
PmN = pwmNR(1 + tmN) (2.18) 
PeA(1 + teA) = pweAR (2.19) 
PeN(1 + teN) = pweNR (2.20) 
Pt = Pq(1 + ts) (2.21) 
PtA = PqA(1 + tsA) (2.22) 
PtN = PqN(1 + tsN) (2.23) 
PxAXA = PeAEA + PdADAS (2.24) 
PxNXN = PeNEN + PdNDNS (2.25) 
Pq(QAS + QNS) = PqAQAS + PqNQNS (2.26) 
PqAQAS = PmAMA + PdADAD (2.27) 
PqNQNS = PmNMN + PdNDND (2.28) 
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R = 1 (2.29) 
DAD = DAS (2.30) 
DND = DNS (2.31) 
QAD = QAS (2.32) 
QND = QNS (2.33) 
pwmAMA + pwmNMN – pweAEA - pweNEN – ft – re = B (2.34) 
G = GA + GN (2.35) 
GA = bGG (2.36) 
T – PtAGA – PtNGN – trPq – ftR = Sg  (2.37) 
Z = ZA + ZN (2.38) 
ZA = bZZ (2.39) 
U = A୙[b୙CA୰౑  + (1 - b୙)CN୰౑]ଵ/୰౑  (2.40) 
 (1 - b୙)P୲୅CA(ଵି୰౑) =  b୙P୲୒CN(ଵି୰౑) (2.41) 
 
  
   
 41 
 
Chapter 3 - Capital misallocation: The 
case of state-owned enterprises in 
Vietnam 
 
Abstract 
The Vietnamese government provides state-owned enterprises (SOEs) favourable access 
to capital, including land. However, SOEs are not efficient capital users. In 2010, SOEs 
accounted for 70 per cent of gross national investment, 50 per cent of state investment, 
60 per cent of total bank loans, and 70 per cent of official development aid, while 
contributing 38 per cent to GDP. On average, SOEs had lower revenue per unit of capital 
than the domestic private enterprises. I employ a dynamic panel estimator on enterprise 
survey data over 2000-2010 to estimate firm-level production functions by different types 
of ownership, and then compare the return on inputs between state and non-state 
enterprises. The results show that SOEs have significantly lower output elasticity of 
capital than non-state enterprises in the three industries that SOEs have the largest market 
share: agriculture, mining and utilities, and financial intermediation. Within types of 
SOEs, central and local SOEs generally have lower output elasticity of capital than SOEs 
having non-state investment. This implies transferring capital away from SOEs in 
agriculture, mining and utilities, and financial intermediation industries might help 
improve overall investment efficiency. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Allocating scarce resources efficiently could help countries increase productivity and 
output. However, it is not always the case that resources are channelled to the most 
productive users. By modelling resource misallocation among heterogeneous firms, 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) concluded that the aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) in 
manufacturing would increase by at least 30 per cent in China and 40 per cent in India if 
these countries had reallocated capital and labour as efficiently as the United States.16 
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) took a similar approach and estimated that distortions 
leading to capital and labour misallocation in the United States could reduce the country’s 
output and TFP by 30 to 50 per cent.17 While focusing on modelling distortions through 
taxes and subsidies, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) reviewed various sources of 
misallocation in the literature, for example non-competitive banking systems, 
government contracts to a group of firms, subsidies for public enterprises, labour market 
regulations, corruption, trade barriers, etc.  
Our work considers one particular source of misallocation: the preferential treatment of 
state-owned firm. Vietnam is an interesting case-study for this topic as the state sector 
has remained a large share of GDP during Vietnam’s recent period of rapid growth and 
structural change. This is in contrast to China which had a rapidly shrinking state sector 
owing to privatizing their large state-owned enterprises (Sjöholm 2006). This is to provide 
essential evidence for the debate on privatization in Vietnam, before moving to the 
privatization efficiency topic, which has a much richer literature such as Estrin et al. 
(2009) for transition economies, and Brown et al. (2006) for some typical Eastern Europe 
countries.  
During Vietnam’s transition from a centrally planned to a market based economy, the 
state sector, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), has maintained its relative size. In 
1976, after the reunification, the share of the state sector in GDP was 40 per cent (GSO 
2004).18 Some 35 years later, in 2012, this share was reduced to 33 per cent (GSO 2013). 
                                                 
16 The authors used the gaps in firm-level marginal products of capital and labour within an industry as the 
indicator of resource misallocation. The key assumption was without distortions, resource would be 
allocated to equate productivity across firms. 
17 The changes in GDP and TFP depend on assuming total capital accumulation constant or not. 
18 The state sector includes SOEs, administrative organs and socio - political organizations, non-productive 
organs, works and investment projects government budget (GSO 2000). According to the development 
investment capital survey in 2000 (GSO 2000), investment by SOEs account for 38 per cent of investment 
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The relatively large and stable share of the state sector in Vietnam matched the 
Government’s development strategies that assigned the state sector a leading role in the 
economy. SOEs were expected to take “key positions in the economy”, using advanced 
technology, demonstrating high productivity and producing high quality products 
(Government of Vietnam 2006b).  
Given the important role assigned to SOEs, the Vietnamese government provided them 
favourable access to capital, including land (Government of Vietnam 2012). According 
to the Law of State Owned Enterprises (National Assembly 2003), central and local state 
enterprises had their charter capital from the state budget.19 The share of profit that was 
allocated for state-owned capital could be retained to increase state-owned capital at the 
SOEs.20 This means SOEs had access to capital at zero interest rate and did not have to 
repay the principal. The loans were effectively an interest free grant. 
Apart from state investment, SOEs had access to credit from state-owned banks and land 
use rights in strategic urban area (Perkins and Vu 2010). Some SOEs even had shares in 
joint-stock banks and could borrow from them (Pincus 2013). The amount of capital used 
by SOEs was underestimated as the value of land assigned to them was assessed at the 
official rate, which was much lower than the market rate. SOEs also benefited from trade 
regulations, for example low tariff rates on their imports, including intermediate goods 
for their production and final goods for their domestic trade (Athukorala 2006). In 2013, 
31 per cent of enterprises participating in the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 
survey reported one big obstacle to their operation is SOEs’ preferential access to land, 
credit, and public procurement at both central and local levels (Malesky et al. 2014). 
In spite of state support, the performance of SOEs was poor. The share of the state sector 
in the gross national investment had consistently been higher than its share in GDP, 
suggesting the sector being relatively less efficient in capital use in compared with the 
                                                 
of the state sector and 22 per cent of the gross national investment. In the following sections, we use data 
from the enterprise surveys and the term “state sector” implicit SOEs. 
19 Charter capital is the minimum amount of capital required by law for the establishment of an enterprise 
(National Assembly 2005). 
20 This policy was changed by the Decree No. 71 on state investment and financial management of state-
owned enterprises dated 11 July 2013. The Decree stipulates profit of state-owned enterprises to be 
collected to the state budget. The amount of transfer to the state budget from state-owned enterprises’ profit 
in 2014 is expected to be 31 trillion dong (Pham 2014), equivalent to 18 per cent of the planned state budget 
deficit in 2014 (Ministry of Finance 2014). 
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non-state sector (Figure 1).21 In 2010, SOEs accounted for 70 per cent of gross national 
investment, 50 per cent of state investment, 60 per cent of total bank loans, and 70 per 
cent of official development aid (ODA), while contributing to 38 per cent of GDP 
(Ministry of Finance 2011). 
I employ a dynamic panel estimator on enterprise survey data over 2000-2010 to estimate 
firm-level production functions by different types of ownership, then compare the return 
on inputs between state and non-state enterprises. The results show that SOEs produce 
significantly lower output per one additional unit of capital than non-state enterprises in 
the three industries that SOEs have the largest market share: agriculture, mining and 
utilities, and financial intermediation. Within types of SOEs, central and local SOEs 
generally have lower rates of return on capital than the ones having domestic non-state or 
foreign investment. This implies transferring capital away from the 100 per cent state-
owned enterprises and SOEs in agriculture, mining and utilities, and financial 
intermediation industries might help improve the overall investment efficiency.22  
Our findings are broadly consistent with those of World Bank (2011a), which stated that 
Vietnam’s SOEs own the largest share of capital but were among the least efficient capital 
users. The World Bank drew its results by comparing key performance indexes, notably 
the ratios of net turnover to capital and net turnover to labour, as measured by the number 
of employees, between SOEs and the whole enterprise sector.  
Our paper goes further by constructing production functions for different types of 
ownership, thus separating the return on capital and the return on labour for the 14 types 
of ownership, and comparing these coefficients among state-owned, private-owned and 
foreign-owned enterprises within each defined industry. 
The paper is divided into a further five sections: data and measurement, performance of 
enterprises by ownership, methodology, results, and conclusion and policy implications.  
                                                 
21 There are only two years, 1994 and 2008, out of 37 years from 1986 to 2012 when the state sector’s share 
in the gross national investment was a bit lower than its share in GDP. These are periods of strong FDI 
flowing-in, especially in 2008 (following Vietnam’s admission to WTO), pushing down the share of state 
sector in total investment while the absolute state investment kept increasing.  
22 I aggregate to 10 industries to ensure an adequate sample of FDI. Further disaggregation is theoretically 
feasible for industries with relatively large sample such as manufacturing or real estate and business 
activities if needed. 
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3.2 Data and measurement 
The GSO has conducted enterprise surveys annually since 2000.23 These surveys were 
done in the first quarter each year, asking for information about each enterprise’s 
activities over the year before. Each enterprise has a unique code so that I can follow a 
panel of firms across years.24 
The first three surveys (2000, 2001 and 2002) were effectively a census of operating 
enterprises. The surveys since 2003 included all state-owned enterprises, enterprises with 
foreign investment and private enterprises having ten or more employees, and a sample 
of private enterprises having less than ten employees. In 2008, the employment threshold 
was raised to 20 employees for enterprises in Hanoi, 30 employees in Ho Chi Minh City, 
and remained at 10 employees in the other provinces. In 2009, the sample was for private 
enterprises with less than 30 employees in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and less than 10 
employees in the other provinces. In 2010, the benchmark was lifted once again to 50 
employees in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, 30 in Dong Nai, Binh Duong and Hai Phong, 
and 20 in the rest of the provinces. Hereafter, for our convenience, I refer to private 
enterprises with the number of employees higher than the benchmark each year as large 
private enterprises, and private enterprises with the number of employees less than the 
benchmark as small private enterprises. The sample sizes were from 15 to 20 per cent of 
the total number of small private enterprises.25  
Enterprises in the sample filled in the full questionnaire of around 250 questions. Small 
private enterprises that were not in the sample filled in the much shorter questionnaire (5 
to 15 questions). The missing information of small private enterprises not in the sample 
                                                 
23 We report the year of data instead of the year of the survey. For example, the first survey was conducted 
in 2001, asking for performance of enterprises in 2000. In this paper, we refer to it as 2000 data. 
24 There are some observations with duplicated codes (accounting for less than 0.7 per cent and recently 
around 0.01 per cent of total number of observations each year). The majority of duplicates are in fact 
distinguished enterprises. One explanation from the GSO is that an enterprise may split into two but has 
yet to register for a new tax code, thus both enterprises are assigned one code, which is based on their tax 
code. We looked at the duplicates’ characteristics to decide if enterprises with the same code are different 
enterprises or real duplicates. As a result, out of 2422 duplicates in total, there are only 296 real duplicates. 
The remaining 2126 duplicates are recoded so that each enterprise has one unique code over the 2000-2010 
period. 
25 Specifically, samples were taken by province. In those provinces with a small number of enterprises, all 
small private enterprises were in the sample. The number of provinces that surveyed only a part of their 
small private enterprises had been increasing, from 20 in 2003 to 47 in 2010 (out of the total 63 provinces). 
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was then extrapolated from the small private enterprises in the sample. This might be a 
source for serially correlated measurement errors that I will discuss in the result section. 
One advantage of using these surveys is that we can follow enterprises across years using 
the enterprise identification code. The scale of the surveys kept rising, from more than 
40,000 enterprises in 2000 to more than 285,000 enterprises in 2010 (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Number of enterprises by year26 
Year Number of enterprises Year Number of enterprises 
2000 42,272 2006 129,349 
2001 49,368 2007 153,341 
2002 60,677 2008 202,203 
2003 70,113 2009 231,395 
2004 89,107 2010 285,793 
2005 110,642 Total 1,424,260 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
Due to new entries and exit of producers every year, the number of enterprises that stay 
in the surveys decreases as the years go by (Figure 3.2). The total number of enterprises 
in the panel for two years or more is 305,037. This is a very large number of observations 
compared with other papers using linear dynamic panel estimators as described in the 
methodology section later.27 There are 9,465 enterprises existing throughout the entire 
eleven years. This enables tracking of the firms’ performance over a long time. 
The surveys collect basic information about each enterprise, notably ownership, sector of 
business, number of employees, wage bill, value of capital, value of assets, revenue, 
profit, taxes, investment and products.  
                                                 
26 This table does not include 22,276 observations (about 1.5 per cent of total number of observations) that 
were dropped due to data problems. A quarter of them (5,727 observations) have missing information about 
total employment both at the beginning and the end of the year. The rest are duplicates or have inconsistent 
or missing information about ownership, capital, revenue and profit. Robustness checks showed that 
dropping these observations does not significantly change our results. Besides, there are 44,799 
observations with zero revenue and 394 with zero capital, which are not counted in our regressions which 
use using logarithmic transformation of these variables. 
27 See, for example, De Loecker et al. (2012) who use the two-year panel of 5,010 enterprises from 33 
countries to measure productivity. 
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I use net revenue as a proxy for output in the production function, which is discussed in 
the methodology section. Net revenue is total revenue excluding deductions such as 
value-added tax, export tax and a special consumption tax. These deductions are the 
amounts that enterprises collect from their customers on behalf of the government and 
that do not come from the enterprise’s output.  
For labour, there are two options: the number of employees and the total wage bill. As 
the information about the skill of worker and the number of hours worked by a typical 
employee within a firm is not available, the wage bill may be the better proxy for labour 
input and comparable among enterprises.28 However, after 2003, information about the 
wage is only available for enterprises answering the full questionnaire while that of total 
employment is available for all enterprises. More important still, the two series are highly 
correlated with the correlation coefficient being 0.86. Thus I focus on using the number 
of employees, which is the average of total number of workers at the beginning and end 
of the year. Missing data is replaced by the end or the beginning of the year number, 
depending on which one is available.29 
For capital, total capital, the average of the book value at the beginning and end of the 
year, is used. Total capital is variable plus fixed assets. Missing data is also replaced by 
the end or the beginning of the year number, depending on which one is available.30 
In the model used in this chapter, enterprises are compared with their counterparts within 
their narrowly defined industries (up to 4-digit code). The industry codes are matched 
with Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification 1993 (VSIC 1993) (Truong and McCaig 
2012). Thanks to the large sample, the econometric analysis could be done separately for 
ten broad industries: (1) agriculture; (2) mining and utilities; (3) manufacturing; 
(4) construction; (5) wholesale and retail trade; (6) hotels and restaurants; 
(7) transportation and communications; (8) financial intermediation; (9) real estate and 
                                                 
28 There is information about structure of workforce of each firm by skill level but only in 2007 and 2009. 
Such information is available for headquarters of firms in 2001. 
29 In total, there are 6.3 per cent of observations having a missing number for employment at the beginning 
of the year. Most of them are newly established firms. The number of observations having missing number 
of employment at the end of the year is much smaller, just 0.4 per cent of the total number of observations. 
30 The share of observations having missing total capital at the beginning of the year is 5.2 per cent. The 
share of observations having missing total capital at the end of the year is 0.1 per cent. 
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business activities; (10) other services.31  Details of industries included in each group 
together with their 4-digit codes are in Appendix 3.15. 
The enterprise surveys do not collect information on input and output prices at the firm 
level. Instead the annual producer price index (PPI) provided by the GSO is used as a 
deflator for nominal indexes. The PPI (50 products) is matched with the 4-digit VSIC 
1993 (300 industries) to derive real values of monetary terms (revenue, capital, and wage 
bill). 
These surveys cover all types of enterprises except agricultural cooperatives.32 Generally, 
there are fourteen types of ownership.33 The first five are classified by the GSO as state-
owned enterprises (SOE):34 
 central state-owned enterprises (central SOE); 
 local state-owned enterprises (local SOE); 
 central state-owned limited companies (central SOE limited); 
 local state-owned limited companies (local SOE limited); and 
 limited or joint stock companies with state capital accounting for more than 50 
per cent of the charter capital (limited or joint stock – state capital > 50%).  
The following six types are classified as privately-owned enterprises (PRI):  
 limited or joint stock enterprises with state capital accounting for less than or equal 
50 per cent of the charter capital (limited or joint stock – state capital ≤ 50%);  
 private limited enterprises; 
                                                 
31 The numbers of enterprises in mining and in utilities industries are both small. The ownership structures 
in these two industries are similar. Thus, I pool them together in order to have a big enough sample size for 
dynamic panel analysis. Other services include research and development, education, health and social 
work, sporting and other recreational activities, community, social and personal service activities, and 
private households with employed persons.  
32 The enterprise surveys do not include household businesses and individual producers. 
33 In 2000 there were 13 types of ownership. In 2001, there were 12 types. The classification has changed 
over time too. For example, in 2001 and 2003, there was one code for the state limited enterprises; while in 
the other years there are separate codes for the central state limited enterprises and the local state limited 
enterprises. Since 2005, there are the limited enterprises with state capital and there are separate codes for 
limited enterprises with the share of state capital higher or lower than 50 per cent. In order to make the 
ownership classification consistent over time, we have to rely on other variables such as the share of central 
state in total capital, the share of local state in total capital, the share of state in total capital, and the change 
of these variables over the years. More detailed discussion can be found in Truong (2013). 
34 It should be noted that the data is collected at plant level. As a result, we are not able to look into the 
policy decision of having general corporations. 
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 private joint stock enterprises; 
 private enterprises;35 
 cooperatives (in industries other than agriculture); and 
 partnerships; 
The last three types of ownership are classified as foreign direct investment enterprises 
(FDI):  
 100 per cent of foreign capital (wholly FDI); 
 joint venture between state and foreign partners (joint SOE-FDI); and 
 joint venture between non-state owned enterprises with foreign partners (joint 
PRI-FDI). 
The number of each type of enterprises in 2000-2010 is shown in Table 3.2. Notably, the 
number of SOEs kept decreasing, in contrast with the number of PRIs and FDIs. From 
2000 to 2010, the number of SOEs reduced nearly by half, while those of PRIs and FDIs 
increased eight and five folds respectively. The speed of reducing number of SOEs was 
at a peak in 2005 and slowed recently (the number of SOE even increased a little in 2009).  
Within SOEs, while the numbers of central SOEs and local SOEs reduced by 14 and 20 
per cent per year in the 2000-2010 period, those of central SOE limited, local SOE 
limited, and limited or joint stock companies with state capital accounting for more than 
50 per cent of the charter capital increased by 49, 36 and 31 per cent respectively. This 
might reflect the impact of the Law on Enterprises (National Assembly 2005) which 
requires SOEs to switch to joint stock or limited companies by mid-2010. Thus the 
reduction in the numbers of central SOEs and local SOEs together with the increase in 
the numbers of central SOE limited, local SOE limited do not necessarily imply a change 
in the way these enterprises operate.     
 
                                                 
35 This type of ownership could be easily misunderstood as covering the whole privately-owned sector. In 
order to avoid that, we use the abbreviation PRIs to represent the privately-owned sector and will only use 
the term “private enterprises” to specify the corresponding typical type of PRIs. 
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Table 3.2 Number of enterprises by ownership 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
Ownership 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
SOE, in which 5,713    5,360    5,219    4,710   4,486   3,976     3,619     3,435     3,266      3,285     3,182     46,251      
Central SOE 1,929   1,830   1,906   1,745   1,613   1,236    965        783       662        591        443        13,703     
Local SOE 3,657   3,272   3,054   2,649   2,150   1,578    1,080     828       717        636        404        20,025     
Central SOE limited 6          9          19        19        44        74         114        139       146        192        315        1,077       
Local SOE limited 27        41        80        43        119      174       263        325       339        373        568        2,352       
Limited or joint stock - 
state capital >50% 94        208      160      254      560      914       1,197     1,360    1,402     1,493     1,452     9,094       
PRI, in which 35,054  42,150  53,219  62,853 81,554 103,051 121,556 145,029 193,358  221,590 275,638 1,335,052 
Limited or joint stock - 
state capital ≤ 50% 206      481      547      650      797      1,514    1,675     1,927    2,116     1,981     2,039     13,933     
Private limited 10,429 15,042 22,336 29,465 40,001 51,309  62,619   76,461  101,916 122,999 161,615 694,192   
Private joint stock 608      1,019   1,978   3,650   6,589   10,229  14,516   20,333  31,378   38,695   53,375   182,370   
Private enterprise 20,569 22,023 24,439 25,170 29,504 34,226  36,877   40,044  46,003   46,497   47,560   372,912   
Cooperative 3,238   3,581   3,896   3,900   4,642   5,738    5,838     6,211    11,879   11,352   10,977   71,252     
Partnership 4          4          23        18        21        35         31          53         66          66          72          393          
FDI, in which 1,505    1,858    2,239    2,550   3,067   3,615     4,174     4,877     5,579      6,520     6,973     42,957      
Wholly FDI 857      1,166   1,521   1,810   2,279   2,795    3,308     3,953    4,579     5,392     5,786     33,446     
Joint SOE-FDI 511      535      519      504      507      472       459        439       423        423        398        5,190       
Joint PRI-FDI 137      157      199      236      281      348       407        485       577        705        789        4,321       
Total 42,272  49,368  60,677  70,113 89,107 110,642 129,349 153,341 202,203  231,395 285,793 1,424,260 
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Looking only at the number of enterprises by ownership over the years might lead to the 
impression that the state sector is shrinking remarkably. However, the story is different if 
we take into account the scale of SOEs, especially their intensive capital use, as discussed 
in the next section. 
3.3 Performance of enterprises by ownership 
In this section, I summarize key characteristics and performance of enterprises from 2000 
to 2010 by ownership. For simplicity, in the following figures and tables, I use the GSO’s 
broad classification of ownership: state-owned enterprise (SOE), privately-owned 
enterprise (PRI), and foreign-invested enterprise (FDI).36  
Table 3.3 Share of state-owned enterprises in total number of enterprises, capital, 
employment, revenue, and tax paid in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (per cent) 
Share of SOEs in total 2000 2005 2010 
Number of enterprises 14 4 1 
Capital 67 55 36 
Employment 60 34 16 
Revenue 55 39 28 
Tax paid 51 41 35 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
Generally, the shares of SOEs in all key indexes are decreasing sharply from 2000 to 2010 
(Table 3.3). This decreasing trend in the number of SOEs is a result of the SOE reform 
that includes equitization and making the operation of SOEs compatible with that of 
privately-owned enterprises. 37  From 2000 to 2010, the equitization process helped 
withdraw more than half a million workers net (more than a quarter of SOEs’ employment 
in 2000) from SOEs but the actual capital in real terms used by SOEs expanded by almost 
three times. In 2010, while the number of SOEs is just 1 per cent of the total number of 
                                                 
36 This classification also matches the current Law on Enterprises (National Assembly 2005) which defines 
a state owned enterprise as “an enterprise in which the State owns over 50 per cent of the charter capital”. 
37 Equitization is “a process of selling part of the equity of an SOE or state-owned commercial bank to the 
public or a strategic investor. In recent years, equitization has mostly taken place through an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) followed by listing of the company on the stock exchange” (World Bank 2011). One 
prominent example of making the operation of SOEs to be compatible with their private counterparts is the 
Law on Enterprises 2005, which is supposed to create the same legal environment for all types of ownership. 
More detailed documentation of SOE reform in Vietnam can be found in Doan (2012). 
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enterprises surveyed, they account for up to 36 per cent of total capital.  Sjöholm (2006) 
commented that the equitization process in Vietnam was to “attract capital without giving 
up state control”. 
The share of SOEs in capital use was shrinking, but not for all industries. The share of 
SOEs in the total capital of the mining and utilities industry increased sharply from 62 
per cent in 2000 to 81 per cent in 2010 (Figure 3.3).38 Again, it should be stressed that the 
popular report of the change in number of SOEs as the result of equitization are 
misleading.39 For example, the mining industry had the largest reduction in the share of 
SOEs in the total number of enterprises, from 38 per cent in 2000 to 8 per cent in 2010. 
This resulted from the combination of the absolute reductions in the number of SOEs and 
the strong increase in the number of PRIs in the industry. The share of SOEs in the total 
employment of the industry decreased only marginally, from 76 to 72 per cent. 
Meanwhile, the share of SOEs in total capital of the mining industry even increased, along 
with the relative reduction of FDI into this industry during the period of 2000-10. Doan 
(2012) also recommended caution while looking at the decline of the number of SOEs 
because “merging is not uncommon in SOE restructuring”. 
By 2010, SOEs still use more than 50 per cent of capital in agriculture, mining and 
utilities, and the financial intermediation industries. These are also industries that SOEs 
have the largest market shares (reflected by their shares in the industry’ total revenue), 
although these shares are decreasing (except for the mining and utilities industry) 
compared with those of PRIs and FDIs (Figure 3.4). 
There has been a shift in investment focus within the state sector over time (Figure 3.5). 
In 2000, the wholesale and retail trade and financial industries got the largest share of 
capital in the state sector. In 2010, the share of the wholesale and retail trade industry 
shrunk while that of the financial intermediation, and mining and utilities expanded 
remarkably. From 2000 to 2010, real capital in the wholesale and retail trade industry 
                                                 
38 The mining and utilities industry includes Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group (PetroVietnam) and 
Vietnam National Coal and Mineral Industries Group (Vinacomin), which were established in 2006. 
PetroVietnam is the biggest state economic group, having the total assets of 466 trillion dong in 2010 (Doan 
2012), equal to 36 per cent of total assets of all enterprises in the mining and utilities industry surveyed or 
61 per cent of Vietnam’s gross capital formation in 2010. Vinacomin is also a big economic group with the 
total asset of 103 trillion dong in 2011 (Tran and Nguyen 2013). 
39  Ministry of Finance is responsible for state management of SOEs and programs relating to SOE 
restructure. However, the Ministry’s reports about the progress of SOE restructure mostly focused on the 
number of equitized enterprises each year, such as the news on the official website of the ministry about 
policies to overcome difficulties in SOE restructuring (Ministry of Finance 2013). 
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reduced by more than a third, while real capital in the financial intermediation industry 
soared up 5 times. This could be the result of policy allowing cross ownership between 
large SOEs and banks, which have been accused of accumulating bad loans in the banking 
system and leading to the need for parallel restructuring of SOEs and banks (Leung 2013). 
The manufacturing industry accounted for around 9 per cent of the total capital of all 
SOEs, ranked only the third in 2010, although having the largest number of SOEs and 
absorbing the largest share of employment in the state sector. In the meantime, PRIs 
concentrated the most in wholesale and retail trade and FDIs in manufacturing. 
The number of enterprises is deceptive because of size differences among enterprises. On 
average, SOEs had the largest average scale, followed by FDIs. This is true for different 
dimensions of scale, including employment, capital, and revenue (Figure 3.6). SOEs were 
catching up with FDIs in capital intensity, illustrated by the narrowing gap between the 
average real capital per worker of SOEs and that of FDIs. PRIs had the much smaller 
scale and were more labour intensive compared to the other two types of ownership. 
Furthermore, the distance between SOEs and PRIs was expanding. In 2000, the average 
number of workers of SOEs was 13 times higher than that of PRIs. In 2010, the ratio was 
22 times. The difference in capital scale was much larger: 42 times in 2000 and 61 times 
in 2010. This was the result of not only the SOE scale expanding but also the business 
environment unfavourable for private enterprises to grow (Nguyen 2013). The average 
number of workers in PRIs was even on a decreasing trend, from 30 in 2001 to 27 in 
2005, then 22 in 2010. 
The SOEs’ strong increase of capital and revenue in the second half of the 2000s decade 
could stem from policies rather than their own business developmental process. At the 
end of 2006, the government’s agenda on SOEs in the 2006-2010 period emphasized the 
role of SOEs as a tool for macro-economic management, enhancing the state investment 
in SOEs, and establishing state-owned business groups (Government of Vietnam 2006a). 
SOEs, especially state economic groups (SEG), were allowed to invest in different kinds 
of businesses instead of concentrating on their core one (Doan 2012).40 For example, the 
now-bankrupt state-owned shipbuilder Vinashin had “hundreds of subsidiaries and 
affiliated companies that operated across a wide range of sectors - often far removed from 
                                                 
40 According to World Bank (2011a), SEG is “a loose alliance of several SOEs with similar business 
interests”, “held together through a pyramid ownership structure in which the parent company is at the top 
of the pyramid with a controlling stake in a number of subsidiaries”. Examples of SEGs are PetroVietnam, 
Vinacomin, Vinashin, Vinalines, etc. 
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the parent company’s core business - with size and influence much bigger than ever 
imagined” (World Bank 2011a). The non-core businesses are notably “real estate, stock 
market and financial sector” (Doan 2012).  
In 2000, the average share of equity in total capital of SOEs was 43 per cent while that of 
PRIs was 77 per cent. This means PRIs had to rely mostly on their own capital while 
SOEs could borrow more than a half of their capital stock.41 This difference in capital 
access narrowed recently due to PRIs’ better access to capital but was still significant 
(Figure 3.7). On average, each SOE borrowed 76 billion dong in 2000. In 2010, this rose 
to 880 billion dong (12-fold increase). Meanwhile, the average amount of credit for each 
PRI was 2 and 13 billion dong in 2000 and 2010 respectively. Notably, among PRIs, the 
joint stock enterprises having state capital had the lowest average share of equity. It shows 
that, for domestic enterprises, connections with the state seemed to be helpful in getting 
loans. 
In addition to capital from the state budget, SOEs received favourable access to credit 
from state-owned banks (Perkins and Vu 2010). Some SOEs even have shares in joint-
stock banks and could borrow from them (Pincus 2013).42 SOEs received soft loans from 
international donors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund through 
the Vietnam Development Bank, and could have the state debt guarantee to borrow in 
international financial markets as well (Nguyen and Tran 2013). SOEs’ uncontrolled easy 
access to capital contributed to the accumulated non-performing loans in the banking 
system, which was recorded high in 2012, threatening the national macroeconomic 
stability.43 In 2013, SOEs accounted for 70 per cent of the total non-performing loans (To 
2013). 
Across three types of ownership, access to capital is correlated with firm size. The greater 
the capital scale, the greater the share of borrowed capital (Figure 3.8). In 2000, if we 
divide enterprises into quintiles of capital, enterprises in the first quintile (the ones with 
the smallest capital scale) borrowed 8 per cent, while those in the fifth quintile (the largest 
                                                 
41 Domestic banks are the major sources of capital for SOEs. In 2010, loans from domestic banks accounted 
for more than half of total borrowing and a quarter of total capital of SOEs. 
42 In principle, banks could not lend to their shareholders, but they avoided by lending to subsidiaries or 
affiliated companies of their shareholders (To 2013).  
43 There are different estimations of the non-performing loans out of the total credit by September 2012: 
8.82 per cent (according to the State Bank of Vietnam), 15 per cent (according to Fitch Ratings), and 20 
per cent (according to Barclays as noted by the Wall Street Journal) (To 2013). 
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ones) borrowed 58 per cent of their total capital. The corresponding numbers in 2010 are 
31 per cent and 61 per cent, showing the improvement in terms of capital access, 
especially for small enterprises.  
Although, on average, PRIs had the larger share of equity in total capital compared with 
SOEs, this did not apply for the large PRIs. In 2010, among enterprises in the fifth quantile 
of capital, PRIs had the smallest share of equity in compared with other types of 
ownership.44 The difference in capital access between small and large PRIs was quite 
large, at 31 percentage points, while that between small and large SOEs was just 8 
percentage points. 
Notably, it was hard to justify SOEs’ favourable access to capital based on economic 
performance as SOEs generally had lower revenue per unit of capital than PRIs (Table 
3.4). The average revenue per unit of capital of PRIs over the 2000-2010 period was 2.5 
while that of SOEs was 1.6 and FDIs was 1.3. It means on average, with one unit of 
capital, PRIs could create 2.5 units of revenue, while SOEs could only produce 1.6 units 
of revenue. 
According to the World Bank (2011a), one explanation for SOEs’ relatively low revenue 
per unit of capital was that SOEs specialized in capital-intensive products. The level of 
capital intensity could be proxied by the average real capital per worker (Figure 3.6). Out 
of the three types of ownership, FDIs had the highest real capital per worker, followed by 
SOEs. However, SOEs had the fastest growing index, followed by PRIs. The average real 
capital per worker of SOEs in 2010 was 6 times higher than that in 2000. In 2000, SOEs’ 
level of capital intensity approximately equalled that of PRIs. In 2010, SOEs’ average 
capital per worker nearly approached that of FDIs.  
Overall, the average revenue per unit of capital kept decreasing, reflecting the economy’s 
inefficient use of capital. The index in 2010 was less than one third of that in 2000 (Table 
3.4). This is consistent with the rising incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) that many 
warned about (e.g. Perkins and Vu 2010, Bui 2011).45 According to Ohno (2010), ICOR 
                                                 
44 As shown by the significant negative coefficient of the dummy for PRIs, which represents the difference 
in the share of equity in total capital between PRIs and SOEs. 
45 World Bank (2011a) also used revenue per unit of capital as a proxy for capital productivity and found 
the average ratio of the entire enterprise sector increasing, from 8.8 in 2000 and up to 21 in 2009. This 
implied the whole economy was increasingly efficient in capital use, which did not agree with 
macroeconomic data as well as literature as mentioned. 
 56 
 
of Vietnam was three in 1990, five in 2000 and eight in 2009. This means, in 2009, 
Vietnam required up to eight additional units of investment to produce one additional unit 
of output.  
The downward trend of the total revenue per unit of capital seems to be driven by that of 
PRIs, due to the overwhelming number of PRIs compared with the other types of 
ownership. It suggested that policies to improve the national efficiency in capital use 
should aim at PRIs. Focusing on private sector development was also recommended by 
World Bank (2011b) who stated that Vietnam needs a “thriving domestic private sector 
to support its middle income aspirations”.  
In 2009 and 2010, the average revenue per unit of capital were the lowest. This reflects 
the economic downturn under the impact of the global financial crisis. However, there 
was a jump in revenue per unit of capital for central SOEs in 2009, which could be the 
result of their better access to the huge stimulus package launched early 2009.  
The revenue per unit of capital of PRIs in 2010 was lower than that of SOEs, which could 
be a signal for private sector’s deteriorated efficiency in capital use. Both SOEs and PRIs 
witnessed their revenue per unit of capital reduced in 2010, while FDIs had an improved 
one. FDIs might exploit the world’s post-crisis recovery better than domestic enterprises 
owing to their better connections with the international market. Further research with 
more recent data is needed to confirm whether the reversal in the order of average revenue 
per unit of capital among the three types of ownership was a short-term or long-term 
effect. 
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Table 3.4 Revenue per unit of capital by ownership from 2000 to 2010 
Ownership 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
SOE, in which 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Central SOE 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.9 2.3 1.7 
Local SOE 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 
Central SOE limited 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.4 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 2.0 1.5 
Local SOE limited 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.3 2.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.4 
Limited or joint stock - state capital >50% 1.3 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 
PRI, in which 5.5 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.5 2.5 
Limited or joint stock - state capital ≤ 50% 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 3.3 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.0 
Private limited 3.4 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.6 1.3 1.9 
Private joint stock 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.6 
Private enterprise 6.7 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.7 4.7 3.9 3.6 3.6 2.7 2.4 3.9 
Cooperative 4.9 3.0 3.8 3.0 4.6 4.4 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 2.7 
Partnership 2.8 3.7 6.1 3.4 1.3 1.6 2.3 2.1 2.2 1.0 1.0 2.0 
FDI, in which 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 
Wholly FDI 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 
Joint SOE-FDI 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.2 
Joint PRI-FDI 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.4 
Total 4.8 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.4 1.8 1.5 2.4 
Notes: Indexes are underlined if the revenue per unit of capital of a type of ownership is greater than the average revenue per unit of capital in the same year 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. 
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Among SOEs, limited or joint stock companies with state capital accounting for more 
than 50 per cent of the charter capital had the highest revenue per unit of capital. Central 
SOEs recently had an improved ratio, but their average revenue per unit of capital over 
2000-2010 period ranked just second in the state sector. Local SOEs and local SOEs 
limited generally had the lowest revenue per unit of capital (Table 3.4). This suggests that 
equitization, especially of local SOEs, could help to improve the state sector’s efficiency 
in using capital. One could argue, however, that only the most profitable SOEs could be 
equitized. Further research is needed to confirm the effectiveness of equitization on firm 
performance, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Within the domestic private sector, the private enterprises had the highest revenue per 
unit of capital, albeit with the downward trend. The limited or joint stock companies with 
state capital accounting for less than or equal to 50 per cent of the charter capital was not 
the best in the domestic private sector, but still better than their counterparts in the state 
sector. 
While FDI was expected to be the most productive sector, their performance did not show 
that. The joint ventures between SOEs and FDIs were not exceptional. These joint 
ventures even had the revenue per unit of capital generally lower than that of local SOEs. 
The level of capital intensity could not be the whole story here as the central SOEs and 
the joint ventures between SOEs and FDIs had similar ratios of capital per worker. Bui 
(2011) used macroeconomic data to assess the investment efficiency and also came to the 
observation that FDI had the lowest and the domestic non-state sector has the highest 
return from investment. He argued that the FDI sector presented low returns from 
investment owing to transfer pricing, pushing up the recorded cost of production, thus 
making a loss on paper. According to Malesky et al. (2014), 20 per cent of FDIs covered 
in the Vietnam 2013 Provincial Competitiveness Index survey increased prices of their 
internally-transferred goods and services to reduce profit, thus paying lower tax.46 
Figure 3.9 presents the difference in average revenue per unit of capital between SOEs 
and PRIs divided by the average revenue per unit of capital of PRIs by industries in 2000 
and 2010. The higher the index, the higher revenue per unit of capital of SOEs in 
compared with that of PRIs. In 2000, the index was negative in all industries except the 
financial intermediation one. A negative index means SOEs had average revenue per unit 
                                                 
46 The Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index surveys have been conducted annually since 2005. The 
survey in 2013 has a special module on transfer pricing, covering 1,609 FDIs in 13 provinces.  
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of capital less than that of PRIs. In 2010, the index was less negative or became positive, 
except in the agriculture industry. Especially, the index had improved most in the 
wholesale and retail trade industry, not because SOEs in the industry performed any 
better, but because the reduction of the average revenue per unit of capital of PRIs was 
much more than that of SOEs. In contrast, in the financial intermediation industry, the 
average revenue per unit of capital of PRIs increased 5 times in the 2000-2010 period 
while that of SOEs was almost the same, leading to the much less positive index in 2010. 
In the mining and utilities industry, SOEs were increasingly dominant, but their average 
revenue per unit of capital was still much lower than that of PRIs. 
In summary, with favourable access to capital from 2000 to 2010, the number of SOEs 
reduced but their capital expanded, leading to their increasingly large scale and capital 
intensity. They still took a dominant share in the total capital of the agriculture, mining 
and utilities, and the financial intermediation industries. However, SOEs had lower 
average revenue per unit of capital than PRIs, although the difference had narrowed at 
the end of the decade. It implies SOEs were on average less efficient in capital use 
compared with their counterparts in the domestic private sector.  
Notably, because SOEs used more capital per worker than PRIs, we could expect SOEs’ 
lower revenue per unit of capital. Although this is true for the average, it may not hold at 
the margin. Moreover, revenue is not only affected by capital use but also other factors.  
To be conclusive about whether transferring capital away from the state sector would help 
improving the total efficiency of the economy, we need to compare the marginal impact 
of capital stock of ownership sectors, controlling for other things, especially labour input. 
In the following sections, I will employ econometric models to estimate returns from 
capital and labour by type of ownership. Hence, I could measure the efficiency differences 
in input use between SOEs and other sectors in different industries.  
3.4 Methodology 
According to Eberhardt and Helmers (2010), there are thousands of empirical papers 
using different techniques to deal with the correlation between a firm’s inputs and its 
output in the presence of unobserved productivity shocks. Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) 
provided an excellent review of the most popular techniques to estimate the Cobb-
Douglas production function, namely the dynamic panel estimators proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998), and the structural estimators by Olley 
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and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006). 
They argued that, in theory, these various estimators are equally valid, but in practice, the 
appropriate choice of estimator should be based on properties of the dataset. It should be 
noted that the structural estimators use the control function approach, requiring observed 
investment or intermediate inputs to proxy for unobserved productivity (Ackerberg, 
Caves and Frazer 2006).  
In our case study of Vietnam, I choose to apply the dynamic panel estimators as the data 
on intermediate inputs is not available and nearly half of the sample does not have 
investment data. Besides, there are several advantages of the dynamic panel estimators 
over the structural ones, most notably the dynamic panel estimators do not require scalar 
unobservable assumptions whereas assumptions imposed by the dynamic panel 
estimators are testable (Eberhardt and Helmers 2010).47  
Our paper extends from Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) by using the second-order 
transcendental logarithmic (translog) production function, which has been used widely in 
the literature (Söderbom and Teal 2004, Christensen et al. 1973). I employ the translog 
function instead of the simple but more restricted Cobb-Douglas as the Cobb-Douglas is 
only a special case of the translog function. Estimation of the static translog production 
function using pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators show the jointly significant 
coefficients of the high order terms, supporting this specification.  
The static production function to be estimated for each type of ownership is: 
yit = a0 + akkit + allit + akkkit2 + alllit2 + aklkitlit + εit 
where yit is the log of output for firm i at time t, kit is the log of capital stock, and lit is the 
log of labour input.48 εit is the error term, including unobserved shocks to output and 
possible measurement errors. The efficiency in capital use is reflected through the partial 
derivative of y with respect to k. Thus, I am interested in estimating ak, akk, and akl. 
                                                 
47 The scalar unobservable assumption is imposed by the structural estimators. It means that the control 
function only includes the unobserved productivity. Other unobserved factors, such as measurement errors, 
are ruled out (Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer 2006). 
48 Some authors (for example Gandhi et al. 2011) specified material cost separately from capital. We cannot 
follow this approach as the intermediate inputs (cost of materials, electricity, water, etc.) are not observed. 
The lack of information on intermediate inputs, which is normal given the size of the surveys, is trivial in 
this case as input cost is reflected in the liquid assets, which is part of the total assets (equal to total capital 
stock by accounting rules). 
(3.1) 
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I proxy output by net revenue, which is deflated by producer price indexes - a standard 
approach in the literature (Syverson 2011). I choose to model output instead of value 
added since value added is a concept that cannot be directly observed (Gandhi et al. 2011). 
Gandhi et al. (2011) argued that a value added production function is correctly specified 
only if value added and intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes or perfectly 
complementary. Perfect substitution between value added and intermediate inputs implies 
output could be produced by intermediate input only, which is unreasonable. In case of 
perfect complementary, if capital and labour are “quasi-fixed”, value added could not be 
specified; and if either capital or labour is flexible, then output is proportional to value 
added and it is better to use output than the difference between output and intermediate 
cost to measure value added (Gandhi et al. 2011).  
The error term εit in equation 3.1 can be decomposed as 
εit = γi + θt + wit  + vit 
where γi is time-invariant firm-specific characteristics; θt represents global shocks to 
output of all firms in period t; wit represents time-variant firm-specific shocks to output; 
and vit is measurement errors.  
The possibility to control for firm fixed effects γi, which could be correlated with 
regressors, is a prominent advantage of panel data. An example of the unobservable firm-
specific term is management quality, assumed to be constant over time and negatively 
correlated with inputs, causing bias to parameter estimation (Verbeek 2008). Fixed effects 
estimator could help by transforming the model to remove γi, but it could not be able to 
condition out the non-random time-variant terms wit.  
Two important components of wit in our case are material inputs and productivity shocks 
that are assumed to be known by firm i. When the managers of the firm could anticipate 
a productivity shock next period, they would adjust the inputs accordingly. Hence, we 
would expect anticipated shocks to correlate with level of capital and labour inputs. This 
endogeneity problem causes bias to both the estimated labour and capital coefficients. 
This is known as the “transmission bias” (Eberhardt and Helmers 2010). Productivity 
shocks are allowed to be serially correlated while measurement errors vit are assumed 
serially uncorrelated. Effectively, I still allow for correlation between measurement errors 
and the contemporaneous input levels. 
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In order to tackle the transmission bias, I use the dynamic panel estimators on the 
transformed model as described by Eberhardt and Helmers (2010). Under the assumption 
that wit follows an AR(1) process  wit = ρwit-1 + uit  where uit are serially uncorrelated terms 
and |ρ|<1, we have the following dynamic transformation:49  
yit = a0* + ρyit-1 + akkit + ak*kit-1 + allit + al*lit-1 + akkkit2 + akk*kit-12 + alllit2 + all*lit-12 + 
aklkitlit + akl*kit-1lit-1 + γi* + θt* + vit* 
where  ak* = - ρak, al* = - ρal, akk* = - ρakk, all* = - ρall, akl* = - ρakl, a0* = (1-ρ) a0, γi* = (1-ρ) 
γi, θt* = θt - ρθt-1, vit*  = uit  + vit - ρvit-1.50  
While the last four restrictions are just identities, the first five restrictions impose a special 
case for the general model in equation 3.2 and are called the common factor restrictions. 
First, I will estimate the unrestricted model and test for these restrictions. If the common 
factor restrictions are not rejected, I will then estimate the restricted model. If the common 
factor restrictions are rejected, the coefficients in equation 3.1 could be recovered from 
the long term solution of the unrestricted model in equation 3.2 (Eberhardt and Helmers 
2010):51 
yi = β0 + βkki + βlli + βkkki2 + βllli2 + βklkili 
where β଴ =
ୟబ∗ ାஓ౟
∗
ଵି஡
; β୩ =
ୟౡାୟౡ
∗
ଵି஡
; β୪ =
ୟౢାୟౢ
∗
ଵି஡
; β୩୩ =
ୟౡౡାୟౡౡ
∗
ଵି஡
; β୪୪ =
ୟౢౢାୟౢౢ
∗
ଵି஡
; β୩୪ =
ୟౡౢାୟౡౢ
∗
ଵି஡
 .  
As the common factor tests are mostly rejecting as shown in the result section, I will focus 
on the long term coefficients. As variables are in the log form, slope coefficients reflect 
the percentage change in output with respect to a percentage change in input. With the 
translog production function, the output elasticities of capital and labour depend on the 
input levels. Specifically, the output elasticity of capital is β୩ + 2β୩୩k୧ + β୩୪l୧ ; and 
output elasticity of labour is β୪ + 2β୪୪l୧ + β୩୪k୧ .   
                                                 
49 The necessity of assuming error terms following the first-order autoregressive process was stressed by 
Blundell and Bond (2000) who applied the system GMM to estimate the production function of US 
manufacturing firms. Our dynamic transformation is extended from that of Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) 
as we use a translog function. 
50 Equation 3.2 is the result of subtracting the lagged values of each term in equation 3.1 times ρ, then 
moving the term ρyit-1 to the right hand side. 
51 Equation 3.3 is basically equation 3.1 without the restriction set in equation 3.2. 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
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The problem in estimating equation 3.2 is that the firm characteristics in γi*, and possibly 
error terms vit*, correlate with the regressors. The fixed effects estimators of equation 3.2 
are downward biased and OLS estimators are upward biased (Eberhardt and Helmers 
2010).52 Unfortunately, we are interested in the output elasticity of capital, which, in our 
set up, depends on several different coefficients, and the estimation of these coefficients 
could be biased in different directions. Hence we could not tell whether the true elasticity 
is bound by the ones estimated by OLS and fixed effects or not.  
In order to get a consistent estimation of rate of return, I use the system general method 
of moment (GMM), which combines the difference GMM, also known as the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) method, and the level GMM, also known as Blundell and Bond (1998) 
method, to estimate equation 3.2 first. GMM is the most common approach for dynamic 
models (Harris et al. 2008, p. 255) and one big advantage of these methods is that we can 
find instruments within the dataset and the validity of the instruments can be tested 
(Eberhardt and Helmers 2010). 
The difference GMM includes differencing the original model (equation 3.2) to eliminate 
γi* and use lags of regressors as instruments in the differenced model. As I assume vit and 
uit to be serially uncorrelated, the error term in equation 3.2 (vit*) follows the first order 
moving average process. That means a change in vit* does not correlate with output and 
input levels three periods before time t (although it could correlate with those in time t, t-
1 and t-2).53 In other words, output and input levels in time t-s with s equal or above 3 
were realized before any productivity shock or determination of material input in time t, 
t-1 and t-2, thus third-and-above lagged output, capital and labour could be valid 
instruments in the first-differencing transformation of equation 3.2. Hence, estimating the 
model using the difference GMM method in the presence of transient measurement errors 
that potentially correlated with inputs requires a panel with at least four waves of data. In 
case of no measurement error, var(vit)=0, vit* is just white noise, then second-period 
lagged variables could be valid instruments too (Blundell and Bond 2000). I estimate the 
model as if there is no measurement error first, then relax this assumption if I found 
evidence against it. 
                                                 
52 This is true if the regressors are positively autocorrelated and their coefficients are positive. If one of 
these conditions change, the direction of bias will change accordingly (Harris et al. 2008, p. 253). 
53 The moment conditions for difference GMM in the presence of measurement errors are E(Zit-s∆vit*)=0 
for t≥3 and s≥3, where Z=(y, k, l). If there is no measurement error, the moment conditions are 
E(Zit-s∆vit*)=0 for t≥3 and s≥2. We still allow simultaneity between output and inputs. 
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However, the result from the difference GMM is often unsatisfactory due to the lack of 
correlation between instruments and regressors after differencing (Harris et al. 2008, 
p.259). In our case, dependent and independent variables are highly persistent (Table 3.5). 
It means the lagged level variables contain little information about the current first 
differences.  
Table 3.5 Correlation coefficients between key variables and their lags 
 yit kit lit 
First lag 0.87 0.93 0.95 
Second lag 0.84 0.90 0.92 
Third lag 0.76 0.86 0.88 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
The reduced form regressions of the first differenced variables on the corresponding 
lagged levels show the insignificant slope coefficients, except for the second lagged 
variable, although they are jointly significant (the first four columns in Appendix 3.14). 
This could lead to the weak instrument finite sample bias in the first-differenced GMM 
estimation, similar to the experiment with the US manufacturing firms by Blundell and 
Bond (2000).  
The level GMM, which uses lags of first differences of regressors as instruments in the 
original model, may help to alleviate this problem, if the lagged differences of regressors 
do not correlate with the firm characteristics.54 The lags of first differences significantly 
correlate with the level variables jointly and separately (the last four columns in Appendix 
3.14). The system GMM combines the moments used by the difference GMM and the 
level GMM to exploit as much information as possible. 
In the following section, I will present the results of applying the above described model 
(equation 3.2) to the panel data of enterprises in Vietnam using the difference and system 
GMM estimators. Estimated results using the OLS and fixed effects estimators also 
included for comparison. The estimated coefficients will then be used to get the output 
elasticities of capital and labour for the different ownership types. 
                                                 
54  The moment conditions for level GMM are E(∆Zit-s(γi* + vit*))=0 for t≥3 and s≥2 (in case of no 
measurement error, we just require s≥1), where Z=(y, k, l).  
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Comparing results from different estimators 
The estimation of the unrestricted form of equation 3.2 using pooled OLS and fixed 
effects estimators supports the assumption that output follows a stationary autoregressive 
process with the coefficient on the lagged output being in (0,1) (Appendix 3.1). The 
coefficient on the lagged output in the fixed effects model is lower than the one in the 
OLS, for the whole sample as well as for the sub-samples by ownership. This matches 
with the assumption of unobserved firm-specific effect. As we expect the lagged output 
to be positively correlated with the current output in the AR(1) model, OLS estimation 
would be biased upward and fixed effects estimation biased downward, being the upper 
and lower bounds of the real value. Results from the fixed effects estimation also show 
that most of variation in output is caused by variation in the firm fixed effect term, 
confirming the need to control for fixed effects.55 The signs of the coefficients on the 
contemporaneous variables and their lags are generally opposite, consistent with the 
assumption of AR(1) process of unobserved output shocks. 
As the OLS and fixed effects estimates are biased due to endogeneity, I turn to GMM 
estimation. Assuming no measurement error, I use the levels of labour, capital and output 
from period t-2 and before as instruments in the first differenced equations, and the 
differenced variables from period t-1 and before as instruments in the levels equations 
(the first 8 columns in Appendix 3.2). As the first differenced residuals are ∆uit = uit - uit-
1, we expect the Arellano-Bond tests do not reject AR(1) and reject AR(2) specification. 
This is true for SOEs and FDIs, though the p-value of AR(2) tests in system GMM 
estimations are quite low. However, this does not happen for the PRI sub-sample (and the 
whole sample as such).  
I estimate the model for PRIs using variables from period t-3 and before (column 9 and 
10 in Appendix 3.2) but still cannot reject the AR(2) specification. In separate estimations 
for large PRI (having 25 or more employees), I found strong evidence to reject AR(2) 
specification in the first differenced residuals (column 12 and 14 in Appendix 3.2), while 
I fail to reject AR(2) specification in estimations for small PRI (having less than 25 
                                                 
55 The fraction of variance due to the fixed effects is from 77 to 81 per cent, depending on ownership types. 
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employees) (column 11 and 13 in Appendix 3.2).56 Our explanation is there are significant 
serially correlated measurement errors in data for PRIs, possibly caused by the 
extrapolated information for small enterprises as mentioned in section 3.2 about data and 
measurement. 
The estimated coefficients on the lagged output and the capital from difference GMM are 
generally lower and less precise than those from system GMM, as expected with weak 
instruments (Blundell and Bond 2000). We will pay attention to results from system 
GMM, which seem to be more reliable. 
The problem is that the Hansen tests for validity of the instruments are strongly rejecting 
in all estimates in Appendix 3.2, except that of FDIs using difference GMM. Blundell and 
Bond (2000) were also faced with rejection for both AR(2) and over-identifying tests for 
(t-2) instruments. Their untested hypothesis is there are serially correlated measurement 
errors, whose effects happen to be offset by similarly serially correlated productivity 
shocks. The difference in our case is the over-identifying tests for (t-3) instruments are 
also rejected. 
In efforts to identify the source of the problem, I run estimations separately for 14 types 
of ownership. Estimation results using pooled OLS, fixed effects, difference GMM and 
system GMM for 14 types of ownership are included in Appendix 3.3 to Appendix 3.6. 
As noted above, I focus on the results from system GMM in Appendix 3.6.  
We do not reject AR(1) across types of ownership.57 The AR(2) tests are rejecting in all 
estimates, except those for private limited and private enterprises, which are the most 
numerous groups of enterprises (Appendix 3.6). When I estimate for the sub-samples of 
large private limited and private enterprises (having 25 employees or more), I could reject 
AR(2) at ten per cent level of significance, except for the private enterprises (the first five 
columns in Appendix 3.11). Thus, the data problem are likely concentrated in small 
private limited enterprises with less than 25 employees and in private enterprises. 
                                                 
56 We choose 25 employees to be the cut-off as this is the average number of employees in PRIs over 2000-
2010. Thus large PRIs are in effect PRIs that are bigger than the average. 
57 One exception is partnership. However, the estimation for this sub-sample are not reliable as the number 
of partnerships are smaller than the number of instruments. This “too many instruments” problem leads to 
over-fitted model and an “implausibly good” Hansen test p-values of 1.000 (Roodman 2009). As the 
number of partnerships is negligible compared to other types of ownership, we are not going to discuss 
results of this sub-sample.   
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The Hansen test are rejecting for several sub-samples of PRIs (Appendix 3.6).  When I 
relax the assumption of no measurement error, thus restricting the instrument set to (t-3) 
variables, the Hansen tests do not reject for limited or joint stock enterprises with state 
capital accounting for less than or equal 50 per cent of charter capital, private enterprises 
and cooperatives. However, the AR(2) test for private limited enterprises does not reject 
either (Appendix 3.11). Arellano-Bond and Hansen tests are to help evaluating the 
validity of the instrument set, and it seems that we cannot satisfy both of them in our 
models for large PRIs. Looking at the estimated coefficients on the lagged output (Table 
3.6), those from system GMM with (t-2) variables as instruments are more likely falling 
in between the values from pooled OLS and fixed effects, compared to the estimated 
coefficients from system GMM with (t-3) variables as instruments. Hence, we are in 
favour of results from system GMM using second lags (t-2) which pass the Arellano-
Bond tests than the system GMM using third lags (t-3).58 
Table 3.6 Estimated coefficients on the lagged output for large PRIsa 
 Limited or joint 
stock - state 
capital ≤50% 
Private 
limited 
Private 
joint stock 
Private 
enterprise Cooperative 
Pooled OLS 0.704*** 0.440*** 0.372*** 0.540*** 0.560*** (0.016) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
Fixed 
effects 
0.146*** 0.015*** -0.066*** 0.115*** 0.050*** 
(0.021) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
System 
GMM (t-2) 
0.374*** 0.196*** 0.157*** 0.237*** 0.297*** 
(0.049) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.032) 
System 
GMM (t-3) 
0.445*** 0.490*** 0.375*** 0.561*** 0.362*** 
(0.092) (0.027) (0.040) (0.042) (0.059) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aLarge PRIs are those with the average number of employees equal 25 or above. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. 
I also estimate equation 3.2 separately for SOEs, PRIs, and FDIs in each of the ten broad 
industries in order to control for the possible impact of the relative concentration of state 
investment in some industries (Appendix 3.7 to Appendix 3.10). The AR(1) tests do not 
reject and the AR(2) tests reject in all models for SOEs and PRIs, except for PRIs in the 
construction industry. Hansen tests strongly reject the validity of instrument sets in 
estimations for PRIs in all industries (Appendix 3.10). Robustness check for large PRIs 
show better results of specification tests, though the Hansen tests still reject in models for 
                                                 
58 Notably, “Arellano and Bond find that their test has greater power than the Sargan and Hansen tests to 
detect lagged instruments being made invalid through autocorrelation” (Roodman 2009, p121). 
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large PRIs in manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and transportation 
and communication (Appendix 3.12). 
As the number of FDIs are lower than the number of instruments in estimations for all 
industries except manufacturing and real estate and business activities, we will need to 
restrict the number of instruments by using the average of available instruments 
(“collapse”) or restrict the lag ranges instead of the full available set as suggested by 
Roodman (2009, p.108). In our case, “collapse” helps reduce the number of instruments 
more than restricting the lag ranges. Even so, if using collapsed instruments, the number 
of instruments is still higher than the number of FDIs in the mining and utilities industry, 
leading to bias toward OLS estimations (Roodman 2009, p.99). We have the same 
problem of too many instruments for SOEs in mining and utilities, hotels and restaurants, 
financial intermediation, and other services. Estimation results with collapsed instruments 
for those enterprises are reported in Appendix 3.13. 
3.5.2 Output elasticities of capital and labour 
With the estimated coefficients for the dynamic model in equation 3.2, I can recover the 
coefficients for the original static production function, then calculate output elasticities of 
capital and labour. As the common factor restrictions are mostly rejected (Appendix 3.2), 
I use the long-run solution of equation 3.2 to estimate the coefficients of the static model 
as explained in the methodology section. Results are reported in the following tables 
(from Table 3.7 to Table 3.10).  For results from GMM estimators, those passing the 
specification tests (Arellano-Bond tests and Hansen J test) are underlined. 
According to results from OLS estimators, FDIs have the highest output elasticity of 
capital, followed by SOEs. Among PRIs, large PRIs (at least 25 employees) have higher 
output elasticity of capital. FDIs also have the highest output elasticity of labour, though 
not significantly higher than that of PRIs. SOEs appear to have the lowest output elasticity 
of labour (column 1-5, Table 3.7). 
When controlling for fixed effects, the differences in output elasticity of capital among 
the three types of ownership become less significant but those in output elasticity of 
labour expand. SOEs have the highest average estimated output elasticity of capital, 
followed by FDIs. PRIs still have the lowest output elasticity of capital and SOEs have 
the lowest output elasticity of labour (column 6-10, Table 3.7). 
 69 
 
With GMM estimators, all estimations fail the specification tests, except the one for FDIs 
using difference GMM. However the estimated output elasticity of capital of FDIs is 
insignificant, which might come from using weak instruments as discussed earlier.  
The rejection by Hansen tests is a sign of unspecified models, not necessarily the use of 
the inexogenous instruments. That the Hansen tests fail to reject in many estimates of 
sub-samples of ownership by industries is evidence that assuming enterprises share the 
same slope coefficients across industries (implied by the estimations for the whole 
sample) might be too restrictive. 
When comparing output elasticity of capital among 14 types of ownership (Table 3.9), 
the rankings are different with different estimators. This confirms that we might get 
misleading results if we fail to control for fixed effects and endogenous variables. Results 
from difference GMM are much less precise than those from system GMM – a 
consequence of weak instruments. We focus on results from system GMM, which are 
potentially consistent. However, results for only five types of SOEs and two types of FDIs 
are considered valid by specification tests.  
Within these seven types of ownership, on average, the limited or joint stock enterprises 
with state capital accounting for more than 50 per cent of the charter capital have the 
highest output elasticity of capital. The joint ventures between SOEs and FDIs have the 
output elasticity of capital generally higher than that of wholly SOEs. The joint ventures 
between PRI and FDI have the lowest ranking among the seven types of ownership with 
valid estimations.  
One important implication here is that SOEs are heterogeneous enterprises in terms of 
capital use. Hence, policies aiming at improving capital efficiency need to take this into 
account. Although we do not have enough evidence to compare output elasticity of capital 
between the state and non-state sectors, the restructuring within SOE sector toward 
allowing diversified ownership may help improve the sector’s overall efficiency. Within 
the state sector, central SOEs seem having the lowest output elasticity of capital, closely 
followed by local SOEs. Thus central and local SOEs should be the key targets of the 
needed reform to improve the state sector’s capital efficiency.  
Unfortunately, we could not compare output elasticity of capital and labour of the 14 
types of ownership by industries as this would require a much larger number of 
enterprises. However, we could generally do so for the three broad types of ownership: 
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SOEs, PRIs, and FDIs (Table 3.10). The relative difference among the three types of 
ownership in the output elasticity of capital changes from one industry to another.  
SOEs seem to have the output elasticity of capital significantly lower than those of non-
state enterprises in agriculture, mining and utilities, and financial intermediation 
industries. These are also the three industries that SOEs account for more than 50 per cent 
of total capital of each industry and have the largest market shares (as shown in the section 
about performance of enterprises by ownership). It is possible that easy access to capital 
and oligopoly power of SOEs in these industries allow them to operate under the average 
efficiency level.  
With an average SOE, one per cent increase in capital stock would create about 0.3 per 
cent increase in revenue in the agriculture as well as the mining and utilities industries, 
and 0.2 per cent increase in revenue in the financial intermediation industry. The 
corresponding numbers for an average PRI are much higher. One per cent increase in 
capital spent in PRIs would create about 0.5 per cent increase in revenue (0.7 if investing 
in large PRIs) in the mining and utilities and the financial intermediation industries, and 
more than one per cent increase in revenue in the agriculture industry (Table 3.10). This 
suggests switching social investment from state sector to non-state sector in these 
industries would improve the overall investment efficiency, especially in the agriculture 
industry. 
SOEs in the wholesale and retail trade industry seem to have the highest output elasticity 
of capital in comparison to non-state enterprises in the industry. The output elasticity of 
capital of SOEs in the wholesale and retail trade industry is also higher than those of 
SOEs in other industries. Athukorala (2006) mentioned wholesale and retail trade 
regulations favourable for SOEs, which could contribute to the high output elasticity of 
capital of SOEs in the wholesale and retail trade industry. However, discrimination 
among stakeholders in wholesale and retail trade is not sustainable, given the increasing 
integration of Vietnam into the international market.  In the other industries, the difference 
in output elasticity of capital among SOEs, PRIs, and FDIs is either not significant or we 
do not have enough information to be conclusive. 
In short, even with favourable treatments, the output elasticity of capital of SOEs are 
mostly lower than or similar to those of non-state enterprises. This does not match with 
their leading role as set by the Vietnam government. Efforts to improve the overall 
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efficiency in capital use should target the wholly SOEs and SOEs in agriculture, mining 
and utilities, and financial intermediation industries which have the relatively low output 
elasticity of capital. 
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Table 3.7 Long-term coefficients and output elasticity of capital and labour from pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators 
 Pooled OLS Fixed effectsa 
All SOE PRI Large PRIb FDI All SOE PRI Large PRIb FDI 
           
βk 0.305*** 0.532*** 0.347*** 0.304*** 0.264*** 0.258*** 0.312** 0.279*** 0.047 0.455*** 
(0.013) (0.103) (0.015) (0.028) (0.082) (0.018) (0.131) (0.020) (0.040) (0.139) 
βl 0.582*** 0.572*** 0.477*** 0.707*** 0.959*** 0.583*** 0.808*** 0.661*** 0.616*** 0.883*** 
(0.014) (0.114) (0.016) (0.050) (0.078) (0.019) (0.155) (0.021) (0.062) (0.118) 
βkk -0.000 -0.002 -0.005*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.023*** -0.003 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
βll -0.085*** -0.023 -0.084*** -0.045*** -0.054*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.010 -0.037*** 
(0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) 
βkl 0.073*** 0.015 0.087*** 0.016** 0.002 0.031*** 0.013 0.024*** -0.013* 0.013 
(0.003) (0.021) (0.003) (0.007) (0.013) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.007) (0.017) 
Output elasticity of capitalc  0.474*** 0.578*** 0.491*** 0.601*** 0.679*** 0.364*** 0.468*** 0.357*** 0.392*** 0.449*** 
(0.003) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.004) (0.024) (0.009) (0.008) (0.025) 
Output elasticity of labourc  0.709*** 0.489*** 0.507*** 0.471*** 0.513*** 0.583*** 0.452*** 0.532*** 0.429*** 0.691*** 
(0.005) (0.022) (0.008) (0.010) (0.018) (0.006) (0.028) (0.010) (0.010) (0.027) 
           
No. of observations 842,955 36,064 774,086 175,932 32,805 842,955 36,064 774,086 175,932 32,805 
CRSd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aFixed effects estimators are based on firm-specific effects. 
 bLarge PRIs are PRIs with the average number of employees equal or more than 25. 
cOutput elasticities are evaluated at the sample and sub-sample means of inputs over 2000-2010. 
dTest for constant return to scale (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. 
 73 
 
Table 3.8 Long-term coefficients and output elasticity of capital and labour from difference and system GMM estimators 
 Difference GMM (t-2)a System GMM (t-2)a 
All SOE PRI Large PRIb FDI All SOE PRI Large PRIb FDI 
           
βk 0.571*** 0.286 0.459*** -0.221* 0.233 0.284*** 0.502** 0.428*** 0.110 0.507 
(0.094) (0.383) (0.087) (0.113) (0.430) (0.076) (0.218) (0.086) (0.092) (0.323) 
βl 0.497*** 0.133 0.943*** 0.783*** -0.796** -0.207** 0.890*** -0.343*** -0.447*** 0.448* 
(0.107) (0.337) (0.112) (0.109) (0.398) (0.091) (0.290) (0.099) (0.096) (0.263) 
βkk -0.071*** -0.039* -0.042*** 0.043*** -0.062** -0.070*** -0.010 -0.072*** 0.017** -0.028 
(0.010) (0.022) (0.009) (0.008) (0.031) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) 
βll -0.323*** -0.129*** -0.324*** 0.021 -0.089** -0.396*** -0.087*** -0.373*** 0.038*** -0.136*** 
(0.016) (0.032) (0.016) (0.014) (0.036) (0.013) (0.033) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024) 
βkl 0.235*** 0.156*** 0.157*** -0.073*** 0.225*** 0.421*** 0.055 0.412*** 0.048** 0.140*** 
(0.020) (0.038) (0.020) (0.016) (0.057) (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.019) (0.038) 
Output elasticity of capitalc 0.090*** 0.294*** 0.209*** 0.208*** -0.012 0.263*** 0.589*** 0.312*** 0.595*** 0.560*** 
(0.021) (0.101) (0.021) (0.036) (0.099) (0.014) (0.040) (0.015) (0.015) (0.039) 
Output elasticity of labourc 0.678*** 0.400*** 0.619*** 0.339*** 0.642*** 0.988*** 0.558*** 0.942*** 0.273*** 0.637*** 
(0.046) (0.090) (0.049) (0.024) (0.094) (0.023) (0.056) (0.024) (0.016) (0.042) 
           
No. of observations 551,932 28,651 497,935 135,374 25,346 842,955 36,064 774,086 175,932 32,805 
CRSd 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aEstimation using second-and-above lagged level variables as instruments in first-differenced equations, and first-and-above lagged differenced variables as instruments in 
level equations, assuming no measurement error. Results are underlined if supported by specification tests for the corresponding estimations of the dynamic model (equation 3.2). 
 bLarge PRIs are PRIs with the average number of employees equal or more than 25. 
c Output elasticities are evaluated at the sample and sub-sample means of inputs over 2000-2010. 
dTest for constant return to scale (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Table 3.9 Output elasticity of capital and labour by 14 types of ownershipab 
 SOE PRI FDI 
 
Central 
SOE 
Local 
SOE 
Central 
SOE 
limited 
Local 
SOE 
limited 
Limited 
or joint 
stock - 
state 
capital 
>50% 
Limited 
or joint 
stock - 
state 
capital 
≤50% 
Private 
limited 
Private 
joint 
stock 
Private 
enterprise Cooperative Partnership 
Wholly 
FDI 
Joint 
SOE-
FDI 
Joint 
PRI-
FDI 
               
Pooled 
OLS 
              
Output 
elasticity 
of capital 
0.635*** 0.540*** 0.441*** 0.537*** 0.634*** 0.657*** 0.466*** 0.411*** 0.458*** 0.481*** 0.790*** 0.677*** 0.695*** 0.590*** 
(0.035) (0.026) (0.082) (0.079) (0.031) (0.026) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.145) (0.016) (0.042) (0.063) 
Output 
elasticity 
of labour 
0.472*** 0.578*** 0.689*** 0.504*** 0.433*** 0.460*** 0.817*** 0.910*** 0.703*** 0.632*** 0.716** 0.502*** 0.569*** 0.626*** 
(0.045) (0.034) (0.101) (0.112) (0.044) (0.036) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.020) (0.279) (0.019) (0.063) (0.076) 
CRSc 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.559 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fixed 
effect 
              
Output 
elasticity 
of capital 
0.592*** 0.360*** 0.445*** 0.474*** 0.533*** 0.508*** 0.407*** 0.373*** 0.344*** 0.310*** -0.194 0.441*** 0.437*** 0.609*** 
(0.045) (0.043) (0.096) (0.099) (0.043) (0.038) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.357) (0.027) (0.082) (0.107) 
Output 
elasticity 
of labour 
0.413*** 0.573*** 0.465*** 0.473*** 0.405*** 0.359*** 0.600*** 0.626*** 0.583*** 0.565*** 1.273 0.703*** 0.624*** 0.682*** 
(0.051) (0.048) (0.092) (0.118) (0.050) (0.043) (0.009) (0.022) (0.011) (0.024) (0.940) (0.028) (0.087) (0.101) 
CRSc 0.926 0.224 0.341 0.691 0.267 0.008 0.469 0.933 0.000 0.000 0.930 0.000 0.459 0.027 
Difference 
GMM 
              
Output 
elasticity 
of capital 
0.561*** 0.425*** 0.498*** 0.370** 0.380*** 0.249** 0.309*** -0.134** 0.117*** 0.368*** 0.448 0.042 0.226 0.477*** 
(0.106) (0.131) (0.127) (0.177) (0.097) (0.101) (0.030) (0.067) (0.028) (0.054) (0.460) (0.131) (0.153) (0.170) 
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Output 
elasticity 
of labour 
0.070 0.565*** 0.588*** 0.299 0.256** 0.142 -0.483*** 0.375*** 1.212*** 0.625*** 0.566 0.654*** 0.667*** 0.619** 
(0.136) (0.139) (0.126) (0.206) (0.112) (0.097) (0.062) (0.139) (0.062) (0.092) (0.913) (0.100) (0.205) (0.253) 
CRSc 0.010 0.961 0.368 0.272 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.936 0.985 0.001 0.478 0.721 
System 
GMM 
              
Output 
elasticity 
of capital 
0.492*** 0.500*** 0.638*** 0.554*** 0.710*** 0.573*** 0.260*** -0.043 0.522*** 0.486*** 0.633*** 0.596*** 0.554*** 0.479*** 
(0.074) (0.065) (0.110) (0.104) (0.051) (0.046) (0.019) (0.049) (0.020) (0.030) (0.177) (0.043) (0.091) (0.087) 
Output 
elasticity 
of labour 
0.678*** 0.760*** 0.558*** 0.454*** 0.380*** 0.602*** 0.958*** 1.323*** 0.675*** 0.972*** 1.044*** 0.621*** 0.659*** 0.589*** 
(0.099) (0.090) (0.149) (0.174) (0.078) (0.071) (0.029) (0.055) (0.030) (0.068) (0.375) (0.044) (0.109) (0.129) 
CRSc 0.017 0.000 0.021 0.938 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.001 0.528 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aGMM estimations using second-and-above lagged level variables as instruments in first-differenced equations, and first-and-above lagged differenced variables as instruments 
in level equations, assuming no measurement error. Results are underlined if supported by specification tests for the corresponding estimations of the dynamic model (equation 3.2). 
b Output elasticities are evaluated at the sample and sub-sample means of inputs over 2000-2010. 
cTest for constant return to scale (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Table 3.10 Output elasticities of capital and labour by ten broad industriesab 
 Agriculture Mining and utilities 
 All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI 
Pooled OLS           
Output elasticity of capital 0.441*** 0.459*** 0.449*** 0.552*** 0.777*** 0.513*** 0.524*** 0.472*** 0.661*** 0.669*** 
(0.019) (0.039) (0.022) (0.048) (0.177) (0.018) (0.057) (0.021) (0.025) (0.085) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.657*** 0.466*** 0.704*** 0.447*** 0.305 0.678*** 0.538*** 0.768*** 0.466*** 0.463*** 
(0.030) (0.054) (0.032) (0.101) (0.215) (0.029) (0.087) (0.036) (0.054) (0.154) 
CRSd 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.987 0.534 0.000 0.221 0.000 0.014 0.339 
Fixed effect           
Output elasticity of capital 0.449*** 0.340*** 0.474*** 0.400*** 0.483** 0.261*** 0.297*** 0.261*** 0.293*** 0.258 
(0.029) (0.069) (0.030) (0.061) (0.230) (0.024) (0.050) (0.026) (0.045) (0.189) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.474*** 0.425*** 0.472*** 0.317*** 0.456** 0.503*** 0.624*** 0.493*** 0.537*** 0.188 
(0.034) (0.071) (0.037) (0.090) (0.201) (0.042) (0.095) (0.045) (0.057) (0.283) 
CRSd 0.019 0.010 0.136 0.001 0.832 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.008 0.037 
Difference GMM           
Output elasticity of capital 0.843*** 0.520*** 0.758*** 0.699*** 0.452 0.200** 0.218** 0.186** 0.121 0.264 
(0.098) (0.147) (0.097) (0.119) (0.302) (0.081) (0.092) (0.091) (0.107) (0.322) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.407*** 0.268 0.342*** 0.269** 0.331 0.226 0.476*** 0.138 0.436*** 0.304 
(0.131) (0.214) (0.133) (0.132) (0.228) (0.192) (0.138) (0.158) (0.090) (0.566) 
CRSd 0.022 0.439 0.430 0.790 0.538 0.003 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.530 
System GMM           
Output elasticity of capital 1.074*** 0.280*** 1.137*** 1.231*** 0.552** 0.509*** 0.411*** 0.552*** 0.659*** 0.953 
 (0.079) (0.051) (0.073) (0.091) (0.221) (0.041) (0.084) (0.046) (0.040) (11.538) 
Output elasticity of labour -0.054 0.727*** 0.436*** 0.281 0.711*** 0.974*** 0.725*** 0.986*** 0.332*** 1.236 
 (0.151) (0.083) (0.164) (0.213) (0.262) (0.070) (0.077) (0.080) (0.080) (82.888) 
CRSd 0.830 0.916 0.000 0.003 0.130 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.899 0.987 
System GMM - collapsee           
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Output elasticity of capital  0.487***   0.972**  0.301***   0.380* 
 (0.138)   (0.428)  (0.116)   (0.199) 
Output elasticity of labour  0.631***   0.550  0.718***   0.753*** 
 (0.170)   (0.476)  (0.127)   (0.248) 
CRSd  0.357   0.079  0.855   0.569 
 Manufacturing Construction 
 All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI 
Pooled OLS           
Output elasticity of capital 0.649*** 0.622*** 0.643*** 0.649*** 0.733*** 0.476*** 0.526*** 0.465*** 0.595*** 0.608*** 
(0.007) (0.033) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.029) (0.008) (0.009) (0.120) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.551*** 0.568*** 0.587*** 0.440*** 0.442*** 0.634*** 0.518*** 0.640*** 0.488*** 0.669*** 
(0.009) (0.050) (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.008) (0.042) (0.009) (0.015) (0.166) 
CRSd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.029 
Fixed effect           
Output elasticity of capital 0.382*** 0.471*** 0.403*** 0.392*** 0.427*** 0.418*** 0.428*** 0.423*** 0.457*** 0.842*** 
(0.009) (0.034) (0.010) (0.012) (0.025) (0.011) (0.046) (0.012) (0.014) (0.151) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.571*** 0.534*** 0.553*** 0.466*** 0.665*** 0.420*** 0.343*** 0.428*** 0.333*** 0.587*** 
(0.011) (0.053) (0.013) (0.015) (0.028) (0.011) (0.048) (0.012) (0.014) (0.139) 
CRSd 0.000 0.934 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Difference GMM           
Output elasticity of capital -0.038 0.352*** 0.012 0.141*** 0.036 0.148*** 0.306*** 0.208*** 0.355*** 0.816*** 
(0.031) (0.098) (0.034) (0.046) (0.083) (0.048) (0.116) (0.047) (0.060) (0.223) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.706*** 0.039 0.514*** 0.333*** 0.768*** 0.160*** 0.221** 0.193*** 0.252*** 0.527*** 
(0.064) (0.147) (0.064) (0.043) (0.087) (0.053) (0.095) (0.062) (0.032) (0.197) 
CRSd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 
System GMM           
Output elasticity of capital 0.369*** 0.644*** 0.472*** 0.691*** 0.735*** 0.324*** 0.503*** 0.388*** 0.616*** 0.642*** 
 (0.022) (0.058) (0.024) (0.019) (0.048) (0.027) (0.077) (0.027) (0.024) (0.187) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.886*** 0.501*** 0.838*** 0.251*** 0.493*** 0.721*** 0.584*** 0.668*** 0.255*** 0.476** 
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 (0.031) (0.081) (0.036) (0.027) (0.044) (0.029) (0.099) (0.030) (0.028) (0.242) 
CRSd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.092 0.141 0.067 0.000 0.470 
System GMM - collapsee           
Output elasticity of capital  0.963***   0.631***  0.674***   0.452* 
 (0.146)   (0.119)  (0.234)   (0.232) 
Output elasticity of labour  0.135   0.656***  0.119   0.440* 
 (0.199)   (0.115)  (0.248)   (0.236) 
CRSd  0.467   0.027  0.402   0.626 
 Wholesale and retail trade Hotels and restaurants 
 All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI 
Pooled OLS           
Output elasticity of capital 0.494*** 0.769*** 0.497*** 0.747*** 0.888*** 0.214*** 0.366*** 0.208*** 0.215*** 0.143 
(0.007) (0.050) (0.007) (0.019) (0.089) (0.010) (0.115) (0.010) (0.030) (0.124) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.637*** 0.317*** 0.635*** 0.370*** 0.456*** 1.099*** 0.863*** 1.099*** 0.970*** 1.200*** 
(0.010) (0.070) (0.010) (0.052) (0.149) (0.016) (0.130) (0.018) (0.058) (0.193) 
CRSd 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fixed effect           
Output elasticity of capital 0.398*** 0.636*** 0.396*** 0.435*** 0.483** 0.166*** 0.308*** 0.172*** 0.188*** 0.098 
(0.007) (0.068) (0.007) (0.029) (0.227) (0.015) (0.086) (0.016) (0.038) (0.197) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.628*** 0.316*** 0.635*** 0.429*** 0.364 0.692*** 0.932*** 0.672*** 0.633*** 0.969*** 
(0.011) (0.086) (0.011) (0.051) (0.268) (0.023) (0.101) (0.023) (0.065) (0.150) 
CRSd 0.015 0.620 0.003 0.009 0.419 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.001 0.792 
Difference GMM           
Output elasticity of capital 0.470*** 0.843*** 0.494*** 0.385*** 0.470 -0.011 0.364** 0.137*** 0.244*** 0.048 
(0.025) (0.176) (0.026) (0.062) (0.297) (0.071) (0.146) (0.044) (0.094) (0.211) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.649*** -0.064 0.541*** 0.219*** 0.512 0.440*** 0.999*** 0.441*** 0.452*** 1.050*** 
(0.062) (0.120) (0.066) (0.046) (0.406) (0.076) (0.181) (0.096) (0.080) (0.275) 
CRSd 0.043 0.253 0.578 0.000 0.951 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.721 
System GMM           
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Output elasticity of capital 0.427*** 0.957*** 0.439*** 0.777*** 1.051*** 0.128*** 0.440** 0.166*** 0.155*** 0.043 
 (0.019) (0.144) (0.019) (0.027) (0.109) (0.035) (0.180) (0.036) (0.052) (0.086) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.756*** 0.249 0.723*** 0.099** 0.344** 1.387*** 0.913*** 1.366*** 0.697*** 1.485*** 
 (0.029) (0.212) (0.028) (0.040) (0.163) (0.048) (0.213) (0.052) (0.073) (0.142) 
CRSd 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.039 0.000 
System GMM - collapsee           
Output elasticity of capital  1.357***   0.648**  0.140   0.113 
 (0.315)   (0.308)  (0.292)   (0.092) 
Output elasticity of labour  0.419   0.476  1.429**   1.327*** 
 (0.375)   (0.464)  (0.604)   (0.154) 
CRSd  0.036   0.716  0.172   0.000  
 Transportation and communication Financial intermediation 
 All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI 
Pooled OLS           
Output elasticity of capital 0.516*** 0.542*** 0.494*** 0.501*** 0.658*** 0.453*** 0.579*** 0.451*** 0.756*** 0.543*** 
(0.015) (0.078) (0.015) (0.024) (0.095) (0.026) (0.057) (0.042) (0.046) (0.058) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.655*** 0.376*** 0.719*** 0.318*** 0.646*** 1.135*** 0.379*** 1.096*** 0.314*** 0.482*** 
(0.021) (0.089) (0.023) (0.041) (0.123) (0.062) (0.112) (0.093) (0.073) (0.056) 
CRSd 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.619 0.000 0.220 0.651 
Fixed effect           
Output elasticity of capital 0.334*** 0.314*** 0.329*** 0.324*** 0.683*** 0.350*** 0.415*** 0.335*** 0.662*** 0.572*** 
(0.017) (0.054) (0.017) (0.030) (0.172) (0.034) (0.127) (0.043) (0.096) (0.098) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.671*** 0.535*** 0.684*** 0.517*** 0.650*** 0.440*** 0.628*** 0.406*** 0.055 0.665*** 
(0.025) (0.082) (0.027) (0.040) (0.127) (0.065) (0.128) (0.076) (0.162) (0.099) 
CRSd 0.813 0.066 0.584 0.000 0.063 0.001 0.754 0.000 0.008 0.023 
Difference GMM           
Output elasticity of capital 0.181*** 0.348*** 0.264*** 0.332*** 0.719*** 0.488*** 0.348*** 0.382*** 0.640*** 0.566*** 
(0.055) (0.099) (0.049) (0.124) (0.182) (0.074) (0.127) (0.079) (0.154) (0.109) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.555*** 0.572*** 0.680*** 0.423*** 0.692*** 0.423** 0.969*** 0.283 0.129 0.756*** 
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(0.087) (0.134) (0.090) (0.091) (0.160) (0.181) (0.167) (0.198) (0.196) (0.152) 
CRSd 0.012 0.568 0.593 0.069 0.084 0.652 0.041 0.134 0.228 0.035 
System GMM           
Output elasticity of capital 0.515*** 0.627*** 0.492*** 0.505*** 0.782*** 0.506*** 0.242*** 0.476*** 0.671*** 0.446*** 
 (0.035) (0.084) (0.034) (0.029) (0.153) (0.037) (0.084) (0.044) (0.090) (0.050) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.785*** 0.373*** 0.863*** 0.249*** 0.517*** 0.979*** 0.763*** 0.995*** 0.355** 0.578*** 
 (0.053) (0.127) (0.053) (0.036) (0.184) (0.081) (0.166) (0.104) (0.145) (0.108) 
CRSd 0.000 0.997 0.000 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.967 0.000 0.759 0.804 
System GMM - collapsee           
Output elasticity of capital  0.470***   0.879***  0.219**   0.543*** 
 (0.118)   (0.311)  (0.108)   (0.070) 
Output elasticity of labour  0.658***   0.343  0.839***   0.536*** 
 (0.191)   (0.240)  (0.286)   (0.140) 
CRSd  0.359   0.269  0.785   0.561 
 Real estate and business activities Other services 
 All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI All SOE PRI Large PRIc FDI 
Pooled OLS           
Output elasticity of capital 0.396*** 0.448*** 0.368*** 0.384*** 0.582*** 0.311*** 0.344*** 0.267*** 0.402*** 0.435*** 
(0.010) (0.059) (0.010) (0.024) (0.044) (0.025) (0.084) (0.025) (0.035) (0.083) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.986*** 0.597*** 0.964*** 0.771*** 0.791*** 0.972*** 0.609*** 0.997*** 0.864*** 0.731*** 
(0.016) (0.088) (0.016) (0.045) (0.069) (0.038) (0.099) (0.042) (0.085) (0.107) 
CRSd 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.606 0.000 0.000 0.028 
Fixed effect           
Output elasticity of capital 0.286*** 0.500*** 0.288*** 0.210*** 0.504*** 0.203*** 0.105** 0.220*** 0.167*** 0.294** 
(0.015) (0.064) (0.016) (0.047) (0.066) (0.034) (0.052) (0.039) (0.049) (0.122) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.782*** 0.405*** 0.765*** 0.615*** 0.767*** 0.865*** 0.604*** 0.833*** 0.484*** 1.158*** 
(0.029) (0.101) (0.029) (0.051) (0.123) (0.059) (0.116) (0.067) (0.091) (0.103) 
CRSd 0.013 0.376 0.055 0.007 0.024 0.232 0.004 0.397 0.000 0.004 
Difference GMM           
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Output elasticity of capital 0.218*** 0.380*** 0.401*** 0.380*** 0.373*** 0.113 0.057 0.257*** 0.148** 0.338* 
(0.052) (0.110) (0.076) (0.121) (0.137) (0.079) (0.078) (0.096) (0.072) (0.197) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.025 0.389*** 0.109 0.313*** 0.301 0.808*** 0.469*** 0.724*** 0.609*** 1.145*** 
(0.140) (0.135) (0.134) (0.097) (0.207) (0.137) (0.175) (0.155) (0.138) (0.115) 
CRSd 0.000 0.175 0.001 0.001 0.069 0.599 0.002 0.912 0.053 0.019 
System GMM           
Output elasticity of capital 0.286*** 0.543*** 0.336*** 0.426*** 0.421*** 0.197*** 0.433*** 0.251*** 0.426*** 0.304* 
 (0.025) (0.082) (0.027) (0.037) (0.072) (0.050) (0.119) (0.051) (0.064) (0.166) 
Output elasticity of labour 0.858*** 0.560*** 0.798*** 0.587*** 0.962*** 1.127*** 0.596*** 0.993*** 0.689*** 0.727*** 
 (0.048) (0.112) (0.047) (0.051) (0.109) (0.084) (0.136) (0.096) (0.117) (0.187) 
CRSd 0.002 0.135 0.004 0.783 0.000 0.000 0.814 0.004 0.185 0.865 
System GMM - collapsee           
Output elasticity of capital  0.363   0.632***  0.227   0.274 
 (0.295)   (0.191)  (0.208)   (0.195) 
Output elasticity of labour  0.756**   0.824***  0.856***   0.803*** 
 (0.344)   (0.220)  (0.244)   (0.174) 
CRSd  0.613   0.009  0.698   0.713 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aGMM estimations using second-and-above lagged level variables as instruments in first-differenced equations, and first-and-above lagged differenced variables as instruments 
in level equations, assuming no measurement error. Results are underlined if supported by specification tests for the corresponding estimations of the dynamic model (equation 3.2). 
bOutput elasticities are evaluated at the sample and sub-sample means of inputs over 2000-2010. 
cLarge PRIs are PRIs with the average number of employees equal or more than 25. 
dTest for constant return to scale (p-value). 
eRobustness check: results from system GMM estimators with collapsed instruments. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. 
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3.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
Resource misallocation among heterogeneous firms has recently been recognized as an 
important cause of countries’ different growth levels. Our paper focuses on the 
preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises, a considerable source of capital 
misallocation in Vietnam. The Government recognized the necessity of SOEs reform and 
set it as one of the three pillars in the national development plan for 2011-2015 (Doan 
2012).  
It should be noted that while the widely-cited macroeconomic statistics show the 
investment inefficiency of the state sector, it does not necessarily mean SOEs, which are 
just a part of the state sector. In order to assess the possible capital misallocation caused 
by SOEs, I use the enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. The large scale panel data 
with more than 1.4 million observations allow us to estimate the dynamic translog 
production functions for each of the 14 types of ownership and for SOEs, PRIs, and FDIs 
in each of the ten broad industries. Hence, I could compare the output elasticity of capital 
among different stakeholders, controlling for labour input and firm fixed effects, while 
accommodating the dynamic aspect and the endogeneity of input use.     
From 2000 to 2010, the number of SOEs decreased while the real capital used by SOEs 
kept expanding. SOEs had the largest average scale and were catching up with FDIs in 
capital intensity. SOEs enjoy uncontrolled easy access to capital, borrowing more than a 
half of their capital stock and accounting for the majority of the gross non-performing 
loans. SOEs generally had lower revenue per unit of capital than PRIs, contributing to 
rising investment inefficiency. However, this relationship was reversed in 2010, possibly 
due to the hard time for PRIs in late 2000s.  
Among SOEs, limited or joint stock companies with state capital accounting for more 
than 50 per cent of the charter capital had the highest revenue per unit of capital. Estimates 
of the translog production function using the dynamic panel estimator confirm that this 
type of SOE has the higher output elasticity of capital than the 100 per cent state-owned. 
The most profitable SOEs tend to be retained instead of being equitized.59 Thus we have 
reason to believe that equitization has helped to improve the enterprise’s efficiency. 
                                                 
59 This observation is according to Mr. Truong Dinh Tuyen, the former minister of trade, as quoted by Vo 
(2014). 
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Further research is however needed to confirm the effectiveness of equitization on firm 
performance, controlling for the initial conditions before equitization. 
SOEs are heterogeneous in terms of capital use. Hence, policies aiming at improving 
capital efficiency need to take this into account. Just “attract capital without giving up 
state control” (Sjöholm 2006) may still lead to a positive result. Central and local SOEs 
should be the key targets of the needed reform to improve the state sector’s capital 
efficiency as they appear to have the lowest output elasticity of capital. This supports the 
Government’s plan to restructure SOEs in 2011-2015, which focuses on the big central 
SOEs.  
Notably, it seems that state capital is pouring into the mining and utilities and the financial 
intermediation industries. SOEs generally have monopoly power in the mining and 
utilities. For example, SOEs account for 97 per cent in revenue from coal, 94 per cent in 
revenue from electricity and gas, and 90 per cent in revenue from water supply (World 
Bank 2011a). Financial intermediation industry attracted a lot of investment from state-
owned general corporations in 2007-2011, together with real estate (Doan 2012).  
Meanwhile, SOEs have the significantly lower output elasticity of capital than those of 
non-state enterprises in the mining and utilities, the financial intermediation industries, 
and in agriculture. Thus transferring capital from SOEs to PRIs in these industries would 
help increase capital efficiency.  
The most important policy to consider is removing favourable treatments for SOEs that 
operate for profit. Without distortions, the limited capital would flow to the most efficient 
users. SOEs would therefore have incentive to improve their own efficiency too. 
Besides, the role of SOEs as instruments in macroeconomic management has been 
criticized as creating distortion in input prices and resource allocation (Economic 
Committee of the National Assembly 2012). This results in ambiguity in the state 
management of SOEs and should be avoided. 
I also find evidence of shrinking PRIs with decreasing revenue per unit of capital, which 
is quite alarming, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. For the next step, I will use 
the estimated coefficients of the translog production function for types of ownership in 
different industries to build a computable general equilibrium model for Vietnam. This 
model could be mobilized to quantify the possible impact of transferring capital from 
state-owned to non-state-owned enterprises.   
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Figure 3.1 Share of the state sector in the gross national investment and GDP from 
1976 to 2012 
 
Source: GSO (2007) - Data from 1986 to 2005, GSO (2014) - Data from 2006 to 2012 
 
Figure 3.2 Number of enterprises by the number of years in the panel 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
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Figure 3.3 Share of SOEs, PRIs, and FDIs in total capital by industry in 2000 and 
2010 (per cent) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data in 2000 and 2010 
 
Figure 3.4 Share of SOEs, PRIs, and FDIs in total revenue by industry in 2000 and 
2010 (per cent) 
 
 Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data in 2000 and 2010 
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Figure 3.5 Allocation of capital for SOEs to ten broad industries in 2000, 2005 and 
2010 (per cent) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data in 2000, 2005 and 2010 
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Figure 3.6 Average employment, real capital, real revenue and real capital per 
worker by ownership from 2000 to 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
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Figure 3.7 Average share of equity in total capital by ownership (per cent) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
 
 
Dependant variable: Share of equity in total 
capital 
(1) (2) 
Year 2000 Year 2010 
   
Dummy equals 1 if PRIs and 0 otherwise 0.340*** 0.079*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Dummy equals 1 if FDIs and 0 otherwise 0.085*** -0.146*** 
 (0.014) (0.031) 
Constant 0.433*** 0.448*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
   
Observations 42,250 285,704 
R-squared 0.128 0.004 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.8 Distribution of share of equity in total capital by scale of capital in 2010 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data in 2010 
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Dependant variable: Share of equity in total 
capital in 2010 
(1) (2) 
1st_quantile 5th_quantile 
   
Dummy equals 1 if PRIs and 0 otherwise 0.187 -0.037*** 
 (0.120) (0.006) 
Dummy equals 1 if FDIs and 0 otherwise -1.252*** -0.019** 
 (0.426) (0.009) 
Constant 0.512*** 0.428*** 
 (0.120) (0.006) 
   
Observations 57,124 57,130 
R-squared 0.013 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.9 The difference in average revenue per unit of capital between SOEs and 
PRIs divided by the average revenue per unit of capital of PRIs by industries in 2000 
and 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
 
Figure 3.10 Relationship between the revenue per unit of capital and the real capital, 
and between the revenue per worker and the number of employment 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 
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Appendix 3.1 Results of estimating equation 3.2 using pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators 
 Pooled OLS Fixed effectsa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
         
yt-1 0.496*** 0.759*** 0.484*** 0.526*** 0.057*** 0.308*** 0.043*** 0.124*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.009) 
kt 0.470*** 0.297* 0.508*** 0.524*** 0.356*** 0.348** 0.379*** 0.447** 
 (0.014) (0.170) (0.014) (0.156) (0.018) (0.177) (0.019) (0.218) 
kt-1 -0.316*** -0.169 -0.329*** -0.399** -0.112*** -0.132 -0.111*** -0.049 
 (0.013) (0.171) (0.013) (0.157) (0.013) (0.134) (0.014) (0.167) 
lt 0.609*** 0.608*** 0.642*** 1.017*** 0.572*** 0.702*** 0.633*** 0.800*** 
 (0.014) (0.136) (0.015) (0.124) (0.018) (0.144) (0.020) (0.167) 
lt-1 -0.315*** -0.470*** -0.396*** -0.562*** -0.022* -0.144 -0.001 -0.026 
 (0.013) (0.138) (0.014) (0.125) (0.012) (0.125) (0.013) (0.128) 
kt2 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.004 -0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.016) 
kt-12 0.012*** -0.003 0.012*** 0.006 0.002* -0.001 0.003*** -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.013) 
lt2 -0.079*** -0.063*** -0.080*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.038*** 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.012) 
lt-12 0.036*** 0.057*** 0.037*** 0.024** 0.003* 0.017 0.001 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.009) 
kt lt 0.049*** 0.037** 0.044*** 0.005 0.020*** 0.016 0.014*** 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.024) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.012*** -0.033* 0.000 -0.004 0.009*** -0.006 0.009*** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.019) 
Constant 1.225*** 0.275** 1.371*** 0.761** 3.459*** 1.977*** 3.339*** 1.434** 
 (0.059) (0.129) (0.061) (0.339) (0.056) (0.519) (0.063) (0.590) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummiesb Yes Yes Yes Yes na. na. na. na. 
         
No. of observations 842,955 36,064 774,086 32,805 842,955 36,064 774,086 32,805 
No. of enterprises na. na. na. na. 288,454 7,420 275,847 7,466 
R-squared 0.750 0.923 0.700 0.872 0.222 0.401 0.216 0.400 
Comfacc 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aFixed effects estimators are based on firm-specific effects; 
 bIndustry dummies are based on 4-digit industry codes; 
cTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
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Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Appendix 3.2 Results of estimating equation 3.2 using GMM estimatorsa 
 Difference GMM (t-2) System GMM (t-2) Difference GMM 
(t-3) 
System GMM 
(t-3) 
Difference GMM (t-2) System GMM (t-2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI PRI PRI Small PRIb Large PRIb Small PRIb Large PRIb 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
               
yt-1 0.188*** 0.278*** 0.182*** 0.209*** 0.228*** 0.503*** 0.219*** 0.272*** 0.389*** 0.469*** 0.191*** 0.144*** 0.189*** 0.194*** 
 (0.004) (0.031) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.024) (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
kt 0.230** 0.815* 0.158 0.200 0.574*** 1.043*** 0.753*** 0.826 0.423* 0.660*** 0.523*** -0.150 1.576*** 0.246 
 (0.107) (0.488) (0.104) (0.406) (0.120) (0.290) (0.146) (0.537) (0.217) (0.158) (0.123) (0.159) (0.160) (0.165) 
kt-1 0.234*** -0.608* 0.217*** -0.016 -0.354*** -0.794*** -0.418*** -0.457 -0.195 -0.777*** -0.086 -0.039 -0.800*** -0.157 
 (0.053) (0.312) (0.053) (0.216) (0.076) (0.285) (0.092) (0.438) (0.144) (0.135) (0.056) (0.091) (0.087) (0.115) 
lt -0.465*** 0.616 -0.233 -0.776* -1.243*** 1.284*** -1.377*** 0.604* -1.154*** -1.229*** 0.897*** 0.592*** 0.797*** -0.878*** 
 (0.130) (0.438) (0.142) (0.433) (0.140) (0.324) (0.156) (0.355) (0.252) (0.224) (0.114) (0.155) (0.116) (0.152) 
lt-1 0.869*** -0.520* 1.005*** 0.147 1.084*** -0.842*** 1.109*** -0.277 1.342*** 1.392*** 0.230*** 0.079 -0.293*** 0.517*** 
 (0.066) (0.292) (0.075) (0.208) (0.083) (0.266) (0.094) (0.275) (0.251) (0.182) (0.066) (0.086) (0.064) (0.095) 
kt2 -0.066*** -0.037 -0.046*** -0.060** -0.128*** -0.020 -0.133*** -0.049 -0.105*** -0.160*** -0.030*** 0.039*** -0.110*** 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.010) (0.029) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.038) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
kt-12 0.008 0.008 0.011** 0.011 0.074*** 0.016 0.077*** 0.029 0.072*** 0.135*** 0.015*** -0.002 0.068*** -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.016) (0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.034) (0.014) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
lt2 -0.426*** -0.110*** -0.427*** -0.081** -0.548*** -0.126*** -0.526*** -0.127*** -0.487*** -0.778*** -0.266*** 0.033* -0.270*** 0.061*** 
 (0.018) (0.035) (0.019) (0.038) (0.016) (0.037) (0.017) (0.032) (0.030) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.014) (0.020) 
lt-12 0.164*** 0.017 0.163*** 0.011 0.242*** 0.082*** 0.234*** 0.028 0.312*** 0.497*** 0.080*** -0.015 0.129*** -0.030*** 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.028) (0.010) (0.023) (0.033) (0.022) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) 
kt lt 0.453*** 0.093** 0.406*** 0.219*** 0.675*** 0.049 0.663*** 0.144*** 0.628*** 0.857*** 0.136*** -0.057*** 0.126*** 0.081*** 
 (0.025) (0.039) (0.026) (0.055) (0.027) (0.044) (0.029) (0.055) (0.040) (0.039) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.262*** 0.019 -0.278*** -0.040 -0.350*** -0.021 -0.342*** -0.042 -0.512*** -0.610*** -0.107*** -0.005 -0.040*** -0.042*** 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029) (0.016) (0.034) (0.017) (0.045) (0.034) (0.030) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
Constant n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.538*** 0.016 2.236*** 1.136 n.a. 2.364*** n.a. n.a. -0.267 4.201*** 
 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. (0.154) (0.546) (0.178) (1.114) n.a. (0.202) n.a. n.a. (0.274) (0.336) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummiesc n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes Yes Yes n.a. Yes n.a. n.a. Yes Yes 
               
No. of observations 551,932 28,651 497,935 25,346 842,955 36,064 774,086 32,805 497,935 774,086 362,561 135,374 598,154 175,932 
No. of enterprises 163,793 6,339 153,520 5,887 288,454 7,420 275,847 7,466 153,520 275,847 128,455 43,166 244,118 57,574 
AR1d 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2e 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.332 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.859 0.000 0.334 
Hansenf 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Comfacg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.670 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 
No. of instruments 419 391 419 407 483 455 483 471 365 423 419 418 483 482 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aResults reported for two-step estimators with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance matrix;  
bSmall PRI include PRIs with the average number of employees less than 25; and large PRI include PRIs with the average number of employees equal or more than 25 
cIndustry dummies are based on 1-digit codes and included in level equations only;  
dArellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
eArellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
fHansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value); 
gTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Appendix 3.3 Results of estimating equation 3.2 using pooled OLS estimators for 14 types of ownership 
  SOE PRI FDI 
 All 
Central 
SOE 
Local 
SOE 
Central 
SOE 
limited 
Local 
SOE 
limited 
Limited or 
joint stock - 
state capital 
>50% 
Limited or 
joint stock - 
state capital ≤ 
50% 
Private 
limited 
Private 
joint stock 
Private 
enterprise Cooperative Partnership 
Wholly 
FDI 
Joint 
SOE-FDI 
Joint 
PRI-FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                
yt-1 0.496*** 0.773*** 0.772*** 0.640*** 0.800*** 0.666*** 0.704*** 0.440*** 0.372*** 0.540*** 0.560*** 0.153* 0.501*** 0.613*** 0.576*** 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.012) (0.071) (0.027) (0.022) (0.016) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.089) (0.010) (0.036) (0.031) 
kt 0.470*** 0.687** 0.220 0.732* 0.045 1.135*** 0.225 0.622*** 0.452*** 0.514*** 0.187*** 0.425 0.460** -0.811* 0.675* 
 (0.014) (0.281) (0.178) (0.412) (0.258) (0.332) (0.165) (0.023) (0.043) (0.029) (0.035) (0.420) (0.181) (0.436) (0.356) 
kt-1 -0.316*** -0.546* -0.113 -0.696* 0.021 -0.885*** -0.178 -0.451*** -0.377*** -0.364*** -0.113*** -0.505 -0.318* 0.856* -0.693** 
 (0.013) (0.290) (0.179) (0.415) (0.219) (0.329) (0.169) (0.020) (0.038) (0.025) (0.034) (0.379) (0.183) (0.436) (0.325) 
lt 0.609*** 0.209 0.781*** 0.434 0.689** 0.603* 0.586*** 0.775*** 0.802*** 0.478*** 0.608*** 0.027 1.065*** 1.720*** 0.628** 
 (0.014) (0.262) (0.147) (0.359) (0.276) (0.319) (0.169) (0.023) (0.046) (0.033) (0.050) (1.117) (0.138) (0.444) (0.255) 
lt-1 -0.315*** -0.032 -0.651*** -0.068 -0.595** -0.467 -0.292* -0.340*** -0.275*** -0.284*** -0.202*** 1.431 -0.575*** -1.278*** -0.145 
 (0.013) (0.258) (0.144) (0.340) (0.264) (0.327) (0.166) (0.021) (0.041) (0.029) (0.050) (0.995) (0.137) (0.441) (0.285) 
kt2 -0.012*** -0.015 0.016* -0.021 0.015 -0.045*** 0.006 -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 0.013*** 0.049 0.011 0.035 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.009) (0.028) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.042) (0.014) (0.026) (0.021) 
kt-12 0.012*** 0.017 -0.018** 0.027 -0.014 0.038** -0.000 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.015*** -0.001 0.040 0.000 -0.028 0.017 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.009) (0.025) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.040) (0.014) (0.026) (0.022) 
lt2 -0.079*** -0.065** -0.026* -0.067 -0.001 -0.087*** -0.072*** -0.098*** -0.116*** -0.066*** -0.022*** 0.217 -0.040*** -0.229*** -0.061** 
 (0.002) (0.032) (0.015) (0.051) (0.037) (0.029) (0.020) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.184) (0.011) (0.041) (0.025) 
lt-12 0.036*** 0.064* 0.018 0.060 -0.004 0.069** 0.045** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.005 -0.111 0.021* 0.185*** 0.018 
 (0.002) (0.036) (0.015) (0.041) (0.039) (0.028) (0.019) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.188) (0.011) (0.039) (0.033) 
kt lt 0.049*** 0.068*** -0.021 0.063 -0.027 0.068** 0.044 0.043*** 0.064*** 0.051*** -0.010 -0.085 -0.010 0.106* 0.044 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.017) (0.064) (0.049) (0.032) (0.030) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.185) (0.020) (0.062) (0.034) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.012*** -0.073*** 0.029* -0.066 0.032 -0.050 -0.036 -0.001 -0.011 -0.010** 0.004 -0.113 0.002 -0.089 -0.032 
 (0.002) (0.026) (0.016) (0.050) (0.047) (0.033) (0.029) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.191) (0.021) (0.058) (0.045) 
Constant 1.225*** -0.391 0.430** 1.542* 0.422 0.739** 0.618** 0.880*** 1.633*** 1.282*** 0.866*** -0.295 0.728** 1.358** 0.763 
 (0.059) (0.289) (0.186) (0.809) (0.459) (0.331) (0.291) (0.280) (0.318) (0.345) (0.080) (1.325) (0.364) (0.544) (0.841) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                
No. of observations 842,955 10,301 14,891 905 2,093 7,874 11,541 379,241 87,788 247,723 47,594 199 25,504 4,186 3,115 
R-squared 0.750 0.925 0.920 0.947 0.949 0.889 0.913 0.661 0.642 0.735 0.770 0.809 0.865 0.924 0.852 
Comfacb 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.344 0.949 0.037 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.326 0.012 0.000 0.012 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aIndustry dummies are based on 4-digit industry codes; 
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bTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. 
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Appendix 3.4 Results of estimating equation 3.2 using fixed effects estimators for 14 types of ownershipa 
  SOE PRI FDI 
 All 
Central 
SOE 
Local 
SOE 
Central 
SOE 
limited 
Local 
SOE 
limited 
Limited or 
joint stock - 
state capital 
>50% 
Limited or 
joint stock - 
state capital 
<=50% 
Private 
limited 
Private 
joint 
stock 
Private 
enterprise Cooperative Partnership 
Wholly 
FDI 
Joint 
SOE-FDI 
Joint 
PRI-FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                
yt-1 0.057*** 0.337*** 0.281*** 0.088 0.191*** 0.075** 0.146*** 0.015*** -0.066*** 0.115*** 0.050*** 0.045 0.112*** 0.181*** 0.146*** 
 (0.002) (0.023) (0.020) (0.077) (0.040) (0.034) (0.021) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.118) (0.009) (0.036) (0.035) 
kt 0.356*** 0.620*** 0.188 0.475 1.077* 1.495*** 0.176 0.598*** 0.366*** 0.474*** 0.082* 0.594 0.474* -0.244 0.314 
 (0.018) (0.233) (0.285) (0.667) (0.585) (0.287) (0.216) (0.032) (0.060) (0.036) (0.043) (0.764) (0.261) (0.501) (0.593) 
kt-1 -0.112*** -0.241 -0.056 -0.034 0.403 -0.628** -0.033 -0.133*** -0.148*** -0.078*** -0.130*** -0.375 -0.076 0.664* -0.358 
 (0.013) (0.204) (0.175) (0.399) (0.308) (0.262) (0.150) (0.022) (0.051) (0.024) (0.034) (0.486) (0.195) (0.369) (0.354) 
lt 0.572*** 0.459* 1.010*** 0.302 0.655 1.036*** 0.519*** 0.631*** 0.611*** 0.446*** 0.640*** -0.190 0.830*** 0.347 0.711* 
 (0.018) (0.244) (0.175) (0.413) (0.411) (0.370) (0.178) (0.033) (0.059) (0.034) (0.064) (1.562) (0.190) (0.507) (0.387) 
lt-1 -0.022* 0.214 -0.028 0.423 -0.413 -0.358 -0.024 -0.003 0.004 0.025 0.052 1.537 -0.019 -0.294 0.150 
 (0.012) (0.187) (0.145) (0.342) (0.320) (0.449) (0.132) (0.021) (0.050) (0.024) (0.051) (1.504) (0.142) (0.391) (0.321) 
kt2 -0.000 -0.006 0.022 -0.032 -0.031 -0.046*** 0.020 -0.013*** -0.006 -0.012*** 0.018*** -0.073 0.002 -0.002 0.010 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.013) (0.036) (0.031) (0.016) (0.015) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.065) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) 
kt-12 0.002* 0.007 -0.006 -0.000 -0.028 0.024* 0.001 0.004** 0.008* 0.001 0.011*** -0.015 -0.002 -0.024 0.011 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.008) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.047) (0.015) (0.023) (0.024) 
lt2 -0.048*** -0.054** -0.018 -0.137*** -0.010 -0.071** -0.011 -0.060*** -0.078*** -0.048*** -0.021** -0.213 -0.026* -0.179*** -0.088** 
 (0.002) (0.023) (0.018) (0.031) (0.062) (0.031) (0.019) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.265) (0.013) (0.045) (0.035) 
lt-12 0.003* 0.023 -0.006 -0.022 0.007 0.023 0.014 -0.004 -0.008 0.003 0.008 -0.357 0.004 0.091*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.022) (0.016) (0.025) (0.054) (0.030) (0.015) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.279) (0.010) (0.032) (0.028) 
kt lt 0.020*** 0.035 -0.048** 0.144*** -0.013 0.009 -0.012 0.018*** 0.040*** 0.036*** -0.008 0.293 -0.006 0.173** 0.057 
 (0.003) (0.024) (0.021) (0.042) (0.083) (0.033) (0.027) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.272) (0.027) (0.072) (0.056) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.009*** -0.040** 0.012 -0.017 0.029 0.008 -0.010 0.016*** 0.022** -0.003 -0.006 0.059 0.005 -0.058 -0.014 
 (0.002) (0.020) (0.016) (0.025) (0.048) (0.030) (0.021) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.237) (0.021) (0.050) (0.040) 
Constant 3.459*** 0.294 1.532* 1.500 -2.896 -0.175 3.627*** 2.744*** 3.795*** 2.983*** 3.137*** 2.835 1.393** 3.066 2.644 
 (0.056) (1.062) (0.931) (3.097) (2.659) (1.490) (0.906) (0.109) (0.236) (0.107) (0.202) (3.161) (0.663) (1.979) (2.641) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                
No. of observations 842,955 10,301 14,891 905 2,093 7,874 11,541 379,241 87,788 247,723 47,594 199 25,504 4,186 3,115 
No. of enterprises 288,454 2,403 3,546 384 774 2,326 3,680 150,681 41,310 71,509 14,835 107 6,103 766 968 
R-squared 0.222 0.488 0.305 0.505 0.345 0.266 0.307 0.226 0.189 0.221 0.243 0.423 0.403 0.400 0.396 
Comfacb 0.000 0.001 0.070 0.083 0.076 0.210 0.894 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.305 0.000 0.000 0.015 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aFixed effects estimators are based on firm-specific effects; 
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bTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Appendix 3.5 Results of estimating equation 3.2 using difference GMM estimators for 14 types of ownershipa 
  SOE PRI FDI 
 All 
Central 
SOE 
Local 
SOE 
Central 
SOE 
limited 
Local 
SOE 
limited 
Limited or 
joint stock - 
state capital 
>50% 
Limited or 
joint stock - 
state capital 
<=50% 
Private 
limited 
Private 
joint 
stock 
Private 
enterprise Cooperative Partnership 
Wholly 
FDI 
Joint 
SOE-FDI 
Joint 
PRI-FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                
yt-1 0.188*** 0.283*** 0.319*** -0.071 0.178*** 0.122** 0.144*** 0.135*** 0.112*** 0.232*** 0.221*** -0.220 0.191*** 0.087* 0.255*** 
 (0.004) (0.047) (0.041) (0.089) (0.050) (0.052) (0.043) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.224) (0.018) (0.052) (0.053) 
kt 0.230** 0.366 1.311*** -0.655 -0.138 0.988* -0.364 0.136 0.118 1.450*** -0.510*** 1.191** -0.567 1.062** 0.531 
 (0.107) (0.348) (0.502) (0.607) (0.619) (0.531) (0.305) (0.166) (0.423) (0.180) (0.127) (0.600) (0.621) (0.512) (0.805) 
kt-1 0.234*** -0.398 -0.867** 0.558 0.157 0.332 -0.003 0.237*** 0.203 -0.276*** -0.209*** -0.348 0.182 -0.001 -0.253 
 (0.053) (0.290) (0.346) (0.440) (0.381) (0.396) (0.238) (0.087) (0.201) (0.083) (0.072) (0.925) (0.227) (0.466) (0.360) 
lt -0.465*** 0.746 0.869** 0.231 0.013 0.318 -0.035 -1.917*** -1.750*** -0.194 0.863*** 1.899 0.325 -0.770 -0.879 
 (0.130) (0.557) (0.435) (0.393) (0.628) (0.811) (0.319) (0.252) (0.429) (0.189) (0.246) (1.934) (0.470) (0.886) (0.753) 
lt-1 0.869*** -0.002 -0.335 0.005 -0.187 -0.154 0.076 1.418*** 0.538** 1.010*** -0.129 -0.521 -0.168 0.176 0.114 
 (0.066) (0.327) (0.333) (0.481) (0.386) (0.785) (0.230) (0.119) (0.224) (0.105) (0.106) (1.963) (0.192) (0.588) (0.363) 
kt2 -0.066*** -0.002 -0.037* 0.026 0.001 -0.056** 0.038* -0.017 -0.075*** -0.161*** 0.077*** -0.044 0.010 -0.099*** -0.046 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.022) (0.031) (0.039) (0.029) (0.022) (0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.011) (0.071) (0.051) (0.035) (0.042) 
kt-12 0.008 0.014 0.025 -0.032 -0.022 -0.017 -0.005 0.006 0.000 0.050*** 0.011 0.013 -0.008 0.024 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.106) (0.016) (0.031) (0.025) 
lt2 -0.426*** -0.117** -0.033 -0.081** -0.061 -0.137** 0.029 -0.150*** -0.214*** -0.401*** 0.001 -0.273 -0.076 -0.152** -0.100 
 (0.018) (0.054) (0.047) (0.036) (0.059) (0.058) (0.039) (0.025) (0.058) (0.021) (0.035) (0.330) (0.056) (0.071) (0.078) 
lt-12 0.164*** 0.024 0.003 -0.030 -0.052 0.036 -0.010 0.121*** 0.068** 0.093*** 0.003 0.030 0.018 0.066 -0.033 
 (0.010) (0.032) (0.029) (0.040) (0.071) (0.052) (0.034) (0.014) (0.027) (0.012) (0.017) (0.258) (0.023) (0.046) (0.059) 
kt lt 0.453*** 0.065 -0.010 0.105*** 0.085 0.132** -0.005 0.307*** 0.411*** 0.455*** -0.046 0.000 0.096 0.255** 0.236** 
 (0.025) (0.049) (0.062) (0.038) (0.093) (0.065) (0.051) (0.039) (0.078) (0.031) (0.028) (0.304) (0.087) (0.109) (0.105) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.262*** -0.032 0.025 0.038 0.066 -0.027 -0.004 -0.278*** -0.121*** -0.259*** 0.004 0.054 -0.006 -0.075 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.040) (0.033) (0.064) (0.059) (0.039) (0.021) (0.042) (0.019) (0.015) (0.355) (0.031) (0.076) (0.056) 
Year dummies Yes. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 551,932 7,914 11,317 785 1,866 6,769 9,649 230,051 49,248 176,456 32,419 112 19,544 3,465 2,337 
No. of enterprises 163,793 2,109 3,091 327 705 1,987 3,017 76,718 19,585 47,219 11,449 57 4,791 651 733 
AR1b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.001 0.000 
AR2c 0.000 0.513 0.435 0.185 0.664 0.236 0.296 0.001 0.203 0.061 0.614 0.161 0.371 0.072 0.108 
Hansend 0.000 0.035 0.285 0.821 0.761 0.145 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.676 0.527 0.611 
Comface 0.000 0.090 0.123 0.617 0.862 0.152 0.975 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.953 0.650 0.215 0.655 
No. of instruments 419 372 378 287 344 381 398 417 391 419 388 104 394 314 302 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes: aResults reported for two-step estimators with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance matrix;  
bArellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
cArellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
dHansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value); 
eTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Appendix 3.6 Results of estimating equation 3.2 using system GMM estimators for 14 types of ownershipa 
  SOE PRI FDI 
 All 
Central 
SOE 
Local 
SOE 
Central 
SOE 
limited 
Local 
SOE 
limited 
Limited or 
joint stock - 
state capital 
>50% 
Limited or 
joint stock - 
state capital 
<=50% 
Private 
limited 
Private 
joint 
stock 
Private 
enterprise Cooperative Partnership 
Wholly 
FDI 
Joint 
SOE-FDI 
Joint 
PRI-FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                
yt-1 0.228*** 0.644*** 0.555*** 0.548*** 0.585*** 0.371*** 0.454*** 0.181*** 0.128*** 0.293*** 0.348*** 0.144 0.244*** 0.326*** 0.343*** 
 (0.004) (0.038) (0.034) (0.067) (0.051) (0.039) (0.037) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.119) (0.017) (0.059) (0.049) 
kt 0.574*** 0.440 0.999*** 0.583 -0.171 1.344** 0.572* -0.265 -1.655*** 2.804*** 0.165 0.027 0.606 0.926* 1.303** 
 (0.120) (0.408) (0.355) (0.530) (0.269) (0.550) (0.320) (0.185) (0.572) (0.210) (0.139) (0.357) (0.545) (0.542) (0.608) 
kt-1 -0.354*** -0.485 -0.914*** -0.569 0.253 -0.503 -0.652** -0.088 0.524 -1.379*** -0.145 -0.213 -0.121 -0.226 -1.359** 
 (0.076) (0.399) (0.323) (0.492) (0.226) (0.475) (0.305) (0.099) (0.351) (0.122) (0.091) (0.428) (0.422) (0.469) (0.589) 
lt -1.243*** 1.600*** 1.403*** 0.913* -0.009 0.348 0.715*** -1.102*** 0.972*** -1.229*** 1.649*** 1.098 1.065*** 0.295 0.625 
 (0.140) (0.463) (0.340) (0.468) (0.582) (0.570) (0.275) (0.198) (0.342) (0.164) (0.222) (1.311) (0.367) (0.748) (0.596) 
lt-1 1.084*** -0.874* -0.601* -0.332 -0.376 -0.259 0.033 1.041*** -0.343 0.590*** -0.404*** 0.643 -0.600** -0.083 0.332 
 (0.083) (0.450) (0.316) (0.372) (0.475) (0.544) (0.275) (0.113) (0.224) (0.108) (0.141) (1.352) (0.276) (0.597) (0.527) 
kt2 -0.128*** -0.007 0.006 -0.023 0.019 -0.060* -0.031 -0.050*** 0.029 -0.243*** 0.029** 0.002 -0.011 -0.096** -0.023 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.022) (0.029) (0.027) (0.033) (0.021) (0.016) (0.035) (0.018) (0.012) (0.044) (0.040) (0.043) (0.040) 
kt-12 0.074*** 0.010 0.013 0.023 -0.024 0.026 0.043** 0.043*** -0.001 0.128*** 0.004 0.038 -0.011 0.064* 0.056 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.021) (0.008) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008) (0.045) (0.031) (0.037) (0.044) 
lt2 -0.548*** -0.216*** -0.009 -0.165*** 0.034 -0.123** -0.159*** -0.475*** -0.481*** -0.202*** -0.106*** -0.366 -0.086*** -0.269*** 0.076 
 (0.016) (0.045) (0.040) (0.050) (0.061) (0.048) (0.042) (0.022) (0.036) (0.021) (0.031) (0.231) (0.032) (0.077) (0.067) 
lt-12 0.242*** 0.148*** 0.006 0.082** -0.024 0.076 0.070* 0.193*** 0.176*** 0.099*** 0.043** 0.025 -0.010 0.196*** -0.070 
 (0.010) (0.046) (0.027) (0.040) (0.068) (0.046) (0.042) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.019) (0.227) (0.020) (0.066) (0.065) 
kt lt 0.675*** 0.108*** -0.089* 0.110* 0.007 0.132** 0.129*** 0.588*** 0.398*** 0.419*** -0.043 0.229 0.053 0.309*** -0.051 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.053) (0.059) (0.075) (0.063) (0.048) (0.036) (0.054) (0.029) (0.031) (0.186) (0.058) (0.119) (0.086) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.350*** -0.081** 0.043 -0.059 0.041 -0.072 -0.089* -0.300*** -0.137*** -0.188*** -0.001 -0.134 0.033 -0.227** -0.015 
 (0.016) (0.035) (0.043) (0.049) (0.080) (0.053) (0.047) (0.020) (0.037) (0.019) (0.019) (0.165) (0.041) (0.100) (0.079) 
Constant 2.538*** 0.644*** 0.555*** 0.548*** 0.585*** 0.371*** 0.454*** 0.181*** 0.128*** 0.293*** 0.348*** 0.144 0.244*** 0.326*** 0.343*** 
 (0.154) (0.038) (0.034) (0.067) (0.051) (0.039) (0.037) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.119) (0.017) (0.059) (0.049) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummiesb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                
No. of observations 842,955 10,301 14,891 905 2,093 7,874 11,541 379,241 87,788 247,723 47,594 199 25,504 4,186 3,115 
No. of enterprises 288,454 2,403 3,546 384 774 2,326 3,680 150,681 41,310 71,509 14,835 107 6,103 766 968 
AR1c 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2d 0.000 0.295 0.093 0.541 0.627 0.417 0.377 0.000 0.576 0.000 0.082 0.558 0.110 0.779 0.047 
Hansene 0.000 0.027 0.015 0.996 0.741 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.591 0.273 
Comfacf 0.000 0.000 0.297 0.001 0.377 0.265 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.777 0.075 0.000 0.094 
No. of instruments 483 436 442 351 408 445 462 481 455 483 452 162 458 378 366 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aResults reported for two-step estimators with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance matrix; 
bIndustry dummies are based on 1-digit industry codes and included in level equations only; 
cArellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
dArellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
eHansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value); 
fTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Appendix 3.7 Result of estimating equation 3.2 using pooled OLS estimators for ten broad industries 
 Agriculture Mining and utilities Manufacturing Construction 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                 
yt-1 0.690*** 0.738*** 0.664*** 0.720*** 0.562*** 0.779*** 0.541*** 0.455*** 0.556*** 0.769*** 0.553*** 0.516*** 0.373*** 0.719*** 0.364*** 0.412*** 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.046) (0.012) (0.028) (0.013) (0.125) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.065) 
kt 0.416*** 0.559** 0.292*** 0.367 0.072 0.396 0.025 -1.476** 0.446*** 0.486 0.563*** 0.198 0.690*** 1.275*** 0.729*** 1.608** 
 (0.074) (0.249) (0.070) (0.588) (0.046) (0.313) (0.052) (0.664) (0.045) (0.385) (0.037) (0.226) (0.045) (0.393) (0.048) (0.672) 
kt-1 -0.240*** -0.274 -0.167** -0.941 -0.005 -0.399 0.022 1.598*** -0.278*** -0.398 -0.363*** -0.209 -0.353*** -1.343*** -0.405*** -0.435 
 (0.072) (0.268) (0.070) (0.604) (0.046) (0.311) (0.056) (0.575) (0.043) (0.388) (0.033) (0.237) (0.040) (0.382) (0.043) (0.681) 
lt 0.277*** 0.597** 0.222** 0.259 0.873*** 0.680 0.892*** -1.533 0.559*** 0.877*** 0.591*** 1.401*** 0.434*** 0.454 0.454*** 0.591 
 (0.066) (0.299) (0.097) (0.649) (0.073) (0.500) (0.080) (1.689) (0.033) (0.283) (0.033) (0.172) (0.035) (0.379) (0.038) (0.536) 
lt-1 -0.141** -0.847*** 0.025 0.510 -0.468*** -0.538 -0.449*** 1.838 -0.177*** -0.666** -0.214*** -0.816*** -0.260*** -0.140 -0.349*** -0.376 
 (0.063) (0.293) (0.096) (0.680) (0.073) (0.485) (0.080) (1.703) (0.032) (0.283) (0.030) (0.181) (0.031) (0.393) (0.032) (0.485) 
kt2 -0.006 -0.009 0.002 0.019 0.019*** -0.036* 0.022*** 0.037 -0.007* 0.003 -0.015*** 0.036** -0.031*** -0.045** -0.033*** -0.072 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.045) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.056) (0.004) (0.025) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.045) 
kt-12 -0.006 -0.017 -0.011* 0.047 -0.009* 0.045** -0.014** -0.030 0.016*** -0.001 0.021*** -0.012 0.015*** 0.051*** 0.017*** 0.011 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.048) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.052) (0.004) (0.025) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.045) 
lt2 -0.039*** -0.033 -0.053*** 0.035 -0.052*** -0.137*** -0.067*** -0.084 -0.056*** -0.030 -0.060*** -0.040*** -0.078*** -0.070** -0.077*** -0.101* 
 (0.011) (0.026) (0.015) (0.062) (0.012) (0.051) (0.013) (0.143) (0.004) (0.033) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.028) (0.004) (0.053) 
lt-12 -0.001 0.005 -0.015 0.007 0.023** 0.150*** 0.014 0.045 0.039*** 0.018 0.039*** 0.027** 0.016*** 0.038 0.016*** 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.028) (0.013) (0.079) (0.011) (0.048) (0.011) (0.134) (0.004) (0.033) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.027) (0.004) (0.050) 
kt lt 0.035** -0.010 0.056*** -0.012 -0.006 0.118*** 0.005 0.279 0.047*** -0.010 0.043*** -0.044* 0.063*** 0.054** 0.059*** 0.078 
 (0.015) (0.040) (0.016) (0.090) (0.015) (0.038) (0.016) (0.178) (0.007) (0.041) (0.006) (0.025) (0.007) (0.025) (0.007) (0.080) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.010 0.078* -0.002 -0.099 0.013 -0.134*** 0.023 -0.254 -0.051*** 0.015 -0.042*** 0.019 0.012** -0.036 0.024*** 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.041) (0.013) (0.102) (0.014) (0.036) (0.014) (0.178) (0.006) (0.041) (0.005) (0.026) (0.006) (0.025) (0.006) (0.080) 
Constant 0.448*** 0.830** 0.344*** 2.536** 1.175*** 1.045*** 1.216*** 1.855 0.741*** 0.396** 0.658*** 1.210*** 1.636*** 1.319*** 1.851*** -2.630 
 (0.082) (0.326) (0.130) (1.223) (0.101) (0.301) (0.157) (2.013) (0.056) (0.185) (0.065) (0.235) (0.081) (0.364) (0.094) (2.127) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
No. of observations 26,012 4,676 20,786 550 15,842 1,733 13,884 225 177,092 9,152 144,086 23,854 106,567 5,810 100,079 678 
R-squared 0.853 0.844 0.793 0.865 0.879 0.960 0.791 0.941 0.857 0.931 0.804 0.881 0.669 0.861 0.591 0.678 
Comfacb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.378 0.008 0.000 0.013 0.061 0.000 0.870 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.661 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Wholesale and retail trade Hotels and restaurants Transportation and communication Financial intermediation 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                 
yt-1 0.520*** 0.822*** 0.513*** 0.416*** 0.508*** 0.808*** 0.495*** 0.643*** 0.574*** 0.782*** 0.558*** 0.713*** 0.513*** 0.745*** 0.428*** 0.317*** 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.003) (0.060) (0.008) (0.030) (0.008) (0.040) (0.006) (0.026) (0.007) (0.036) (0.019) (0.032) (0.024) (0.054) 
kt 0.751*** 1.094*** 0.761*** 1.017** 0.210*** 0.313 0.228*** 0.165 0.354*** -0.256 0.424*** 1.321* 0.072 0.436 0.073 -0.156 
 (0.028) (0.263) (0.029) (0.393) (0.050) (0.361) (0.053) (0.502) (0.046) (0.662) (0.044) (0.716) (0.090) (0.383) (0.113) (0.724) 
kt-1 -0.472*** -0.876*** -0.492*** -0.612 -0.234*** -0.354 -0.217*** -0.372 -0.205*** 0.130 -0.191*** -0.992 -0.037 -0.154 -0.178 -0.657 
 (0.024) (0.260) (0.025) (0.450) (0.041) (0.339) (0.045) (0.441) (0.045) (0.668) (0.042) (0.673) (0.096) (0.352) (0.140) (0.556) 
lt 0.190*** 0.490** 0.187*** 1.190** 0.780*** 1.939*** 0.814*** -0.212 1.029*** 0.607 1.162*** 2.096*** 0.969*** 1.601*** 0.966*** 0.975 
 (0.037) (0.242) (0.039) (0.491) (0.065) (0.560) (0.067) (0.614) (0.058) (0.548) (0.054) (0.567) (0.147) (0.477) (0.194) (0.671) 
lt-1 -0.297*** -0.458* -0.383*** -0.640 -0.182*** -1.641*** -0.171*** 0.671 -0.621*** -0.276 -0.662*** -1.696*** -0.056 -1.644*** 0.070 0.256 
 (0.033) (0.235) (0.034) (0.445) (0.057) (0.574) (0.060) (0.541) (0.054) (0.589) (0.049) (0.547) (0.175) (0.479) (0.268) (0.640) 
kt2 -0.036*** -0.019 -0.037*** 0.001 -0.008 0.013 -0.009 -0.067 -0.002 0.015 -0.006 -0.020 0.015* 0.029 0.014 0.029 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.029) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.061) (0.004) (0.042) (0.004) (0.041) (0.009) (0.025) (0.011) (0.030) 
kt-12 0.020*** 0.007 0.020*** 0.007 0.018*** -0.002 0.017*** 0.062 0.006* 0.008 0.005 0.014 -0.000 -0.038 0.010 0.029 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.032) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.043) (0.004) (0.046) (0.003) (0.042) (0.011) (0.024) (0.017) (0.025) 
lt2 -0.138*** -0.028 -0.136*** -0.136 -0.044*** -0.075 -0.043*** -0.121 -0.085*** -0.065 -0.097*** -0.002 0.013 0.110 0.002 0.020 
 (0.005) (0.030) (0.005) (0.099) (0.010) (0.072) (0.010) (0.097) (0.008) (0.048) (0.007) (0.042) (0.022) (0.067) (0.032) (0.041) 
lt-12 0.053*** -0.006 0.058*** 0.104* 0.029*** 0.082 0.031*** 0.030 0.054*** 0.087* 0.059*** -0.018 -0.037 -0.113* -0.072 0.013 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.005) (0.056) (0.009) (0.070) (0.010) (0.088) (0.007) (0.048) (0.007) (0.041) (0.029) (0.067) (0.053) (0.039) 
kt lt 0.125*** 0.007 0.124*** 0.025 0.026* -0.071 0.020 0.227* 0.008 0.056 -0.002 -0.134* -0.042* -0.163** -0.041 -0.052 
 (0.006) (0.032) (0.007) (0.102) (0.013) (0.088) (0.013) (0.133) (0.008) (0.067) (0.009) (0.072) (0.025) (0.071) (0.032) (0.063) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.024*** 0.027 -0.013** -0.035 -0.025** 0.050 -0.026** -0.150* -0.004 -0.101 0.002 0.126* 0.013 0.177** 0.027 -0.036 
 (0.006) (0.029) (0.006) (0.071) (0.011) (0.087) (0.012) (0.087) (0.007) (0.075) (0.007) (0.073) (0.034) (0.071) (0.057) (0.058) 
Constant 2.087*** -0.384 2.222*** 0.724 1.243*** 0.571 1.118*** 2.128*** 1.131*** 1.048** 0.898*** -0.886 0.565*** 0.236 1.207*** 7.443*** 
 (0.056) (0.295) (0.060) (1.059) (0.064) (0.405) (0.078) (0.478) (0.213) (0.487) (0.188) (1.159) (0.149) (0.395) (0.245) (2.066) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
No. of observations 310,757 6,058 303,918 781 34,770 1,360 32,614 796 45,800 2,297 42,457 1,046 10,136 900 8,809 427 
R-squared 0.659 0.920 0.630 0.890 0.862 0.925 0.815 0.951 0.772 0.937 0.719 0.876 0.928 0.949 0.865 0.890 
Comfacb 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.253 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.595 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.164 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Real estate and business activities Other services 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
         
yt-1 0.370*** 0.660*** 0.336*** 0.518*** 0.444*** 0.796*** 0.396*** 0.539*** 
 (0.006) (0.044) (0.007) (0.028) (0.015) (0.031) (0.016) (0.075) 
kt 0.380*** 0.062 0.416*** 0.614*** 0.485*** -0.848 0.509*** 1.291*** 
 (0.034) (0.376) (0.034) (0.201) (0.056) (0.534) (0.057) (0.373) 
kt-1 -0.217*** -0.137 -0.193*** -0.394** -0.214*** 1.123** -0.137** -1.051** 
 (0.031) (0.349) (0.033) (0.194) (0.059) (0.484) (0.061) (0.421) 
lt 1.032*** -0.185 1.046*** 1.036*** 0.706*** 1.325*** 0.677*** 0.650 
 (0.049) (0.471) (0.049) (0.267) (0.083) (0.407) (0.089) (0.577) 
lt-1 -0.362*** 0.532 -0.398*** -0.525** -0.289*** -1.227*** -0.394*** -0.141 
 (0.046) (0.443) (0.046) (0.246) (0.083) (0.402) (0.089) (0.674) 
kt2 -0.006** -0.001 -0.008*** -0.010 -0.027*** 0.048 -0.029*** -0.076** 
 (0.003) (0.021) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.034) (0.004) (0.033) 
kt-12 0.010*** 0.015 0.008*** 0.009 0.010* -0.059* 0.001 0.072* 
 (0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.016) (0.006) (0.032) (0.006) (0.040) 
lt2 -0.066*** -0.075 -0.057*** -0.095*** -0.070*** -0.114** -0.066*** -0.054 
 (0.006) (0.052) (0.006) (0.036) (0.015) (0.046) (0.017) (0.054) 
lt-12 0.028*** 0.069 0.035*** 0.018 0.014 0.113** 0.026 0.019 
 (0.006) (0.045) (0.007) (0.036) (0.015) (0.046) (0.017) (0.058) 
kt lt 0.004 0.125** -0.006 0.027 0.057*** 0.020 0.055*** 0.076 
 (0.008) (0.049) (0.008) (0.040) (0.015) (0.063) (0.015) (0.084) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.011 -0.134*** 0.018** 0.007 -0.001 -0.017 0.018 -0.068 
 (0.007) (0.034) (0.008) (0.039) (0.015) (0.060) (0.016) (0.100) 
Constant 1.225*** 1.512*** 1.341*** 0.138 0.665*** -0.529 0.871*** 0.674 
 (0.079) (0.484) (0.096) (0.344) (0.171) (0.940) (0.211) (0.830) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummiesa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
No. of observations 55,128 2,042 49,642 3,444 9,881 984 8,293 604 
R-squared 0.623 0.876 0.542 0.795 0.777 0.933 0.675 0.860 
Comfacb 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.451 0.006 0.013 0.004 0.668 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aIndustry dummies are based on 4-digit industry codes; 
bTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Appendix 3.8 Result of estimating equation 3.2 using fixed effect estimators for ten broad industriesa 
 Agriculture Mining and utilities Manufacturing Construction 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                 
yt-1 0.050*** 0.265*** -0.054*** 0.185*** 0.048*** 0.273*** 0.035** 0.066 0.122*** 0.280*** 0.105*** 0.136*** -0.022*** 0.255*** -0.031*** -0.015 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.018) (0.039) (0.016) (0.040) (0.017) (0.071) (0.004) (0.027) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.043) (0.006) (0.072) 
kt 0.488*** 0.719** 0.285** -0.237 0.056 0.002 0.032 -1.558** 0.363*** 0.685* 0.420*** -0.023 0.331*** 1.421*** 0.364*** 3.315*** 
 (0.110) (0.332) (0.127) (0.656) (0.064) (0.420) (0.079) (0.694) (0.053) (0.356) (0.045) (0.272) (0.060) (0.530) (0.068) (0.747) 
kt-1 0.066 -0.406* 0.111 0.278 -0.002 -0.528 0.024 0.156 -0.138*** -0.034 -0.200*** 0.129 -0.184*** -1.458*** -0.255*** 0.573 
 (0.068) (0.240) (0.074) (0.798) (0.047) (0.328) (0.059) (0.854) (0.043) (0.331) (0.031) (0.228) (0.044) (0.431) (0.050) (0.586) 
lt 0.395*** 0.852*** 0.351** 0.722 0.478*** 0.794 0.572*** -1.250 0.592*** 1.110*** 0.629*** 1.137*** 0.491*** 0.476 0.567*** -1.569*** 
 (0.098) (0.308) (0.144) (0.725) (0.088) (0.620) (0.102) (1.481) (0.039) (0.330) (0.040) (0.225) (0.040) (0.381) (0.043) (0.567) 
lt-1 0.048 -0.669*** 0.200* 0.384 -0.127* -0.100 -0.081 2.420 -0.054* -0.324 0.034 -0.338** -0.015 -0.175 -0.030 -0.557 
 (0.061) (0.234) (0.114) (0.549) (0.077) (0.519) (0.086) (1.446) (0.030) (0.224) (0.028) (0.172) (0.032) (0.606) (0.034) (0.562) 
kt2 -0.009 -0.013 0.002 0.050 0.014* -0.020 0.019** 0.042 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.035* 0.002 -0.053** 0.001 -0.193*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.048) (0.007) (0.025) (0.008) (0.058) (0.005) (0.023) (0.004) (0.021) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.044) 
kt-12 -0.012** -0.004 -0.012* -0.008 -0.011* 0.037 -0.011* 0.044 0.003 -0.015 0.012*** -0.022 0.011*** 0.050*** 0.017*** -0.048 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.049) (0.005) (0.024) (0.006) (0.058) (0.004) (0.020) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.045) 
lt2 -0.044*** -0.037 -0.080*** -0.011 -0.028* -0.147*** -0.036** -0.042 -0.028*** -0.034 -0.031*** -0.028* -0.039*** -0.072*** -0.040*** -0.080** 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.022) (0.052) (0.016) (0.047) (0.017) (0.125) (0.005) (0.031) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.023) (0.005) (0.037) 
lt-12 -0.016 0.000 -0.040** 0.047 -0.014 0.055 -0.013 -0.009 0.011*** -0.021 0.012*** 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.049 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.019) (0.047) (0.012) (0.042) (0.013) (0.137) (0.004) (0.028) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.032) (0.004) (0.062) 
kt lt 0.032 -0.025 0.070*** -0.031 0.015 0.131*** 0.006 0.213 0.010 -0.023 0.005 -0.034 0.012 0.053* 0.003 0.281*** 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.025) (0.094) (0.018) (0.047) (0.019) (0.179) (0.008) (0.034) (0.007) (0.032) (0.008) (0.029) (0.008) (0.078) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.021 0.076* 0.021 -0.079 0.039*** -0.059 0.031* -0.266** -0.001 0.043 -0.013** 0.033 0.013** 0.023 0.017*** 0.116 
 (0.013) (0.042) (0.014) (0.065) (0.015) (0.054) (0.016) (0.127) (0.006) (0.030) (0.005) (0.024) (0.006) (0.033) (0.006) (0.099) 
Constant 1.210*** 2.232 2.045*** 1.741 3.687*** 5.777*** 3.374*** 12.551*** 2.922*** -0.832 2.781*** 2.789*** 4.023*** 4.660** 4.056*** -9.563** 
 (0.332) (1.425) (0.572) (3.849) (0.249) (1.366) (0.331) (3.584) (0.121) (1.025) (0.134) (0.713) (0.210) (2.011) (0.249) (4.126) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
No. of observations 26,012 4,676 20,786 550 15,842 1,733 13,884 225 177,092 9,152 144,086 23,854 106,567 5,810 100,079 678 
No. of enterprises 9,953 875 9,004 136 5,835 394 5,444 47 53,232 1,995 46,911 5,065 38,455 1,246 37,403 227 
R-squared 0.244 0.237 0.275 0.271 0.175 0.621 0.140 0.217 0.272 0.414 0.251 0.427 0.186 0.386 0.180 0.399 
Comfacb 0.020 0.009 0.033 0.321 0.057 0.003 0.224 0.335 0.000 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.850 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Wholesale and retail trade Hotels and restaurants Transportation and communication Financial intermediation 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                 
yt-1 0.054*** 0.398*** 0.048*** 0.198*** 0.093*** 0.256*** 0.087*** 0.199*** 0.077*** 0.232*** 0.072*** 0.155** 0.057** 0.245*** 0.031 0.069 
 (0.004) (0.032) (0.004) (0.042) (0.009) (0.062) (0.008) (0.040) (0.009) (0.047) (0.010) (0.069) (0.025) (0.055) (0.027) (0.055) 
kt 0.637*** 0.742** 0.650*** 1.487*** 0.112* 1.208*** 0.074 0.498 0.284*** 0.048 0.291*** 2.725*** -0.244** -0.134 -0.297** -1.224*** 
 (0.035) (0.341) (0.036) (0.359) (0.059) (0.413) (0.066) (0.511) (0.050) (0.403) (0.053) (0.942) (0.103) (0.319) (0.134) (0.312) 
kt-1 -0.080*** -0.457 -0.065** -0.902 -0.097*** -0.388 -0.125*** 0.141 -0.178*** 0.097 -0.168*** -1.607*** -0.171 -0.375 -0.293 -0.957*** 
 (0.025) (0.288) (0.026) (0.637) (0.037) (0.282) (0.041) (0.647) (0.039) (0.272) (0.042) (0.617) (0.141) (0.292) (0.196) (0.238) 
lt 0.253*** 0.517* 0.291*** 0.723 0.468*** 2.536*** 0.483*** -0.531 0.920*** 1.166*** 0.945*** 1.815*** 0.651*** 1.301*** 0.709*** 1.799*** 
 (0.048) (0.303) (0.051) (0.982) (0.090) (0.567) (0.092) (0.569) (0.062) (0.380) (0.067) (0.606) (0.181) (0.441) (0.243) (0.477) 
lt-1 0.049 -0.084 0.042 -0.858 0.054 -0.872** 0.050 0.972* -0.005 -0.322 -0.020 0.098 0.254 -0.044 0.173 0.586 
 (0.030) (0.245) (0.031) (0.784) (0.047) (0.396) (0.049) (0.520) (0.050) (0.354) (0.053) (0.416) (0.266) (0.299) (0.381) (0.399) 
kt2 -0.024*** -0.007 -0.025*** -0.037 0.000 -0.021 0.004 -0.080* 0.002 0.032 0.001 -0.092** 0.033*** 0.024 0.038*** 0.083*** 
 (0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.031) (0.007) (0.023) (0.008) (0.041) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004) (0.042) (0.010) (0.023) (0.014) (0.019) 
kt-12 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.013 0.009** -0.005 0.011*** 0.008 0.014*** -0.019 0.014*** 0.097** 0.020 0.019 0.026 0.051*** 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.041) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.034) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.039) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.013) 
lt2 -0.113*** -0.031 -0.118*** -0.068 0.001 -0.102 -0.000 -0.070 -0.054*** -0.007 -0.056*** -0.041 0.034 -0.092 0.022 0.084* 
 (0.006) (0.035) (0.007) (0.089) (0.013) (0.068) (0.013) (0.054) (0.009) (0.029) (0.009) (0.044) (0.028) (0.061) (0.045) (0.047) 
lt-12 -0.001 -0.045* 0.003 0.022 0.016** 0.018 0.015* -0.117 0.016** -0.003 0.019*** 0.085** -0.001 0.054 -0.010 0.047 
 (0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.055) (0.007) (0.048) (0.008) (0.079) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.042) (0.044) (0.055) (0.068) (0.033) 
kt lt 0.095*** 0.009 0.092*** 0.027 0.012 -0.107 0.009 0.186** -0.007 -0.059 -0.009 -0.085 -0.047 0.006 -0.054 -0.145** 
 (0.008) (0.037) (0.009) (0.137) (0.018) (0.086) (0.018) (0.076) (0.009) (0.037) (0.010) (0.064) (0.031) (0.067) (0.042) (0.057) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.005 0.037 0.005 0.050 -0.008 0.080 -0.006 0.013 -0.007 0.027 -0.006 -0.091 -0.027 -0.045 -0.011 -0.066 
 (0.006) (0.025) (0.006) (0.082) (0.008) (0.057) (0.009) (0.062) (0.007) (0.026) (0.007) (0.057) (0.054) (0.058) (0.078) (0.040) 
Constant 3.310*** 1.877 3.210*** 2.738 3.348*** -3.401** 3.521*** 1.176 3.174*** 2.395 3.117*** -4.515 5.103*** 5.767*** 5.601*** 15.407*** 
 (0.104) (1.460) (0.109) (3.487) (0.157) (1.702) (0.163) (4.090) (0.197) (1.454) (0.217) (4.155) (0.395) (1.212) (0.499) (1.717) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
No. of observations 310,757 6,058 303,918 781 34,770 1,360 32,614 796 45,800 2,297 42,457 1,046 10,136 900 8,809 427 
No. of enterprises 115,266 1,437 114,051 251 10,834 312 10,463 159 15,986 507 15,339 250 2,048 164 1,811 99 
R-squared 0.251 0.406 0.250 0.499 0.219 0.459 0.210 0.464 0.306 0.517 0.301 0.472 0.530 0.796 0.500 0.680 
Comfacb 0.000 0.327 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.092 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.691 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Real estate and business activities Other services 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
         
yt-1 -0.070*** 0.071 -0.090*** 0.067** -0.034 0.298*** -0.055** 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.095) (0.011) (0.033) (0.022) (0.048) (0.023) (0.060) 
kt 0.297*** -0.366 0.357*** 0.362 0.278*** -1.241*** 0.282*** 1.312** 
 (0.050) (0.436) (0.052) (0.270) (0.078) (0.341) (0.091) (0.509) 
kt-1 -0.021 0.573 0.013 -0.060 -0.196** 0.619** -0.208** -0.682 
 (0.041) (0.429) (0.044) (0.197) (0.080) (0.285) (0.095) (0.426) 
lt 0.819*** -0.449 0.954*** 0.594 0.927*** 1.321*** 1.027*** 0.081 
 (0.075) (0.424) (0.076) (0.367) (0.117) (0.386) (0.132) (0.653) 
lt-1 0.107** 0.484** 0.089 0.326 0.101 -0.203 0.052 1.477* 
 (0.052) (0.232) (0.057) (0.208) (0.104) (0.383) (0.111) (0.786) 
kt2 0.002 0.008 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.078*** 0.002 -0.088** 
 (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.018) (0.007) (0.028) (0.007) (0.038) 
kt-12 -0.001 -0.018 -0.002 0.006 0.007 -0.019 0.008 0.077* 
 (0.003) (0.024) (0.004) (0.014) (0.010) (0.025) (0.011) (0.041) 
lt2 -0.031*** -0.086 -0.026*** -0.102** -0.041** -0.066 -0.053** -0.033 
 (0.009) (0.052) (0.010) (0.041) (0.020) (0.041) (0.025) (0.044) 
lt-12 -0.009 0.016 0.001 -0.020 -0.017 0.078 -0.013 0.023 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (0.030) (0.017) (0.050) (0.021) (0.030) 
kt lt -0.008 0.160*** -0.032*** 0.071 -0.012 -0.027 -0.026 0.122 
 (0.012) (0.051) (0.011) (0.049) (0.020) (0.057) (0.022) (0.083) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.018** -0.058** 0.016* -0.016 0.032 -0.058 0.038 -0.159* 
 (0.009) (0.027) (0.010) (0.030) (0.022) (0.056) (0.023) (0.089) 
Constant 2.654*** 4.328** 2.302*** 1.702 2.710*** 4.948*** 2.577*** -0.528 
 (0.211) (2.002) (0.228) (1.180) (0.341) (0.962) (0.398) (3.295) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
No. of observations 55,128 2,042 49,642 3,444 9,881 984 8,293 604 
No. of enterprises 26,946 513 25,540 1,071 4,550 199 4,171 203 
R-squared 0.217 0.380 0.218 0.342 0.262 0.644 0.231 0.606 
Comfacb 0.000 0.076 0.002 0.398 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.237 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aFixed effects estimators are based on firm-specific effects; 
bTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Appendix 3.9 Result of estimating equation 3.2 using difference GMM estimators for ten broad industriesa 
 Agriculture Mining and utilities Manufacturing Construction 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                 
yt-1 0.206*** 0.246*** 0.129*** 0.191*** 0.228*** 0.183*** 0.217*** 0.015 0.213*** 0.252*** 0.223*** 0.171*** 0.094*** 0.062 0.094*** 0.016 
 (0.028) (0.042) (0.037) (0.059) (0.029) (0.067) (0.031) (0.080) (0.008) (0.047) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.070) 
kt 0.960*** 1.109** 0.748* -0.095 0.283 -0.300 0.593*** -1.308 -0.311*** 0.638* -0.187 1.101*** 0.093 1.150 0.284 2.925** 
 (0.291) (0.484) (0.389) (1.096) (0.192) (0.487) (0.220) (1.267) (0.121) (0.358) (0.149) (0.400) (0.253) (0.901) (0.234) (1.365) 
kt-1 -0.148 -1.232*** -0.003 1.158 -0.307** -0.938** -0.279* -0.117 0.297*** -0.148 0.271*** -0.132 0.087 -1.283** -0.023 0.857 
 (0.188) (0.449) (0.299) (1.244) (0.121) (0.437) (0.157) (1.026) (0.066) (0.362) (0.077) (0.209) (0.121) (0.612) (0.124) (1.025) 
lt 0.324 0.786 0.759* 0.311 -0.041 -0.018 -0.085 -2.478 1.092*** 0.443 0.970*** 0.539 -0.710*** 1.188 -0.475* -1.897*** 
 (0.346) (0.729) (0.391) (1.063) (0.287) (0.834) (0.393) (2.031) (0.154) (0.408) (0.204) (0.480) (0.239) (1.233) (0.253) (0.724) 
lt-1 0.001 -1.414** -0.119 0.180 -0.132 0.765 -0.044 2.993* -0.336*** -0.396 -0.025 -0.350* 0.345*** -1.227 0.393*** -0.853 
 (0.191) (0.601) (0.248) (0.819) (0.235) (0.712) (0.308) (1.636) (0.072) (0.377) (0.078) (0.213) (0.106) (0.983) (0.132) (0.883) 
kt2 -0.006 -0.009 0.018 0.024 -0.021 -0.033 -0.042** 0.000 0.006 -0.029 0.012 -0.083** -0.031 -0.047 -0.031 -0.193** 
 (0.023) (0.034) (0.030) (0.086) (0.021) (0.038) (0.021) (0.089) (0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.037) (0.020) (0.039) (0.019) (0.085) 
kt-12 0.002 0.013 -0.006 -0.064 0.026* 0.090** 0.026 0.064 -0.018*** -0.006 -0.015** 0.007 0.008 0.027 0.016 -0.061 
 (0.015) (0.035) (0.023) (0.086) (0.014) (0.037) (0.016) (0.078) (0.006) (0.025) (0.006) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.078) 
lt2 0.050 0.012 0.059 -0.061 -0.030 -0.166** -0.014 -0.098 -0.195*** -0.112*** -0.161*** -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.140** -0.090*** -0.142** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.061) (0.042) (0.029) (0.070) (0.035) (0.245) (0.023) (0.043) (0.023) (0.048) (0.026) (0.057) (0.033) (0.072) 
lt-12 -0.013 -0.015 -0.019 0.019 0.046*** 0.096* 0.043 -0.023 0.100*** 0.028 0.080*** 0.041** 0.070*** 0.021 0.055*** -0.020 
 (0.021) (0.043) (0.041) (0.064) (0.017) (0.055) (0.037) (0.236) (0.016) (0.045) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012) (0.041) (0.013) (0.099) 
kt lt -0.033 -0.068 -0.111* 0.056 0.083* 0.229*** 0.067 0.354* 0.104*** 0.096* 0.066** 0.127 0.214*** 0.061 0.162*** 0.369*** 
 (0.052) (0.081) (0.066) (0.133) (0.047) (0.080) (0.042) (0.208) (0.024) (0.053) (0.026) (0.080) (0.041) (0.090) (0.048) (0.112) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.001 0.159** 0.022 -0.046 -0.045 -0.191*** -0.052 -0.282* -0.051*** -0.008 -0.077*** -0.004 -0.106*** 0.088 -0.104*** 0.113 
 (0.029) (0.080) (0.032) (0.111) (0.033) (0.073) (0.035) (0.170) (0.014) (0.055) (0.013) (0.030) (0.019) (0.063) (0.022) (0.155) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
No. of observations 15,919 3,738 11,767 414 9,840 1,342 8,319 179 123,011 7,190 97,045 18,776 67,358 4,550 62,358 450 
No. of enterprises 6,848 739 6,051 102 3,726 272 3,453 42 33,482 1,708 28,171 4,229 20,656 1,068 19,811 153 
AR1b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 
AR2c 0.556 0.678 0.688 0.177 0.224 0.189 0.134 0.337 0.301 0.429 0.876 0.654 0.084 0.363 0.051 0.950 
Hansend 0.000 0.226 0.011 1.000 0.000 0.993 0.005 1.000 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.778 0.000 1.000 
Comface 0.826 0.021 0.689 0.616 0.003 0.014 0.412 0.263 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.848 
No. of instruments 396 387 380 298 391 272 385 165 419 375 419 388 419 384 419 293 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Wholesale and retail trade Hotels and restaurants Transportation and communication Financial intermediation 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                 
yt-1 0.152*** 0.229*** 0.150*** 0.203*** 0.108*** 0.133** 0.117*** 0.213*** 0.139*** 0.181*** 0.151*** 0.154** 0.168*** 0.155** 0.127*** 0.044 
 (0.006) (0.059) (0.006) (0.056) (0.012) (0.057) (0.011) (0.062) (0.014) (0.062) (0.014) (0.072) (0.030) (0.079) (0.034) (0.067) 
kt 0.712*** 1.231* 0.676*** 1.478* -0.070 1.150** -0.325* 0.660 -0.139 0.422 0.040 2.920*** -0.261 -0.762** -0.178 -1.406*** 
 (0.152) (0.645) (0.161) (0.785) (0.183) (0.474) (0.176) (0.763) (0.135) (0.514) (0.164) (0.792) (0.331) (0.371) (0.385) (0.531) 
kt-1 -0.107 -0.895 -0.196*** -1.755** -0.104 0.205 -0.089 0.229 -0.131 0.250 -0.290*** -1.952*** -0.244 0.019 -0.138 -1.141*** 
 (0.074) (0.584) (0.076) (0.892) (0.093) (0.367) (0.083) (0.867) (0.117) (0.376) (0.108) (0.619) (0.280) (0.400) (0.295) (0.434) 
lt -0.049 -0.508 0.432* 0.896 -0.126 2.190*** 0.479 -0.392 0.719*** 1.668*** 0.919*** 1.688* 1.223** 3.128*** 1.187* 1.518 
 (0.229) (0.471) (0.250) (1.129) (0.454) (0.785) (0.293) (0.691) (0.263) (0.619) (0.271) (0.909) (0.598) (0.611) (0.659) (1.276) 
lt-1 0.867*** 0.159 0.645*** -0.213 0.059 -0.471 0.028 1.155** 0.039 -0.940* -0.076 0.841 0.234 -0.700 -0.464 1.000 
 (0.110) (0.453) (0.121) (1.000) (0.132) (0.517) (0.104) (0.579) (0.120) (0.528) (0.118) (0.710) (0.513) (0.470) (0.530) (0.980) 
kt2 -0.067*** -0.027 -0.060*** -0.040 -0.016 -0.034 0.036** -0.098** 0.026** 0.024 0.013 -0.091* 0.051* 0.091*** 0.043 0.090*** 
 (0.015) (0.037) (0.015) (0.059) (0.026) (0.025) (0.016) (0.045) (0.011) (0.030) (0.014) (0.047) (0.030) (0.029) (0.036) (0.031) 
kt-12 0.026*** 0.036 0.029*** 0.068 0.021* -0.038 0.014* 0.016 0.010 -0.043* 0.024** 0.135*** 0.032 -0.019 0.012 0.065** 
 (0.007) (0.032) (0.007) (0.055) (0.011) (0.023) (0.008) (0.044) (0.011) (0.022) (0.010) (0.042) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
lt2 -0.647*** 0.050 -0.780*** -0.148 0.000 -0.113* 0.051 -0.061 -0.007 -0.031 -0.039 -0.019 0.075** 0.036 0.021 0.113 
 (0.043) (0.064) (0.052) (0.113) (0.033) (0.068) (0.048) (0.141) (0.030) (0.027) (0.036) (0.067) (0.037) (0.067) (0.065) (0.090) 
lt-12 0.175*** -0.048 0.203*** 0.040 0.038** -0.063 0.009 -0.139 0.015 0.005 0.024 0.183*** 0.103** -0.040 0.097 0.094* 
 (0.020) (0.045) (0.023) (0.072) (0.017) (0.088) (0.020) (0.110) (0.014) (0.032) (0.015) (0.050) (0.051) (0.056) (0.073) (0.056) 
kt lt 0.435*** 0.014 0.407*** 0.070 0.086 -0.049 -0.036 0.181* -0.021 -0.075 -0.014 -0.081 -0.117* -0.215*** -0.090 -0.141 
 (0.043) (0.078) (0.045) (0.168) (0.077) (0.098) (0.045) (0.100) (0.025) (0.052) (0.028) (0.090) (0.067) (0.082) (0.082) (0.133) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.226*** 0.014 -0.196*** -0.029 -0.043* 0.120 -0.020 0.003 -0.023 0.075* -0.013 -0.247*** -0.107 0.077 -0.028 -0.116 
 (0.021) (0.054) (0.022) (0.102) (0.024) (0.097) (0.018) (0.084) (0.015) (0.042) (0.015) (0.085) (0.076) (0.069) (0.083) (0.094) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
No. of observations 194,164 4,587 189,048 529 23,711 1,051 22,025 635 29,402 1,800 26,804 798 8,034 736 6,965 333 
No. of enterprises 60,678 1,153 59,780 140 6,881 259 6,564 133 9,502 401 8,993 196 1,574 131 1,384 76 
AR1b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
AR2c 0.937 0.599 0.585 0.771 0.739 0.412 0.590 0.541 0.011 0.183 0.012 0.453 0.560 0.314 0.541 0.633 
Hansend 0.000 0.950 0.000 1.000 0.011 1.000 0.060 1.000 0.000 0.657 0.000 1.000 0.026 1.000 0.217 1.000 
Comface 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.079 0.109 0.141 0.048 0.202 0.175 0.216 0.051 0.005 0.002 0.124 0.111 0.030 
No. of instruments 419 394 419 306 419 346 419 290 417 304 417 285 386 307 373 271 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Real estate and business activities Other services 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
         
yt-1 0.115*** 0.176** 0.113*** 0.183*** 0.115*** 0.141** 0.128*** 0.026 
 (0.014) (0.069) (0.015) (0.053) (0.034) (0.055) (0.031) (0.044) 
kt 0.017 -1.043 0.074 0.214 0.242 -1.164*** 0.372 1.146 
 (0.202) (0.675) (0.227) (0.519) (0.294) (0.396) (0.261) (0.871) 
kt-1 0.211 0.450 0.067 0.164 -0.350* 0.052 -0.441** -0.808* 
 (0.134) (0.489) (0.116) (0.329) (0.204) (0.420) (0.188) (0.423) 
lt 0.361 -0.097 1.133*** -0.858* 0.396 1.164* 0.522* -0.634 
 (0.260) (0.500) (0.336) (0.489) (0.269) (0.660) (0.302) (0.875) 
lt-1 -0.140 0.712** -0.321** -0.160 0.053 -0.264 -0.124 1.593** 
 (0.150) (0.280) (0.149) (0.332) (0.198) (0.397) (0.209) (0.674) 
kt2 0.025 0.039 0.035* -0.025 -0.018 0.079** -0.009 -0.096** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029) (0.039) (0.021) (0.044) 
kt-12 -0.024** -0.013 -0.012 -0.025 0.023 0.013 0.030 0.093*** 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.010) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) 
lt2 0.034 -0.134** -0.065 -0.097 -0.018 -0.018 0.020 -0.051 
 (0.032) (0.060) (0.041) (0.069) (0.056) (0.060) (0.072) (0.064) 
lt-12 -0.044* 0.001 -0.019 -0.108** -0.011 0.082 0.029 0.055 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.029) (0.044) (0.038) (0.054) (0.035) (0.035) 
kt lt -0.064* 0.172*** -0.112*** 0.208*** 0.058 -0.055 -0.009 0.199 
 (0.036) (0.053) (0.039) (0.080) (0.051) (0.083) (0.051) (0.124) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.043 -0.078** 0.057** 0.076 0.000 -0.065 0.012 -0.186** 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.027) (0.048) (0.040) (0.063) (0.041) (0.076) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
No. of observations 27,760 1,536 23,860 2,364 5,251 761 4,096 394 
No. of enterprises 11,461 414 10,507 685 2,036 165 1,767 124 
AR1b 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 
AR2c 0.425 0.875 0.382 0.869 0.384 0.542 0.294 0.955 
Hansend 0.000 0.901 0.000 0.860 0.112 1.000 0.543 1.000 
Comface 0.040 0.118 0.345 0.316 0.111 0.688 0.011 0.019 
No. of instruments 414 332 408 327 388 323 373 279 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: aResults reported for two-step estimators with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance matrix; 
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bArellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
cArellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
dHansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value); 
eTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
 113 
 
Appendix 3.10 Result of estimating equation 3.2 using system GMM estimators for ten broad industriesa 
 Agriculture Mining and utilities Manufacturing Construction 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                 
yt-1 0.585*** 0.438*** 0.564*** 0.601*** 0.350*** 0.582*** 0.337*** 0.421 0.293*** 0.573*** 0.286*** 0.244*** 0.165*** 0.545*** 0.161*** 0.307*** 
 (0.025) (0.041) (0.031) (0.049) (0.025) (0.052) (0.025) (12.345) (0.008) (0.046) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.038) (0.008) (0.055) 
kt 2.231*** 1.411*** 2.005*** -0.130 0.682*** 0.668 0.794*** 0.221 -0.146 1.280*** -0.024 1.467*** 0.033 1.574*** 0.799*** 1.596 
 (0.314) (0.504) (0.528) (1.022) (0.169) (0.502) (0.197) (17.876) (0.132) (0.318) (0.158) (0.372) (0.234) (0.516) (0.283) (1.308) 
kt-1 -0.833*** -1.046* -0.640 -0.650 -0.465*** -0.949** -0.478*** 0.000 -0.003 -1.135*** -0.059 -0.441 -0.070 -1.994*** -0.708*** 0.322 
 (0.289) (0.538) (0.447) (0.968) (0.121) (0.437) (0.143) (0.000) (0.084) (0.346) (0.110) (0.368) (0.147) (0.544) (0.181) (1.320) 
lt -0.522* 1.982*** -0.286 -0.570 1.480*** 0.481 1.325*** 0.000 1.098*** 0.948** 0.782*** 1.096** -0.159 1.724** -0.414 0.324 
 (0.292) (0.657) (0.323) (0.899) (0.278) (0.699) (0.299) (0.000) (0.136) (0.433) (0.164) (0.483) (0.226) (0.736) (0.274) (1.092) 
lt-1 -0.108 -2.108*** 0.032 0.477 -0.438* -0.081 -0.273 0.000 -0.221*** -0.633 0.192* -0.810** 0.183 -1.067* 0.184 -0.874 
 (0.221) (0.646) (0.208) (0.898) (0.244) (0.706) (0.248) (0.000) (0.084) (0.480) (0.104) (0.370) (0.126) (0.624) (0.156) (0.894) 
kt2 -0.126*** -0.019 -0.113** 0.024 -0.013 -0.057 -0.024 0.014 0.001 -0.061** -0.006 -0.051 -0.050** -0.049* -0.092*** -0.081 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.044) (0.077) (0.017) (0.040) (0.019) (0.852) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.037) (0.020) (0.029) (0.022) (0.097) 
kt-12 0.018 -0.020 0.016 0.011 0.022* 0.092** 0.025* -0.006 0.011 0.059** 0.024*** -0.001 0.033*** 0.065** 0.073*** -0.027 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.034) (0.074) (0.013) (0.036) (0.014) (3.354) (0.008) (0.029) (0.009) (0.033) (0.011) (0.025) (0.013) (0.092) 
lt2 -0.056 -0.033 -0.037 0.002 -0.145*** -0.147** -0.145*** 0.000 -0.226*** -0.164** -0.248*** -0.132*** -0.302*** -0.157*** -0.214*** -0.120 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.056) (0.076) (0.032) (0.073) (0.034) (0.000) (0.020) (0.072) (0.025) (0.041) (0.029) (0.057) (0.027) (0.085) 
lt-12 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.061 0.076*** 0.190*** 0.048** 0.035 0.104*** 0.128** 0.113*** 0.017 0.132*** 0.069 0.092*** 0.062 
 (0.023) (0.051) (0.033) (0.099) (0.022) (0.072) (0.021) (21.403) (0.014) (0.065) (0.019) (0.022) (0.014) (0.043) (0.014) (0.072) 
kt lt 0.129** -0.127* 0.117* 0.106 0.031 0.155* 0.038 0.044 0.183*** 0.135* 0.230*** 0.074 0.355*** 0.033 0.314*** 0.127 
 (0.054) (0.074) (0.068) (0.134) (0.038) (0.080) (0.036) (3.266) (0.027) (0.075) (0.029) (0.079) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043) (0.162) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.033 0.237*** 0.007 -0.016 -0.034 -0.209*** -0.023 -0.004 -0.114*** -0.106 -0.174*** 0.044 -0.155*** 0.024 -0.123*** 0.014 
 (0.037) (0.080) (0.038) (0.146) (0.030) (0.075) (0.030) (14.154) (0.015) (0.079) (0.018) (0.052) (0.023) (0.037) (0.023) (0.137) 
Constant -2.497*** 1.714 -2.720*** 2.170 -0.005 2.957*** -0.363 0.000 2.773*** 0.907 2.114*** -1.592 4.151*** 3.492** 3.772*** -2.535 
 (0.309) (1.389) (0.673) (3.340) (0.286) (0.910) (0.442) (0.000) (0.247) (0.905) (0.280) (1.143) (0.459) (1.723) (0.550) (3.828) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
No. of observations 26,012 4,676 20,786 550 15,842 1,733 13,884 225 177,092 9,152 144,086 23,854 106,567 5,810 100,079 678 
No. of enterprises 9,953 875 9,004 136 5,835 394 5,444 47 53,232 1,995 46,911 5,065 38,455 1,246 37,403 227 
AR1b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 
AR2c 0.005 0.225 0.022 0.279 0.079 0.290 0.056 0.993 0.011 0.110 0.049 0.178 0.000 0.427 0.000 0.426 
Hansend 0.000 0.316 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Comface 0.000 0.011 0.035 0.760 0.000 0.003 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.430 
No. of instruments 451 442 435 353 446 394 440 212 474 430 474 443 474 439 474 348 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Wholesale and retail trade Hotels and restaurants Transportation and communication Financial intermediation 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
                 
yt-1 0.174*** 0.734*** 0.168*** 0.372*** 0.166*** 0.696*** 0.165*** 0.433*** 0.250*** 0.528*** 0.257*** 0.595*** 0.262*** 0.701*** 0.198*** 0.362*** 
 (0.006) (0.044) (0.006) (0.067) (0.013) (0.065) (0.013) (0.047) (0.015) (0.048) (0.015) (0.099) (0.030) (0.042) (0.030) (0.076) 
kt 1.677*** 1.583*** 2.048*** 1.332* 0.064 0.940** -0.248 -0.318 0.400*** -0.218 0.506*** 1.752* 0.260 -0.026 0.447* 0.032 
 (0.182) (0.539) (0.201) (0.713) (0.297) (0.473) (0.210) (0.666) (0.148) (0.592) (0.158) (1.010) (0.226) (0.439) (0.245) (0.833) 
kt-1 -0.817*** -1.017* -0.955*** -0.857 -0.046 -0.751* 0.097 -0.139 -0.332*** 0.405 -0.337*** -1.682 -0.042 -0.003 -0.246 -0.640 
 (0.093) (0.579) (0.103) (0.704) (0.181) (0.403) (0.129) (0.614) (0.113) (0.583) (0.112) (1.248) (0.226) (0.436) (0.259) (0.728) 
lt -2.231*** 0.563 -2.171*** 1.524* 1.604*** 1.714** 1.755*** -0.276 1.862*** 0.878 2.019*** 1.589** 1.271*** 1.777*** 1.604*** 1.536 
 (0.225) (0.483) (0.231) (0.897) (0.294) (0.698) (0.255) (0.543) (0.194) (0.647) (0.200) (0.734) (0.370) (0.540) (0.393) (0.992) 
lt-1 1.132*** -0.429 0.870*** -1.000 -0.043 -1.565** 0.002 1.332** -0.492*** -0.568 -0.641*** -0.962 -0.249 -1.392*** -0.492 -0.377 
 (0.120) (0.473) (0.119) (0.655) (0.132) (0.677) (0.144) (0.590) (0.129) (0.562) (0.126) (0.899) (0.424) (0.529) (0.448) (0.954) 
kt2 -0.180*** -0.034 -0.201*** -0.019 -0.010 -0.028 0.028 -0.056 0.009 0.035 -0.005 -0.051 0.018 0.054** 0.001 0.026 
 (0.017) (0.036) (0.019) (0.050) (0.032) (0.023) (0.021) (0.050) (0.013) (0.036) (0.014) (0.051) (0.020) (0.027) (0.022) (0.041) 
kt-12 0.089*** 0.003 0.094*** 0.037 0.021 0.009 0.007 0.052 0.019** -0.035 0.022** 0.068 -0.006 -0.047* 0.014 0.018 
 (0.008) (0.036) (0.009) (0.045) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.040) (0.009) (0.034) (0.009) (0.075) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.038) 
lt2 -0.584*** -0.015 -0.539*** -0.170 -0.061 -0.087 -0.008 -0.110 -0.168*** -0.063 -0.208*** -0.023 0.025 0.109 -0.076 0.004 
 (0.034) (0.062) (0.035) (0.107) (0.041) (0.104) (0.041) (0.114) (0.026) (0.049) (0.027) (0.070) (0.032) (0.067) (0.048) (0.067) 
lt-12 0.223*** -0.066 0.210*** 0.195** 0.013 0.029 -0.007 -0.055 0.061*** 0.026 0.085*** -0.004 -0.053 -0.111 0.051 0.013 
 (0.019) (0.052) (0.019) (0.076) (0.022) (0.110) (0.022) (0.118) (0.017) (0.046) (0.016) (0.054) (0.062) (0.073) (0.061) (0.065) 
kt lt 0.725*** -0.007 0.681*** 0.030 0.024 -0.035 -0.037 0.248** -0.026 0.024 -0.017 -0.057 -0.067 -0.181*** -0.029 -0.089 
 (0.045) (0.076) (0.046) (0.136) (0.061) (0.103) (0.052) (0.103) (0.031) (0.066) (0.030) (0.077) (0.045) (0.069) (0.050) (0.101) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.297*** 0.075 -0.246*** -0.080 -0.052** 0.103 -0.046* -0.122 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 0.034 0.048 0.169** 0.003 0.019 
 (0.024) (0.067) (0.023) (0.084) (0.024) (0.100) (0.026) (0.089) (0.016) (0.057) (0.016) (0.103) (0.076) (0.076) (0.074) (0.093) 
Constant 2.092*** -1.511 1.425*** -0.381 1.551*** 0.286 1.802*** 3.265*** 1.384*** 1.161 1.014*** 0.771 0.571 1.828** 0.838* 6.258** 
 (0.311) (0.964) (0.328) (1.743) (0.403) (0.977) (0.485) (0.842) (0.327) (0.939) (0.385) (2.596) (0.418) (0.866) (0.501) (2.605) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
No. of observations 310,757 6,058 303,918 781 34,770 1,360 32,614 796 45,800 2,297 42,457 1,046 10,136 900 8,809 427 
No. of enterprises 115,266 1,437 114,051 251 10,834 312 10,463 159 15,986 507 15,339 250 2,048 164 1,811 99 
AR1b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2c 0.217 0.542 0.287 0.883 0.310 0.649 0.236 0.346 0.242 0.377 0.210 0.377 0.231 0.441 0.255 0.238 
Hansend 0.000 0.525 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.435 0.000 1.000 0.002 1.000 0.122 1.000 
Comface 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.328 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.730 0.000 0.616 0.107 0.484 0.244 0.672 
No. of instruments 474 449 474 361 474 401 474 345 472 359 472 340 441 362 428 326 
 Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Real estate and business activities Other services 
 All SOE PRI FDI All SOE PRI FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
         
yt-1 0.146*** 0.475*** 0.134*** 0.261*** 0.179*** 0.677*** 0.164*** 0.651*** 
 (0.012) (0.081) (0.011) (0.050) (0.030) (0.059) (0.029) (0.102) 
kt -0.329* 0.397 -0.312* 0.994** 0.062 -0.838 0.290 0.950* 
 (0.183) (0.513) (0.179) (0.459) (0.253) (0.547) (0.205) (0.565) 
kt-1 0.181 -0.116 0.237** -0.128 -0.252* 1.272** -0.220* -0.944** 
 (0.117) (0.519) (0.113) (0.330) (0.151) (0.535) (0.132) (0.465) 
lt 1.446*** -0.391 1.365*** 0.644 0.843*** 1.969*** 0.706** 0.282 
 (0.185) (0.400) (0.219) (0.423) (0.282) (0.486) (0.282) (0.930) 
lt-1 -0.654*** 0.658** -0.602*** 0.117 0.038 -1.730*** -0.199 0.357 
 (0.101) (0.307) (0.139) (0.246) (0.197) (0.486) (0.194) (1.024) 
kt2 0.056*** -0.022 0.059*** -0.059** -0.008 0.049 -0.015 -0.065* 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.013) (0.026) (0.025) (0.040) (0.017) (0.038) 
kt-12 -0.027*** 0.015 -0.031*** 0.012 0.020 -0.045 0.013 0.069 
 (0.009) (0.027) (0.008) (0.019) (0.016) (0.038) (0.013) (0.046) 
lt2 -0.004 -0.059 -0.020 -0.106** -0.080 -0.146** -0.065 -0.066 
 (0.026) (0.052) (0.030) (0.054) (0.054) (0.068) (0.051) (0.052) 
lt-12 0.005 0.028 0.027 -0.031 -0.022 0.209*** 0.019 0.003 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.045) (0.038) (0.070) (0.038) (0.056) 
kt lt -0.097*** 0.134** -0.094*** 0.118** 0.078 0.006 0.061 0.114 
 (0.026) (0.057) (0.034) (0.047) (0.066) (0.085) (0.051) (0.122) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.088*** -0.102*** 0.080*** -0.036 -0.003 -0.077 0.017 -0.108 
 (0.018) (0.031) (0.027) (0.035) (0.041) (0.081) (0.042) (0.139) 
Constant 3.184*** 0.996 2.786*** -0.688 2.911*** -0.699 2.330*** 1.267 
 (0.381) (1.071) (0.436) (1.503) (0.592) (1.399) (0.573) (1.612) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
No. of observations 55,128 2,042 49,642 3,444 9,881 984 8,293 604 
No. of enterprises 26,946 513 25,540 1,071 4,550 199 4,171 203 
AR1b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
AR2c 0.945 0.504 0.570 0.840 0.703 0.159 0.471 0.117 
Hansend 0.000 0.938 0.000 0.825 0.001 1.000 0.116 1.000 
Comface 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.639 0.299 0.037 0.338 0.702 
No. of instruments 469 387 463 382 443 378 428 334 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: aResults reported for two-step estimators with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance matrix 
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bArellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
cArellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
dHansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value); 
eTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
 117 
 
Appendix 3.11 Robustness check – estimations for large PRIs using system GMMab 
 
 t-2 t-3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Limited or joint stock - 
state capital ≤50% 
Private 
limited 
Private 
joint stock 
Private 
enterprise Cooperative 
Limited or joint stock - 
state capital ≤50% 
Private 
limited 
Private joint 
stock 
Private 
enterprise Cooperative 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
           
yt-1 0.374*** 0.196*** 0.157*** 0.237*** 0.297*** 0.445*** 0.490*** 0.375*** 0.561*** 0.362*** 
 (0.049) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.032) (0.092) (0.027) (0.040) (0.042) (0.059) 
kt 1.064** 0.234 0.710*** 0.532 0.574** 0.749 -0.223 0.410 0.077 0.071 
 (0.418) (0.240) (0.260) (0.344) (0.258) (0.530) (0.291) (0.272) (0.317) (0.315) 
kt-1 -0.772* -0.235 -0.569*** 0.046 -0.641*** -0.233 -0.045 -0.370 0.155 -0.013 
 (0.434) (0.148) (0.175) (0.228) (0.192) (0.537) (0.225) (0.250) (0.239) (0.283) 
lt -0.169 -0.953*** -0.422 -0.806** 0.186 -0.196 -0.633*** 0.026 -0.388 0.294 
 (0.417) (0.128) (0.281) (0.316) (0.225) (0.493) (0.193) (0.310) (0.312) (0.290) 
lt-1 -0.410 0.593*** 0.133 0.579*** -0.292 -0.335 0.388** -0.248 0.131 -0.158 
 (0.391) (0.083) (0.193) (0.208) (0.181) (0.620) (0.157) (0.270) (0.235) (0.290) 
kt2 -0.024 0.017 -0.007 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.037** 0.009 0.042** 0.030 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) 
kt-12 0.012 0.006 0.025** -0.010 0.028* -0.021 -0.004 0.011 -0.030** -0.002 
 (0.025) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.034) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) 
lt2 -0.015 0.080*** 0.104*** 0.113*** 0.069** 0.037 0.083*** 0.062** 0.104*** 0.004 
 (0.043) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.054) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) 
lt-12 0.001 -0.034*** -0.040** -0.041** 0.005 -0.031 -0.032 -0.005 -0.036 0.030 
 (0.041) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.051) (0.024) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) 
kt lt 0.059 0.071** -0.005 0.020 -0.066** 0.006 0.030 -0.031 -0.024 -0.021 
 (0.052) (0.028) (0.034) (0.053) (0.031) (0.076) (0.036) (0.034) (0.046) (0.041) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.024 -0.047*** 0.011 -0.043 0.034* 0.048 -0.036 0.023 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.051) (0.015) (0.023) (0.033) (0.020) (0.089) (0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) 
Constant 3.371*** 4.516*** 4.191*** 2.089*** 3.133*** 1.735 4.197*** 3.503*** 1.929** 1.964* 
 (1.086) (0.541) (0.703) (0.767) (0.721) (1.119) (0.588) (0.658) (0.790) (1.010) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummiesc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
No. of observations 9,907 93,858 32,305 28,940 10,883 9,907 93,858 32,305 28,940 10,883 
No. of enterprises 2,884 31,733 12,309 9,504 3,851 2,884 31,733 12,309 9,504 3,851 
AR1d 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2e 0.740 0.453 0.217 0.002 0.778 0.961 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.837 
Hansenf 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.030 
Comfacg 0.230 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.885 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.670 
No. of instruments 459 459 455 456 448 399 399 395 396 388 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aResults reported for two-step estimators with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance matrix; 
bLarge PRIs are those with the average number of employee equal 25 or above; 
cIndustry dummies are based on 1-digit industry codes and included in level equations only; 
dArellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
eArellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
fHansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value); 
gTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.  
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Appendix 3.12 Robustness check – estimations for large PRIs by ten broad industries using system GMMab 
 
Agriculture Mining and utilities Manufacturing Construction 
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
Transportation and 
communication 
Financial 
intermediation 
Real estate and 
business activities 
Other 
services 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
           
yt-1 0.562*** 0.253*** 0.242*** 0.159*** 0.310*** 0.235*** 0.275*** 0.344*** 0.165*** 0.293*** 
 (0.058) (0.051) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.039) (0.025) (0.077) (0.025) (0.044) 
kt 3.011*** 0.449 0.754*** 0.438 0.636* -0.444 0.316* 0.294 0.242 0.487* 
 (0.646) (0.321) (0.171) (0.277) (0.335) (0.359) (0.192) (0.348) (0.281) (0.276) 
kt-1 -1.348*** 0.303 -0.634*** -0.299 -0.511** 0.306 -0.264* -0.326 -0.257 -0.123 
 (0.475) (0.270) (0.130) (0.197) (0.239) (0.265) (0.159) (0.320) (0.205) (0.243) 
lt -1.091** 0.066 -0.518*** -0.467** -0.800*** -0.133 0.236 1.351*** 0.460 -0.010 
 (0.487) (0.544) (0.189) (0.208) (0.285) (0.408) (0.218) (0.522) (0.351) (0.412) 
lt-1 0.468 -0.499 0.312** 0.225* 0.122 -0.084 -0.248* -0.674 -0.562** -0.439* 
 (0.397) (0.328) (0.136) (0.121) (0.198) (0.262) (0.151) (0.464) (0.284) (0.239) 
kt2 -0.120*** -0.000 0.002 0.020 -0.013 0.049** 0.027** 0.012 0.007 -0.017 
 (0.040) (0.022) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.019) 
kt-12 0.081** -0.027 0.013 0.009 0.025* -0.017 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.005 
 (0.035) (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019) 
lt2 0.261*** 0.024 0.051* 0.114*** 0.062 0.122* 0.078** -0.028 -0.004 0.039 
 (0.098) (0.069) (0.027) (0.034) (0.048) (0.069) (0.032) (0.054) (0.034) (0.072) 
lt-12 -0.015 0.024 -0.039** -0.032** -0.024 0.047 -0.018 0.002 0.028 0.043 
 (0.080) (0.045) (0.018) (0.015) (0.028) (0.033) (0.021) (0.038) (0.034) (0.046) 
kt lt -0.090 -0.002 0.059* -0.031 0.045 -0.031 -0.080*** -0.042 -0.001 0.026 
 (0.074) (0.047) (0.031) (0.040) (0.049) (0.074) (0.028) (0.060) (0.042) (0.064) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.065 0.040 -0.025 0.005 0.006 -0.038 0.044** 0.025 0.050* 0.008 
 (0.065) (0.036) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.037) (0.018) (0.061) (0.028) (0.044) 
Constant -3.651*** 1.480 3.760*** 4.021*** 4.891*** 5.598*** 4.172*** 2.406 4.472*** 2.851** 
 (1.227) (1.093) (0.437) (0.640) (0.725) (1.033) (0.745) (1.614) (0.959) (1.236) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
No. of observations 5,142 4,074 61,483 41,834 27,230 4,649 12,427 564 7,402 1,809 
No. of enterprises 2,289 1,430 18,108 14,734 10,355 1,657 4,080 201 3,257 787 
AR1c 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
AR2d 0.188 0.143 0.194 0.274 0.161 0.188 0.632 0.609 0.016 0.269 
Hansene 0.130 0.624 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.253 0.000 1.000 0.063 0.999 
Comfacf 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.020 0.269 0.008 0.060 0.238 0.259 
No. of instruments 373 411 474 474 471 453 462 340 449 386 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aResults reported for two-step estimators with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance matrix; 
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bLarge PRIs are those with the average number of employees equal 25 or above; 
cArellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
dArellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
eHansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value); 
fTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. 
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Appendix 3.13 Robustness check – estimations for SOEs and FDIs by ten broad industries using system GMM with collapsed instrumentsab 
 Agriculture Mining and utilities Manufacturing Construction Wholesale and retail trade 
 SOE FDI SOE FDI SOE FDI SOE FDI SOE FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
           
yt-1 0.324*** 0.426*** 0.357*** 0.238* 0.548*** 0.239*** 0.424*** 0.086 0.743*** 0.357*** 
 (0.050) (0.131) (0.113) (0.122) (0.061) (0.021) (0.124) (0.090) (0.054) (0.091) 
kt 1.645** -2.010 1.277 -1.633 1.271* 4.218*** 2.483 3.188 3.630*** 0.771* 
 (0.717) (2.376) (1.113) (1.100) (0.670) (1.304) (2.289) (2.055) (0.885) (0.464) 
kt-1 -0.788 2.234 -1.702 0.528 -0.724 -1.829** -2.332 -1.584 -2.446*** -3.091*** 
 (0.532) (2.850) (1.155) (1.035) (0.533) (0.927) (1.526) (1.654) (0.866) (1.180) 
lt 1.083 1.355 -1.233 -2.294 -0.467 -0.716 0.083 -2.572* 0.404 0.664 
 (1.120) (2.200) (1.100) (2.004) (0.770) (2.022) (1.389) (1.532) (0.912) (1.447) 
lt-1 -1.131 -2.234 0.647 3.097** 0.778 0.047 -1.042 0.415 -0.306 1.893 
 (0.939) (2.318) (1.008) (1.531) (0.631) (0.606) (1.049) (1.332) (0.730) (1.407) 
kt2 -0.035 0.184 -0.120 0.009 -0.111** -0.299*** -0.125 -0.209 -0.150*** 0.014 
 (0.063) (0.175) (0.088) (0.100) (0.054) (0.112) (0.116) (0.138) (0.051) (0.053) 
kt-12 -0.012 -0.181 0.154* 0.051 0.086* 0.125* 0.039 0.073 0.080* 0.185** 
 (0.046) (0.201) (0.093) (0.084) (0.050) (0.072) (0.083) (0.109) (0.045) (0.079) 
lt2 -0.019 -0.012 -0.149 -0.104 -0.347*** -0.348** -0.301*** -0.099 -0.054 -0.025 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.130) (0.169) (0.095) (0.139) (0.116) (0.165) (0.115) (0.186) 
lt-12 -0.009 0.086 0.265** 0.048 0.258*** 0.120 0.048 -0.039 -0.081 0.126 
 (0.060) (0.110) (0.116) (0.159) (0.092) (0.088) (0.071) (0.132) (0.091) (0.103) 
kt lt -0.028 -0.125 0.313* 0.353 0.422*** 0.476 0.310 0.412 0.046 0.004 
 (0.121) (0.286) (0.160) (0.278) (0.128) (0.293) (0.204) (0.252) (0.143) (0.239) 
kt-1 lt-1 0.106 0.195 -0.334** -0.332 -0.350*** -0.144 0.055 -0.026 0.079 -0.314* 
 (0.097) (0.283) 0.357*** 0.238* (0.123) (0.106) 0.424*** 0.086 (0.101) (0.167) 
Constant -0.647 1.820 7.965*** 9.186** -4.727 -2.530** 1.470 -2.542 -5.130* 10.467* 
 (2.487) (5.718) (2.120) (3.918) (3.943) (1.132) (7.498) (5.258) (2.879) (5.581) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
No. of observations 4,676 550 1,733 225 9,152 23,854 5,810 678 6,058 781 
No. of enterprises 875 136 394 47 1,995 5,065 1,246 227 1,437 251 
AR1c 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.021 
AR2d 0.303 0.273 0.120 0.426 0.247 0.424 0.926 0.740 0.757 0.849 
Hansene 0.046 0.954 0.208 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.939 0.586 0.992 
Comfacf 0.159 0.723 0.216 0.121 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.615 0.246 0.054 
No. of instruments 90 166 80 166 103 166 96 166 96 166 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Hotels and 
restaurants 
Transportation and 
communication 
Financial 
intermediation 
Real estate and business 
activities Other services 
 SOE FDI SOE FDI SOE FDI SOE FDI SOE FDI 
VARIABLES yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt yt 
           
yt-1 0.563*** 0.258*** 0.467*** 0.377*** 0.561*** 0.229** 0.551*** 0.237*** 0.482*** 0.087 
 (0.138) (0.061) (0.094) (0.112) (0.080) (0.099) (0.078) (0.066) (0.120) (0.107) 
kt 0.040 1.467 -1.120 2.538** 0.879 -1.256 -2.217 2.164* -1.190 1.139 
 (0.954) (1.968) (0.838) (1.149) (0.621) (1.194) (2.230) (1.170) (0.973) (1.043) 
kt-1 0.049 -1.252 1.344 -2.303 -0.773 -0.116 1.072 -0.658 0.313 -0.687 
 (0.816) (1.779) (0.852) (1.590) (0.509) (1.039) (1.282) (0.525) (1.516) (0.656) 
lt -0.340 -0.079 2.302** 0.172 1.351* 1.153 -0.750 1.482** 3.249** -0.220 
 (1.706) (1.137) (0.898) (1.218) (0.814) (1.319) (0.746) (0.689) (1.413) (1.812) 
lt-1 1.465 0.578 -1.822** 0.521 -1.029 0.155 0.394 -0.351 -2.724** 1.694 
 (1.485) (0.948) (0.884) (1.008) (0.729) (1.280) (0.642) (0.382) (1.352) (1.310) 
kt2 -0.134* -0.158 0.097* -0.111 -0.010 0.087 0.110 -0.080 0.099* -0.079 
 (0.070) (0.122) (0.051) (0.070) (0.041) (0.056) (0.112) (0.053) (0.055) (0.080) 
kt-12 0.120* 0.130 -0.087* 0.132 0.015 -0.006 -0.054 0.019 -0.027 0.073 
 (0.067) (0.100) (0.046) (0.098) (0.039) (0.057) (0.071) (0.026) (0.065) (0.056) 
lt2 -0.545** -0.154 -0.036 -0.048 0.096 0.003 -0.024 -0.016 -0.139 -0.032 
 (0.241) (0.097) (0.102) (0.131) (0.147) (0.090) (0.129) (0.123) (0.147) (0.064) 
lt-12 0.426** 0.100 0.055 0.013 -0.056 0.025 0.041 -0.070 0.203 -0.040 
 (0.217) (0.067) (0.090) (0.120) (0.138) (0.067) (0.081) (0.076) (0.148) (0.048) 
kt lt 0.611* 0.269* -0.099 0.100 -0.102 -0.072 0.133 -0.075 -0.107 0.142 
 (0.332) (0.139) (0.114) (0.144) (0.124) (0.134) (0.137) (0.115) (0.119) (0.200) 
kt-1 lt-1 -0.555* -0.173* 0.067 -0.123 0.075 -0.012 -0.076 0.071 0.030 -0.169 
 (0.310) (0.091) (0.075) (0.140) (0.127) (0.128) (0.081) (0.082) (0.133) (0.128) 
Constant -0.492 2.073 0.984 0.784 2.268 11.275** 8.584 -4.115 6.039 1.091 
 (2.648) (2.152) (2.030) (4.630) (2.100) (4.482) (5.356) (3.785) (5.487) (3.253) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
No. of observations 1,360 796 2,297 1,046 900 427 2,042 3,444 984 604 
No. of enterprises 312 159 507 250 164 99 513 1,071 199 203 
AR1c 0.010 0.029 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 
AR2d 0.312 0.486 0.895 0.476 0.600 0.624 0.341 0.942 0.208 0.322 
Hansene 0.992 0.645 0.854 0.455 0.751 0.218 0.435 0.557 0.353 0.967 
Comfacf 0.310 0.059 0.454 0.869 0.402 0.799 0.989 0.973 0.343 0.612 
No. of instruments 81 166 76 166 71 166 98 166 87 166 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  aResults reported for two-step estimators with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance matrix; 
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bCollapse – create one instrument for each variable and lag distance to control the number of instruments; 
cArellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
dArellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differenced residuals (p-value);  
eHansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value); 
fTest for common factor restrictions (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.
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Appendix 3.14 Reduced form regression of key variables on their instruments 
 First differences (∆xt)  Levels (xt) 
VARIABLES x = y x = k x = l VARIABLES x = y x = k x = l 
        
xt-2 -0.055** -0.097*** -0.060*** ∆xt-1 0.696*** 0.247*** 0.368*** 
 (0.026) (0.036) (0.023)  (0.046) (0.061) (0.042) 
xt-3 0.027 0.064 0.041 ∆xt-2 0.691*** 0.518*** 0.321*** 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.029)  (0.043) (0.049) (0.041) 
xt-4 0.021 0.024 -0.014 ∆xt-3 0.833*** 0.699*** 0.384*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.026)  (0.043) (0.052) (0.038) 
xt-5 0.031 -0.058 0.014 ∆xt-4 0.547*** 0.307*** 0.266*** 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.034)  (0.041) (0.051) (0.044) 
xt-6 0.027 0.051 0.005 ∆xt-5 0.551*** 0.397*** 0.271*** 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.033)  (0.041) (0.051) (0.045) 
xt-7 -0.012 0.003 -0.013 ∆xt-6 0.630*** 0.529*** 0.449*** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.024)  (0.040) (0.054) (0.042) 
xt-8 -0.033 -0.025 0.013 ∆xt-7 0.655*** 0.628*** 0.543*** 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.024)  (0.042) (0.057) (0.042) 
xt-9 0.017 -0.032 -0.016 ∆xt-8 0.507*** 0.538*** 0.550*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.021)  (0.040) (0.051) (0.037) 
xt-10 -0.012 0.032** 0.023* ∆xt-9 0.142*** 0.158*** 0.269*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.028) (0.039) (0.029) 
Constant -0.133*** 0.411*** -0.019* Constant 8.778*** 8.770*** 3.769*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.011)  (0.028) (0.029) (0.019) 
        
No. of 
observations 
8,869 8,869 8,869 No. of 
observations 
8,869 8,869 8,869 
R-squared 0.005 0.022 0.005 R-squared 0.136 0.083 0.052 
Walda 0.017 0.000 0.013 Walda 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: aWald test of jointly zero slope coefficients (p-value). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. 
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Appendix 3.15 Allocation of 4-digit Viet Nam Standard Industrial Classification 
(VSIC) codes into ten broad industries 
Abbreviations: AR - agriculture; MU - mining and utilities; MA - manufacturing; CO - 
construction; TR – whole sale and retail trade; HR - hotels and restaurants; TC - 
transportation and communication; FI - financial intermediation; RB - real estate and 
business activities; OS - other services.  
10 broad 
industries 
as used in 
the paper 
4-
digit 
VSIC Description of 4-digit codes 
10 broad 
industries 
as used in 
the paper 
4-
digit 
VSIC Description of 4-digit codes 
AR 0111 Growing of rice MU 4010 Production, collection and distribution of electricity  
AR 0112 Growing of other crops MU 4020 
Manufacture of gas; 
distribution of gaseous fuels 
through mains  
AR 0113 Growing of industrial trees MU 4030 Steam and hot water supply 
AR 0114 Growing of herbs MU 4100 Collection, purification and distribution of water 
AR 0115 
Growing of fruits (exclude 
trees that are counted as 
industrial trees) 
CO 4510 Site preparation  
AR 0116 Growing of vegetables, beans, flowers, and spice CO 4520 
Building of complete 
constructions or parts thereof; 
civil engineering  
AR 0117 Growing of other unclassified trees CO 4530 Building installation  
AR 0121 Farming of domestic animals CO 4540 Building completion  
AR 0122 Farming of poultry CO 4550 
Renting of construction or 
demolition equipment with 
operator 
AR 0123 Farming of other unclassified animals TR 5010 Sale of motor vehicles  
AR 0130 
Growing of crops combined 
with farming of animals 
(mixed farming)  
TR 5020 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  
AR 0140 
Agricultural and animal 
husbandry service activities, 
except veterinary activities  
TR 5030 Sale of motor vehicle parts and accessories  
AR 0150 
Hunting, trapping and game 
propagation including related 
service activities 
TR 5040 
Sale, maintenance and repair 
of motorcycles and related 
parts and accessories  
AR 0200 Forestry, logging and related service activities TR 5050 Retail sale of automotive fuel 
AR 0500 
Fishing, operation of fish 
hatcheries and fish farms; 
service activities incidental to 
fishing 
TR 5110 Wholesale on a fee or contract basis  
MU 1010 Mining and agglomeration of hard coal  TR 5121 
Wholesale of agricultural raw 
materials, live animals 
MU 1020 Mining and agglomeration of lignite  TR 5122 
Wholesale of food, beverages 
and tobacco 
MU 1030 Extraction and agglomeration of peat TR 5131 
Wholesale of textiles, 
already-made goods, and 
footwear 
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MU 1110 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas  TR 5139 
Wholesale of personal-use 
and family-use goods 
MU 1120 
Service activities incidental to 
oil and gas extraction 
excluding surveying 
TR 5141 Wholesale of rigid, liquid, and gas products 
MU 1200 Mining of uranium and thorium ores TR 5142 
Wholesale of metals and 
metal ores 
MU 1310 Mining of iron ores  TR 5143 
Wholesale of building 
materials, five-metals, home 
water supply equipment, heat 
equipment and replacing parts 
MU 1320 
Mining of non-ferrous metal 
ores, except uranium and 
thorium ores 
TR 5149 
Wholesale of other non-
agricultural intermediate 
products, waste and scrap 
MU 1410 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay  TR 5150 
Wholesale of machinery, 
equipment and supplies  
MU 1421 Mining of chemical and fertilizable minerals TR 5190 Other wholesale 
MU 1422 Mining of salt TR 5211 
Retail trade, food, beverages, 
cigarette mainly in non-
specialized stores 
MU 1429 Quarrying of stone, and other ores TR 5219 
Other non-specialized retail 
trade in stores 
MA 1511 
Production, processing and 
preservation of meat, and 
meat related products 
TR 5220 
Retail sale of food, beverages 
and tobacco in specialized 
stores  
MA 1512 
Production, processing and 
preservation of fish and other 
fish related products 
TR 5231 
Retail trade, medicine, 
medical instruments, 
cosmetics, and hygiene 
products 
MA 1513 
Production, processing and 
preservation of fruit and 
vegetables 
TR 5232 Retail trade: pre-made goods, footwear, and leather 
MA 1514 
Production, processing and 
preservation of oils and fats 
from animals and vegetables 
TR 5233 Retail trade, home-use appliances 
MA 1520 Manufacture of dairy products  TR 5234 
Retail trade: five-metals, 
paints, mirrors 
MA 1531 Manufacture of grain mill products TR 5239 
Other retail trade of goods in 
specialized stores 
MA 1532 Manufacture of starches and starch products  TR 5240 
Retail sale of second-hand 
goods in stores  
MA 1533 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds  TR 5251 
Retail trade, goods through 
catalogues 
MA 1541 Manufacture of starch products  TR 5252 
Retail trade, on-wheel or at 
the supermarket 
MA 1542 Manufacture of sugar TR 5259 Other retail trade outside stores 
MA 1543 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate, and candies TR 5260 
Repair of personal and 
household goods 
MA 1544 Manufacture of other starch products  HR 5510 
Hotels; camping sites and 
other provision of short-stay 
accommodation  
MA 1549 Manufacture of other food products  HR 5520 
Restaurants, bars and 
canteens 
MA 1551 
Distilling and blending strong 
wine, liquor; manufacture 
etilic wine from raw, 
fermentative materials 
TC 6010 Transport via railways  
MA 1552 Manufacture of wine TC 6020 Other land transport  
MA 1553 Manufacture of beer TC 6030 Transport via pipelines 
 127 
 
MA 1554 Manufacture of non-alcohol beverages TC 6110 
Sea and coastal water 
transport  
MA 1600 Manufacture of tobacco products TC 6120 Inland water transport 
MA 1711 Spinning and weaving of textiles  TC 6200 Air transport 
MA 1712 Finishing of textiles  TC 6301 Picking goods 
MA 1721 
Manufacture of weaved and 
already made textiles 
(exclude clothes) 
TC 6302 Warehouse activities 
MA 1722 Manufacture of carpet, blanket, and mattress TC 6303 
Other supporting and 
auxiliary transport activities 
MA 1723 Manufacture of net TC 6304 Activities of travel agencies, activities supporting tourism 
MA 1729 Manufacture of other textiles (not yet mentioned above)  TC 6309 
Other supporting and 
auxiliary transport activities 
(not yet mentioned above) 
MA 1730 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles TC 6410 Post and courier activities  
MA 1810 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel  TC 6420 Telecommunications 
MA 1820 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur FI 6511 Central bank 
MA 1911 Tanning and dressing of leather FI 6519 
Other monetary 
intermediation  
MA 1912 Manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddler and harness  FI 6591 
Financial subscription 
activities 
MA 1920 Manufacture of footwear FI 6592 Other credit providers 
MA 2010 Sawmilling and planning of wood  FI 6599 
Other monetary 
intermediation (not yet 
classified) 
MA 2021 
Manufacture of plywood, 
carved, pressed and other thin 
woods 
FI 6601 Life insurance 
MA 2022 Manufacture of woods for construction FI 6602 Pension funding 
MA 2023 Manufacture of wood wrapped products FI 6603 
Other insurance (except life 
insurance) 
MA 2029 
Manufacture of other 
products from wood; 
manufacture of products from 
cork, straw and plaiting 
materials 
FI 6711 Managing financial markets 
MA 2101 Manufacture of paper-flour, paper, and cover FI 6712 
Financial instruments trading 
activities 
MA 2102 Manufacture of label and envelope FI 6719 
Activities auxiliary to 
financial intermediation (not 
yet classified) 
MA 2109 
Manufacture of other paper 
products and cover (not yet 
mentioned above) 
FI 6720 
Activities auxiliary to 
insurance and pension 
funding 
MA 2211 Publishing book OS 7010 Research and development of natural science 
MA 2212 Publishing newspaper and magazine OS 7020 
Research and development of 
social and physiological 
science 
MA 2213 Publishing recorded media RB 7110 Real estate activities with own or leased property  
MA 2219 Publishing other printings RB 7120 Real estate activities on a fee or contract basis 
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MA 2221 Printing RB 7211 Renting of land transport equipment 
MA 2222 Service activities related to printing  RB 7212 
Renting of sea transport 
equipment 
MA 2230 Reproduction of recorded media RB 7213 
Renting of air transport 
equipment 
MA 2310 Manufacture of coke oven products  RB 7221 
Renting of agricultural 
machinery and equipment 
MA 2320 Manufacture of refined petroleum products  RB 7222 
Renting of constructional 
machinery and equipment 
MA 2330 Processing of nuclear fuel RB 7223 
Renting of office machinery 
and equipment (including 
computer) 
MA 2411 
Manufacture of basic 
chemicals (except fertilized 
and nitrogen chemicals ) 
RB 7229 
Renting of other machinery 
and equipment (not yet 
classified) 
MA 2412 Manufacture of fertilized and nitrogen chemicals RB 7230 
Renting of personal and 
household goods n.e.c. 
MA 2413 Manufacture of protoplasmic plastic and synthetized rubber RB 7310 Hardware consultancy 
MA 2421 
Manufacture of pesticide and 
other chemical products used 
in agriculture 
RB 7320 Software consultancy and supply 
MA 2422 
Manufacture of paint, varnish 
and similar paint products; 
manufacture of ink 
RB 7330 Data processing  
MA 2423 Manufacture of drug and medical products  RB 7340 Data base activities 
MA 2424 
Manufacture of cosmetic, 
soap, and home-cleaning 
products  
RB 7350 
Maintenance and repair of 
office, accounting and 
computing machinery 
MA 2429 
Manufacture of other 
chemical products (not yet 
mentioned above) 
RB 7390 Other computer related activities 
MA 2430 Manufacture of man-made fibres RB 7411 Legal service activities 
MA 2511 
Manufacture of rubber tyre, 
bank up and reproduce rubber 
tyre  
RB 7412 
Accounting, book-keeping 
and auditing activities; tax 
consultancy 
MA 2519 Manufacture of other rubber products  RB 7413 
Market research and public 
opinion polling 
MA 2520 Manufacture of plastics products RB 7414 
Business and management 
consultancy  
MA 2610 Manufacture of glass and glass products  RB 7421 
Architectural, engineering 
and related technical 
activities  
MA 2691 
Manufacture of non-fire-
endurable pottery and 
chinaware (except pottery 
used in construction) 
RB 7422 Testing and analysing technology 
MA 2692 Manufacture of fire-endurable pottery and chinaware RB 7430 
Advertising (except printing 
advertisement) 
MA 2693 
Manufacture of brick, tile, 
non-fire-endurable pottery 
used in construction 
RB 7491 Recruiting activities 
MA 2694 Manufacture of cement, lime, mortar RB 7492 
Protecting and inspecting 
activities 
MA 2695 
Manufacture of concrete, 
other products from cement 
and mortar 
RB 7493 Sanitary activities 
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MA 2696 Cutting, carving, and finishing stones RB 7494 Photographical activities 
MA 2699 
Manufacture of other non-
metallic mineral products 
n.e.c. 
RB 7495 Packing activities 
MA 2710 Manufacture of basic iron and steel  RB 7499 Business activities n.e.c. 
MA 2720 
Manufacture of basic 
precious and non-ferrous 
metals  
OS 7511 Administration of the State  
MA 2731 Casting of basic metals OS 7512 
Coordinating activities of 
health organizations, 
education , social cultural 
organizations (except social 
insurance) 
MA 2732 Casting of non-ferrous metals OS 7513 Coordinating and supporting to improve business activities 
MA 2811 Manufacture of structural metal products OS 7514 
Supporting Government 
activities  
MA 2812 
Manufacture of tanks, 
reservoirs and other container 
made from metals 
OS 7521 Foreign affairs activities 
MA 2813 Manufacture of steam generators  OS 7522 National security activities 
MA 2891 Forging, pressing, rolling, and refining metals OS 7523 Social security activities 
MA 2892 
Processing metals, other 
general mechanical 
processing activities 
OS 7530 Compulsory social security activities 
MA 2893 
Manufacture of knife, 
scissors, hand tools and other 
general used metal products 
OS 8011 Kindergarten 
MA 2899 
Manufacture of other 
fabricated metal products (not 
yet mentioned above) 
OS 8012 Junior high 
MA 2911 
Manufacture of engine and 
tubing (except airplane, car, 
motorcycle engines) 
OS 8021 High school education 
MA 2912 
Manufacture of pumping, 
compressing machines, tap 
and valve 
OS 8022 Specialized high school and technical training 
MA 2913 
Manufacture of marble, cog-
wheel, gear-box, control and 
communicate parts  
OS 8030 Higher education  
MA 2914 Manufacture of oven, furnace OS 8090 Adult and other education 
MA 2915 Manufacture of lifting and picking equipment OS 8511 Hospital activities 
MA 2919 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery OS 8512 Village infirmary activities 
MA 2921 
Manufacture of machineries 
used in agriculture and 
forestry 
OS 8513 Health office activities 
MA 2922 Manufacture of instrumental machinery OS 8514 
Hygienic and preventive of 
epidemic activities 
MA 2923 Manufacture of metallurgical machinery OS 8519 Other human health activities 
MA 2924 
Manufacture of  mining and 
quarrying machinery and 
construction  
OS 8520 Veterinary activities  
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MA 2925 
Manufacture of food, 
beverages, cigarette 
processing machinery 
OS 8531 Concentrative social work activities 
MA 2926 
Manufacture of weaving, 
sewing, and leathering 
machinery 
OS 8532 Non-concentrative social work activities 
MA 2927 Manufacture of weapon, ammunition OS 9011 
Produce and distribute 
movies and videos  
MA 2929 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery OS 9012 Cinemas activities 
MA 2930 Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c. OS 9013 
Broadcast radio and 
television activities 
MA 3000 
Manufacture of office, 
accounting and computing 
machinery 
OS 9014 Theatrical, musical and other art performing activities  
MA 3110 
Manufacture of electric 
motors, generators and 
transformers  
OS 9019 Other art activities (not yet classified) 
MA 3120 
Manufacture of electricity 
distribution and control 
apparatus  
OS 9020 News agency activities 
MA 3130 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable  OS 9031 
Library and archives 
activities  
MA 3140 
Manufacture of accumulators, 
primary cells and primary 
batteries  
OS 9032 Museums activities  
MA 3150 Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting equipment  OS 9033 
Zoos, botanical and natural 
reserve activities 
MA 3190 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. OS 9041 Sporting activities 
MA 3210 
Manufacture of electronic 
valves and tubes and other 
electronic components  
OS 9049 Other recreational activities (not yet classified) 
MA 3220 
Manufacture of television and 
radio transmitters and 
apparatus for line telephony 
and line telegraphy  
OS 9110 Activities of the party 
MA 3230 
Manufacture of television and 
radio receivers, sound or 
video recording or 
reproducing apparatus, and 
associated goods 
OS 9121 Activities of trade unions 
MA 3311 
Manufacture of medical 
appliances and instruments 
and appliances for orthopaedy 
OS 9122 Activities of youth associations 
MA 3312 
Manufacture of instruments 
and appliances for measuring, 
checking, testing, navigating 
and other purposes, except 
inspecting instruments of 
industrial production 
processes 
OS 9123 Activities of women associations 
MA 3313 
Manufacture of instruments 
and appliances for inspecting  
industrial production 
processes 
OS 9124 Activities of national front 
MA 3320 
Manufacture of optical 
instruments and photographic 
equipment  
OS 9131 Activities of business and employers organizations 
MA 3330 Manufacture of watches and clocks OS 9132 
Activities of professional 
organizations 
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MA 3410 Manufacture of motor vehicles  OS 9191 
Activities of religious 
organizations 
MA 3420 
Manufacture of bodies 
(coachwork) for motor 
vehicles; manufacture of 
trailers and semi-trailers  
OS 9199 Activities of other not-yet-classified associations 
MA 3430 
Manufacture of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 
OS 9200 
Sewage and refuse disposal, 
sanitation and similar 
activities 
MA 3511 Building and repairing of ships OS 9301 
Cleaning weaving products 
and furs 
MA 3512 
Building and repairing of 
ships and boats for travelling 
and sports 
OS 9302 Hair and beauty care activities 
MA 3520 
Manufacture of railway and 
tramway locomotives and 
rolling stock  
OS 9303 Funeral service activities 
MA 3530 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft  OS 9309 
Other service activities (not 
yet classified) 
MA 3591 Manufacture of motorcycles OS 9500 Private households with employed persons 
MA 3592 Manufacture of bicycle and vehicles for disability people OS 9900 
Extra-territorial organizations 
and bodies 
MA 3599 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 
   
MA 3610 Manufacture of furniture     
MA 3691 Manufacture of jewellery and similar products 
   
MA 3692 Manufacture of musical instruments 
   
MA 3693 Manufacture of sport instruments 
   
MA 3694 Manufacture of toys and entertainment instruments 
   
MA 3699 Manufacture of other instruments 
   
MA 3710 Recycling of metal waste and scrap  
   
MA 3720 Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap 
   
 
Source: Codes and descriptions from the Government of Vietnam (1993). 
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Chapter 4 - Labour misallocation: 
Implications of the possible removal of 
migration restrictions in Vietnam 
 
Abstract 
Rural-urban migration has played an important role in Vietnam’s economic development 
since reforms began in 1986. However, the household registration system and poor rural-
urban connectivity restricts migration from rural to urban areas. This contributes to 
Vietnam having nearly half of its labour force in the agricultural sector, despite the 
sector’s low share in total value added and low productivity. As an aspiring lower-middle 
income economy, Vietnam is in desperate need of economic restructuring towards high 
value added production. Removing restrictions on internal migration and improved rural-
urban connectivity could help maintain the supply of low cost labour needed for such a 
transformation. In this chapter, a simple general equilibrium model with two regions 
called DUAL is built to quantify the impact of the removal of migration restrictions on 
national economic structure and production. The simulated results show that relaxing 
migration restrictions to narrow the urban-rural wage gaps improves Vietnam’s 
competitiveness through raising labour productivity. It also helps to withdraw a sizable 
amount of labour out of agriculture and brings about a large welfare gain. Especially, this 
relatively low cost policy option could magnify the impact of an ambitious labour skill 
upgrade program. 
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4.1 Background and justification 
Income per capita differs significantly across countries. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) 
argue that the misallocation of resources across uses may help explain these differences. 
Resource allocation among different producers depends on the relative prices they are 
facing. Policies that distort relative prices could impose a sizable loss in terms of 
aggregate output and total factor productivity (Baily et al. 1992, Restuccia and Rogerson 
2008, Hsieh and Klenow 2009). Thus, “it is not only aggregate relative prices that matter 
but also the relative prices faced by different producers” (Restuccia and Rogerson 2008, 
p. 707), as the relative prices have impacts on how resources are allocated. 
This chapter focuses on the misallocation of labour between urban and rural areas in 
Vietnam. As shown later in this chapter, there is a significant and sustained gap between 
urban and rural average wages, after controlling for the regional difference in the cost of 
living and the share of skilled workers. This might be a result of policies that obstruct 
labour mobility within regions, notably the household registration system.  
Vietnam is one of only five countries imposing formal restrictions on internal migration 
(UNDP 2009).60 These are countries with a history of central planning. It should be noted, 
however, more than one third of countries impose “significant restrictions” on their 
citizens’ movements, formal or informal (UNDP 2009). Meanwhile, migration seem to 
help migrants improve income in particular and human development in general, and 
contributes to reducing disparities, especially between rural and urban areas (Harttgen 
and Klasen 2011). 61  Thus, quantifying the impact removing rural-urban migration 
restrictions is highly relevant to policy makers in many countries, including Vietnam.  
                                                 
60 The other four countries are Belarus, China, Mongolia, and Russia. 
61 Harttgen and Klasen (2011) calculated the Human Development Index (HDI) separately for migrants and 
non-migrants in urban and rural areas of 16 developing countries, including Vietnam. They found 
improvement in the index between migrants and non-migrants in 14 countries, mostly contributed by the 
difference in income between the two groups of households. Vietnam has the fifth largest ratio of migrant 
to non-migrant HDI. Two countries where internal migrants seem to be worse off are Guatemala and 
Zambia, who are respectively characterized by migration displacement and urban poverty (UNDP 2009). 
Interestingly, only Vietnam has urban HDI smaller than rural HDI. However, Harttgen and Klasen (2011) 
do not provide any related comment or explanation. It is unclear which component in the household level 
HDI index (income, education, and life expectancy) drives this result. It should be noted that the definition 
of migrants in Harttgen and Klasen (2011) is based on the place of birth of household heads, which is 
different from most of papers on migration in Vietnam. 
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The various impacts of migration on source and destination areas, at different levels 
(individual, household, regional, country and world) are well documented. One impact is 
driving the convergence in wages between the two areas as labour mobility helps integrate 
the two labour markets (UNDP 2009). I narrow my research into the most prominent 
segmentation of labour market in Vietnam: the urban-rural divide. Vietnam is not the only 
country with a seemingly dual economy, but an interesting case as the urban-rural gap in 
Vietnam is relatively significant.62 
In reality, the household registration system and the related policies to control rural-urban 
migration in Vietnam could not block the flow but create labour market segmentation and 
distort the labour prices faced by urban and rural enterprises. It helps explain urban-rural 
income inequality, a significant part of the overall inequality.63  
The urban-rural differences in wage and household income are measurable through 
various surveys. The major contribution of this chapter is to estimate the urban-rural wage 
gap, controlling for labour skill and industry, then quantify the nation-wide impact of 
removing migration restrictions through closing the gap in wages between urban and rural 
areas in Vietnam. 
4.2 Estimation of the urban-rural wage gap in Vietnam 
4.2.1 A dual economy 
Vietnam has achieved remarkable development outcomes since reforms began in 1986. 
However, rural areas still seem to be lagged behind. In many respects (Table 4.1), 
Vietnam looks like a dual economy, in which the urban and rural areas are at two different 
stages of development.  
                                                 
62 For example, the 2012 poverty head count ratio of rural area is four times higher than that in urban area 
in Vietnam. Only Bhutan and Turkey (among 30 countries with available data) witness the wider urban - 
rural gap in poverty rate in 2012 (World Bank 2014b).  
63 Nguyen et al. (2007) found that the increase in overall inequality between 1993 and 1998 was mainly 
due to increase in urban - rural inequality. GSO (2013a) provides the similar observation for 2012: the 
national Gini index is 0.424, much higher than the indexes of urban and rural (0.385 and 0.399 respectively).  
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Table 4.1 Key differences in development between urban and rural areas in 
Vietnama 
No. Index name Urban Rural 
1 Population (million people) 28.9 60.8 
2 Labour force (15 or above years old, million people) 16.0 37.2 
3 Share of literate labour in the total labour force (%) 98.4 93.4 
4 Share of trained workers in total employment (%)b 33.7 11.2 
5 Unemployment rate (%) 3.6 1.5 
6 Under-employment rate (%) 1.5 3.3 
7 Share of agricultural labour in total employment (%) 14.9 60.3 
8 Share of service labour in total employment (%) 58.2 21.0 
9 Share of wage employment in total employment (%) 52.0 27.6 
10 Monthly average income per capita (million dong) 3.0 1.6 
11 Monthly average expenditure per capita (million dong) 2.3 1.3 
12 Poverty rate (%)c 4.3 14.1 
13 Share of households using hygienic water in the total 
number of households (%) 
98.1 87.9 
14 Share of households using hygienic latrines in the total 
number of households (%) 
93.7 70.0 
15 Share of household using electricity in the total number of 
households (%) 
99.8 96.6 
Notes:  aIndexes number 1 to 9 are for 2013, the rest are for 2012. 
 bTrained workers are those completed equivalent 3-month-and-above training courses. 
cPoverty rate is calculated by monthly average income per capita. Poverty line as specified by the 
Government is 660 thousand dong for urban area and 530 thousand dong for rural area.  
Source:  Indexes number 7 to 9 are from GSO (2014c), the rest from GSO (2014b). 
The rural area has a larger population, with a higher poverty rate. This means the poor are 
concentrated in rural areas. Specifically, the difference in poverty rate between rural and 
urban areas would be significantly larger if using the same World Bank’s poverty line of 
871 thousand dong: 5.4 per cent for urban area and 22.1 per cent for rural area in 2012 
(GSO 2014b). Thus bridging the urban-rural gap should significantly contribute to 
poverty alleviation. 
The majority of rural labourers work in agriculture. It explains the lower unemployment 
rate but higher under-employment rate in rural areas in comparison with urban areas. 
Specifically, only 15 per cent of urban labourers are in the agricultural sector. This could 
be the result of the administrative classification that is “not necessarily based on the actual 
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economic functions of the cities” (World Bank 2011c). The related criterion for an area 
to be classified as urban is at least 65 per cent of the total labour being non-agricultural 
(Government of Vietnam 2009a). 
The urban-rural labour segmentation helps explain the labour stuck in agriculture. The 
share of agriculture in total GDP gradually reduced from 40 per cent in 1990 to 20 per 
cent in 2012. The share of agriculture in total employment also reduced, but at a slower 
pace, from 73 per cent in 1990 to almost 47 per cent in 2012. That means in 2012, half of 
labour force that was stuck in agriculture produced only one fifth of total output. There is 
little change in the absolute number of agricultural labour in over 20 years, which 
fluctuated around 22-25 million workers. As a result, from 2010 to 2013, Vietnam kept 
being in the twenty countries with the lowest agricultural productivity (World Bank 
2014b), despite being among the top agricultural exporters. 
Porter (2010) specified demography as the second factor (after geographic location) 
contributing to Vietnam’s comparative advantage. Vietnam has entered the golden age of 
population structure with every two independent workers providing for just one 
dependent person (GSO 2010b). This is the crucial base for low labour cost, which has 
been attractive to foreign direct investment. In 2007-2010, the average wage in Vietnam, 
though increasing, was lower than in most of its major Asian counterparts (Figure 4.1). 
However, this advantage would be deteriorated with the aging population and birth 
control.  
Relatively low wages together with recent high inflation contributed to the rising number 
of strikes, which in turn have hurt Vietnam’s competitiveness (Bland 2012). 64  The 
minimum wage in Vietnam has been gradually rising, but is still low compared with the 
minimum wage in other Asian countries. For example, the gap in minimum wages 
between Vietnam and India is sizable and expanding from 2007 to 2010 (Figure 4.1). 
Meanwhile, the difference in the average wage between Vietnam and India (having the 
second lowest wage among those reported) narrowed dramatically and became negligible 
in 2010 (Figure 4.1). It could be said that the increase in minimum wage has not fully 
reflected the increase in the cost of living in Vietnam. In 2010, Vietnam set the minimum 
wage at the level less than 30 per cent of the average wage, approximately equal US$1.3 
                                                 
64 The consumer price index of Vietnam in 2013 had increased 38 per cent since 2010, the fastest growth 
rate in Asia (World Bank 2014) 
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per day, barely higher than the extreme poverty line of US$1.25 but lower than the 
moderate poverty line of US$2 per day.    
Importantly, labour costs need to be considered along with labour productivity. Ohno 
(2010) argued the only way for a nation to maintain its competitiveness is having the 
increase in productivity greater than the increase in wage. Labour concentration in 
agriculture with low productivity and generally unskilled contributes to the national low 
labour productivity, deteriorating the advantage of low wage in attracting foreign 
investors. In comparison with labour productivity (proxied by GDP divided by total 
employment), the labour cost in Vietnam is not so cheap anymore (Table 4.2). Noticeably, 
whether labour productivity is in current dollars or constant international dollars, the ratio 
of wages over labour productivity of Vietnam increased most significantly (12 and 42 per 
cent respectively from 2007 to 2010).  
Table 4.2 Wages and labour productivity of some selected Asian countries in 2007 
and 2010  
 
Wage as percentage of 
labour productivity in 
current dollars 
Wage as percentage of 
labour productivity in 
constant 1990 
international dollars 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 
China 70.1 69.3 32.6 41.3 
India 43.7 41.6 19.0 19.3 
Indonesia 30.9 26.1 13.9 16.3 
Korea, Republic 69.0 62.8 80.1 65.2 
Malaysia 38.5 39.4 29.5 34.5 
Philippines 40.6 38.4 22.7 25.3 
Thailand 41.3 41.8 17.9 21.7 
Vietnam 60.9 68.7 19.5 27.6 
Notes: The nominal wages in local currency units from the ILO global wage database are converted to US 
dollars using the corresponding average exchange rates from ADB (2013). Labour productivity in current 
dollar is GDP in current dollars (World Bank 2014) divided by total employment (ADB 2013). Labour 
productivity in constant 1990 international dollars is GDP converted to 1990 constant international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates divided by total employment (World Bank 2014). 
Sources: ILO (2014), ADB (2013), World Bank (2014). 
There is a concern, though, in comparing average wage (measured as the earning of paid 
employees) with labour productivity (measured as the average output of employed 
labour), if a large share of total employment are self-employed (ILO 2013). In Vietnam, 
the share of wage employment has increased but is still at a low level, around one third 
of total employment. The largest group is self-employed workers, accounting for about 
half of the total employment (Figure 4.2).  
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In order to compare wage increase with productivity growth for the same group of 
employees, I use the Vietnam enterprise survey data. Details about the data can be found 
in the section on data and measurement in Chapter 3. The average wage equals total wage 
bill divided by the number of workers.65 Labour productivity is proxied by revenue per 
worker. The ratio of average wage over labour productivity from the enterprise survey in 
2010 was 40 per cent higher than in 2007, and two and a half times higher than the ratio 
in 2000. These confirm that wages are increasing faster than productivity in Vietnam. 
Improvement in lowering labour cost as well as raising productivity is needed to maintain 
Vietnam’s competitiveness. Keeping the minimum wage at a low level as it has been 
could not solve the problem, as argued above, and may contribute to income inequality 
between wage earners and capital owners. 
Integrating the rural area into the national development process through narrowing the 
urban-rural divide could be an effective solution. Seventy per cent of the total labour force 
is in rural area, and these workers are paid less than their urban counterparts (GSO 2014c). 
Connecting rural labourers with the urban job market could help bring into use a huge 
source of low-cost labour for the national industrialization process. It could also help 
drawing labour out of agriculture, improving labour mobility and the overall labour 
productivity. 
4.2.2 Urban-rural wage gap 
There is a sizable gap in the average nominal wage between urban and rural areas. This 
is consistent with urban-rural labour segmentation. In 2007, the urban wage (paid to 
workers in enterprises located in urban area) nearly doubled the rural one (paid to workers 
in enterprises located in rural area). The urban-rural nominal wage gap has been reduced 
recently, with the average level in the urban area is about 40 per cent higher than in the 
rural area (Table 4.3). 
                                                 
65 The total wage bill excludes employers’ social security contribution, close to the definition of wages used 
in ILO (2013). 
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Table 4.3 Comparison of average monthly wages between urban and rural workers 
Year Urban wage 
(thousand dongs) 
Rural wage 
(thousand dongs) 
Urban/rural wage ratio 
2007 2,415 1,271 1.90 
2010 2,940 2,183 1.35 
2011 3,629 2,687 1.35 
2012 4,466 3,166 1.41 
2013 4,919 3,476 1.42 
Notes: The data is for wage employment. There is significant difference between the 2009 wage levels 
reported in GSO (2012a) and in GSO (2010a), thus I do not quote them here. There is no wage level reported 
for 2008. 
Source: Labour Force Surveys (GSO 2012a, GSO 2013b, GSO 2014c). 
If we look into the enterprise sector only, the urban-rural nominal wage ratio had been 
fluctuating in the range 1.4-1.6 in 2000-2007 and expanded to 1.7 in 2008 and 2009 before 
falling back to 1.4 in 2010.66 Meanwhile, the real wage gap looks more stable (Figure 
4.4). Hence, the expansion in the nominal wage gap in 2008-2009 was mostly caused by 
an increase in the difference in the urban-rural cost of living. It could be that rural living 
cost were less influenced by macro upheavals in 2008 and the economic crisis in 2009, 
given the higher level of self-sufficiency of rural households. The share of self-made or 
given goods in total expenditure of rural households was 17 per cent in 2008, while that 
of urban households was less than 4 per cent (GSO 2013a).67 In 2010-2013, around 70 
per cent of rural workers were self-employed or unpaid family workers. The 
corresponding number in urban areas was much lower - from 40 to 44 per cent (GSO 
2011a, GSO 2014c). 
There is a considerable difference in labour qualifications between urban and rural areas 
(Figure 4.5). The share of unskilled labour, who have no qualifications, has reduced in 
both urban and rural areas, but still very high. By 2013, only 33 per cent of urban labour 
and 11 per cent of rural labour could be considered skilled (having gone through 
vocational training or college, university or higher education) (GSO 2014c).  
                                                 
66 Calculating wage from the enterprise data enable the inclusion of rural-urban migrantwages into urban 
wages. Other sources like household living standard data usually do not cover migrants or could not separate 
rural-urban migrants from their sending households in rural area. There are specific surveys on migrants, 
however they are not as frequent and representative as enterprise surveys and household living standard 
surveys. The wage level in enterprise data is also one of the factors affecting Vietnam’s competitiveness in 
the view of investors. 
67 In 2012, the share of self-made or given goods in total expenditure of rural households was reduced to 
12.6 per cent, while that of urban households was kept at 3.7 per cent. 
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For labour employed in the enterprise sector, the share of skilled workers is higher, but 
the urban-rural gap in labour qualifications is similar. In 2009, the share of skilled workers 
in total employment of urban enterprises was 54 per cent, while that share of rural 
enterprises was 37 per cent. 
However, the gap in labour skills does not fully explain the gap in wage. Figure 4.6 shows 
the positive correlation between the urban-rural wage gap and the share of skilled 
workers. The information about labour qualifications is only available in 2001, 2007 and 
2009. Even then, the 2001 survey asked for labour qualifications in headquarters only. 
Hence, it is hard to conclude about a trend in the wage gap, but nonetheless, the gap seems 
larger in 2009 compared with 2007, for both nominal and real average wage. 
In order to estimate the urban-rural wage gap while controlling for labour skill levels, we 
use the enterprise survey data for the following simple model: 
Ln(wage)i = β0 + β1 urbani + 𝛾Xi + εi 
in which wage is the average real wage of firm i, equal the total wage bill divided by the 
number of workers at the end of the year, converted to 2000 constant prices using 
consumer price and urban-rural spatial cost-living indexes.68  
Urban is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if firm i is in urban area and 0 if the firm is in 
rural area. As the model is in the semi-log form, β1 represents the percentage change in 
average wage due to the firm’s place of operation being in urban area instead of rural 
area. In other words, β1 represents the urban-rural wage gap. 
Xi are control variables, include year dummies, industry dummies, and share of workers 
by skill levels, and interactions of these variables. Skilled workers include those with 
either doctoral degree, master degree, bachelor degree or graduates from college, 
secondary vocational school, vocational training.69 As the classification of workers by 
                                                 
68 The classification of employees by qualifications is available for the employment at the end of the year 
only. Thus, for consistency I use the number of employees at the end of the year to calculate average wage.   
69 Vocational training has three levels: college, secondary and primary training. One difference between the 
vocational training and school at the same level (for example secondary vocational training versus 
secondary vocational school) is the share of theoretical study. Vocational training is managed by Ministry 
of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs while universities, colleges, and schools are managed by Ministry of 
Education and Training. 
(*) 
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skill is only available in 2001, 2007, and 2009, interpretation of results should take the 
difference in sampling into account.  
εi is the error term, including unobserved variables such as measurement errors or 
characteristics of entrepreneur. The error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
included variables. 
I choose to use the enterprise survey to estimate the urban – rural wage gap for two 
reasons. First, a potential investor would possibly look at the average wage in the 
enterprise sector to consider his investment decision. Second, dividing workers by 
urban/rural based on enterprises’ place of operation could include migrants’ wage into 
urban wage. In contrast, household surveys normally count rural-urban migrants as 
members of their sending households at rural areas. 
Results of estimating the equation (*) using pooled OLS on the full sample from 2000 to 
2010 are in Appendix 4.1. The estimation results on the restricted sample of 2001, 2007, 
and 2009 with available information on labour skill are in Appendix 4.2. A summary of 
the estimated urban-rural wage gap across different estimations is in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Estimated urban-rural wage gap as the percentage change in the average 
wage (per cent) 
Included variables Urban-rural 
wage gap  
(per cent) 
Urban dummy 36.8*** 
Urban dummy and year dummies 32.5*** 
Urban dummy, year dummies, and interaction between urban 
dummy and year dummies 
23.3*** 
Urban dummy, year dummies, interaction between urban dummy 
and year dummies, and industry dummies 
14.8*** 
Urban dummy, year dummies, interaction between urban dummy 
and year dummies, industry dummies, and share of skilled workers 
16.3*** 
Urban dummy, year dummies, interaction between urban dummy 
and year dummies, industry dummies, share of skilled workers, and 
interaction between urban dummy and share of skilled workers 
13.4*** 
Urban dummy, year dummies, interaction between urban dummy 
and year dummies, industry dummies, share of university graduates 
and higher, share of college graduates, share of vocational school 
graduate, and share of workers with vocational training 
10.8*** 
Notes: *** means the probability of no urban-rural wage gap is less than one per cent. Details of the 
estimation results are in Appendix 4.1 and Appendix 4.2. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data. 
The urban-rural wage gap is significant in all estimations (Table 4.4). This is the evidence 
that the average wage of urban workers is at least ten per cent higher than that of rural 
workers, even after controlling for the difference in wage across industries and labour 
skill levels. In the first estimation with only the urban dummy included, the estimated 
average wage in urban area is 36.8 per cent higher than that in rural area, close to the 
results from the Labour Force Surveys in 2010-2013 (Table 4.3).  
The increasing trend in real wage is reflected by the significant and increasing coefficients 
of the year dummies. This trend is maintained despite the hit of the global financial crisis 
in 2009, possibly owing to the stimulus packages. The average real wage in 2010 was 
almost 70 per cent higher than that in 2000 (the base year) (column 4, Appendix 4.1). The 
similar trend is observed in the restricted sample, where the average real wage in 2009 
has increased by half since 2001 (Appendix 4.2). 
There is no clear trend in the urban-rural wage gap. The coefficients of the interaction 
terms between the urban dummy and the year dummies are significantly positive in some 
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years and significantly negative in others. The urban-rural wage gap was 15 per cent in 
2000, expanded in 2001, 2003, 2008 up to at most 23 per cent, and narrowed down in 
2007, 2009, 2010 to at least 10 per cent, after controlling for wage differences across 
industries (column 4, Appendix 4.1).  
For the restricted sample, the coefficients of the interaction terms between the urban 
dummy and the year dummies are consistently negative, implying the narrowed urban-
rural wage gap in 2007 and 2009 in compared with 2001. However, it should be noted 
that the information in 2001 is for headquarters only, thus this change in wage gap might 
reflect the difference in average wage between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
There is positive correlation between the average level of labour skill and the average real 
wage. Specifically, average wage in enterprises that only employ skilled workers is 24 
per cent higher than in enterprises that only employ unskilled workers (column 1, 
Appendix 4.2). The wage difference between enterprises with university graduates and 
higher and enterprises with unskilled workers is up to 68 per cent (column 3, Appendix 
4.2). 
Noticeably, the difference in wage between skilled and unskilled workers is significantly 
higher in urban area. To be specific, the difference in average wage between enterprises 
that only employ skilled workers and enterprises that only employ unskilled workers is 
20 per cent in rural area and 27 per cent in urban area. This also implies the urban-rural 
wage gap is larger for skilled workers. The urban-rural wage gap for enterprises with 
unskilled workers is 13 per cent, while that for enterprises with skilled workers is 22 per 
cent (column 2, Appendix 4.2). 
The existence of urban-rural wage gap possibly signals a distortion to labour market. 
Removing such distortion could help improve the national economic efficiency. Being of 
equal importance, narrowing the urban-rural wage gap would also help controlling the 
expanding inequality in Vietnam. Gini index was 0.4 in 2004 and rose to 0.43 in 2010 
(World Bank 2012a), reflecting the increasing inequality.  
The urban-rural gap is not something specific to Vietnam. Young (2012) found out that 
40 per cent of consumption inequality in a sample of 65 countries could be attributed to 
urban-rural gap. Meanwhile, the gap in educational attainment only explains 19 per cent 
of total inequality. He also noted that “urban-rural differences in developing countries 
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represent a gigantic, unexploited, arbitrage opportunity”. 70  Removing migration 
restrictions in Vietnam seems to be a low-cost option to exploit such opportunity.  
4.2.3 Migration restrictions contributes to urban-rural wage gap 
In a well-functioning labour market, the equilibrium of labour demand and supply would 
determine wages – the price of labour. The wage gap analysed above can most likely be 
attributed to restrictions to labour mobility, which could include general obstacles such 
as poor rural-urban physical connectivity and limited information at the origin as well as 
a particular constraint such as the household registration system specific to Vietnam and 
some other socialist countries. 
Clements (2011) claims the tightly binding constraints on emigration “the greatest single 
class of distortions in the global economy”. I focus on the similar distortion, within one 
country, but not necessarily less serious. Workers are on the move in many developing 
countries, seeking better opportunities. The number of total internal migrants estimated 
by UNDP (2009) is 740 million people, much higher than the estimated number of 200 
million international migrants. With the world population of 6.8 billion in 2009 (World 
Bank 2014b), the number of internal migrants accounts for at least 11 per cent of the total 
world population.71 The results from the two latest censuses in 1999 and 2009 (GSO 
2010b) show the relative increase in internal migration in Vietnam, from 6 to 8 per cent 
of total population. It is hard to directly compare the share of internal migrants in total 
population of Vietnam with other countries due to the difficulties in following this mobile 
group of people and the possible inconsistency in definition of migrants. However, it is 
safe to say that the level of internal migration in Vietnam is low in comparison with other 
developing countries. For example, in India, internal migration accounts for nearly 30 per 
cent of the total population in 2007-2008 (United Nations 2013).72 This suggests that 
migration restrictions in Vietnam, notably the household registration system, are still 
binding. 
                                                 
70 Young (2012), however, suspects such opportunity if the urban – rural gap in living standards were only 
a selection bias due to unobserved skill and human capital. His suspection is based on the condition that 
movement is completely volunteered, which seems not be the case in Vietnam with government-organized 
migration and different kinds of restrictions to spontaneous migration. 
71 UNDP (2009) states that they use the most conservative estimation of the number of internal migrants. 
72 India and Vietnam have similar PPP GDP per capita in 2013 (5410 and 5293 international dollars 
respectively) (World Bank 2014b). 
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Before 1986, most of migration in Vietnam was organized by the government (Dang 
2009). Rural-urban migration in Vietnam, especially moving into Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City, was tightly restricted by administrative and economic instruments. Migration to big 
cities was mostly due to job changes within the state sector (Dang 2009).  
Since 1986, the migration restrictions have been gradually relaxed and spontaneous 
migration emerged. Dang (2009) summarized six factors facilitating spontaneous 
migration: 
- Redundant labourers owing to increased agricultural productivity; 
- Broken link between residency and food access owing to deregulated food 
markets; 
- Non-farm job opportunities in the developing private sector; 
- Reduced cost owing to better information and removed legal barriers to inter-
regional moves; 
- Polarized economic development led by major cities, especially Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City, which have higher living standards and more job opportunities, 
thus attracting labourers; and 
- Migrants’ access to land (though unofficially) owing to the emergence of land 
market.  
The majority of migration is from rural to urban area. The results of 2009 census show 
that the number of rural-urban migrants is nearly four times higher than the number of 
urban-rural migrants. And the number of rural-urban migrants during 2004-2009 doubled 
that in 1994-1999 (Table 4.5).73  
Table 4.5 The scale of rural-urban migration 
 1999 2009 
Number of rural-urban migrants (person) 855,943 2,062,171 
Share of rural-urban migrants (per cent)   
in urban population 7.2 8.9 
in rural population 2.5 3.7 
in total migrants 34.1 31.6 
Notes: Migrants defined by the censuses are those older than five and having the current place of permanent 
residence different from their place of permanent residence five years before. Thus the number of rural-
                                                 
73 It should be noted that the quoted data does not allow separating the spatial moving with the expansion 
of urban area. 
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urban migrants in 1999 (or 2009) include those moved from rural to urban area in the period 1994-1999 (or 
2004-2009). The data does not cover seasonal migration, temporary migration, and return migration. 
Source:  GSO (2011d). 
Vietnam is considered to be having a rapid urbanization process (World Bank 2011c). 
The share of urban population in total population was 32 per cent in 2013 (GSO 2014b), 
up from 19 per cent in 1986 (GSO 2004). A considerable part of this urban population 
expansion comes from rural-urban migrants. From 1999 to 2009, rural-urban migration 
contributed to raise the population growth rate in urban area to 3.4 per cent and reduce 
the population growth rate in rural area to 0.4 per cent per year, while there is little 
difference in the birth and death rates between the two areas (GSO 2010b). In 2009, 16 
per cent of urban population are migrants who moved there in less than 5 years (GSO 
2010b).74 
The Government of Vietnam (2009d) set to increase the urban population to 50 per cent 
of total population by 2025. It seems to be an ambitious plan, though. Given the current 
age structure and patterns of birth, mortality, and immigration rates, the urban share of 
population would only reach 50 per cent by 2035-2040 (GSO 2011b).  
The government might have counted on the accelerated rural-urban migration flow in 
setting up the urbanization target. However, Dang (2009) argues that the state 
development programs disregard or aim to limit migration. Specially, residency-based 
social policies are making rural-urban migrants marginalized (Le et al. 2011). 
In Vietnam, each household has to register for a booklet, called “hộ khẩu”, listing all 
household members that permanently reside in the household. This household registration 
system, similar to the “hukou” system in China, has been in effect since late 1950s. If 
people change their permanent residence, they should apply for a change in their “hộ 
khẩu”.  
For different reasons, individuals may not reside in the same place where they have their 
“hộ khẩu”. One prominent reason is that the person is not entitled permanent residence in 
his/her place of residence. 75  According to the current law on residence (National 
                                                 
74 This is an underestimation of migration flow as the Census data does not account for seasonal migration 
or temporal migration within 5 years.  
75 Nearly half of migrants in the 2004 migration survey reported “being unqualified” as the reason they did 
not have household registration at their current resident place. Other reasons include “not necessary”, 
“applied but yet to be granted”, “do not know how to apply”, “complicated registration procedures”, “high 
cost”, “time consuming”, and “other reasons” (GSO 2006a). 
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Assembly of Vietnam 2006, National Assembly of Vietnam 2013), there are conditions 
for granting permanent residence and long-term temporary residence in cities directly 
under the central government, notably the condition on legal housing.76 Besides, each city 
might set additional conditions for granting permanent residence to control migration into 
that city.77 
As a result, Vietnam citizens are classified into four categories - KT1, KT2, KT3, and 
KT4 - depending on their residency. KT is the abbreviation of “kiểm tra”, which means 
“inspect”. From the migration management view, KT1 and KT2 are residents, while KT3 
and KT4 are migrants. KT1 includes individuals who have household registration at the 
district where they reside. KT2 includes individuals who have household registration at 
another district in the same city/province where they reside. KT3 includes individuals 
who do not have household registration but long-term temporary registration (more than 
6 months) at the city/province where they reside. KT4 includes individuals who do not 
have household registration but short-term temporary registration (up to 6 months) at the 
city/province where they reside. There is also a significant number of people who do not 
register at all (Table 4.6), raising the question on the efficiency of the household 
registration system in population management.  
                                                 
76  In the current urban administration system, there are two types of cities: those under the direct 
management of the central government (provincial-level administrative units), and those under the 
provincial governments (district-level administrative units). Since 2004, there have been five centrally run 
cities: Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, Hai Phong, Can Tho. This list is expected to expand soon to 
include Hue (Government of Vietnam 2014). 
77 For example, the Law on the Capital raises the minimum duration of temporary residence to be switched 
to permanent residence in Hanoi - the capital - from one year (as stated in the Law on Residence) to three 
years (National Assembly of Vietnam 2012). In late 2011, Da Nang ceased granting permanent residence 
for unemployed or migrants with previous convictions (People’s Council of Da Nang City 2011). 
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Table 4.6 Share of migrants by residence status (per cent) 
Status Percentage in total migrants 
KT1 11.4 
KT2 6.0 
KT3 32.6 
KT4 45.7 
Not registered 4.3 
Notes: Migrants in the 2004 Vietnam migration survey are persons who moved within five years before 
the survey. The survey was conducted in regions with high in-migration rate (big cities, industrial zones, 
and the Central Highland). The sample size was 10,007 persons in the age group 15-59, including 4,998 
migrants and 5,009 non-migrants. 
Source: 2004 Vietnam migration survey (GSO 2005). 
Notably, the impact of the household registration system is beyond the state management 
of population. Though the link between household registration and food supply was 
broken, access to key social services keeps depending on household registration. This 
leads to unequal access to social services among citizens (Appendix 4.3). The impact of 
this unequal access to social services might be sustained over generations. In 2009, non-
migrants have the rate of their children from 11 to 18 years old attending school reached 
75 per cent. The corresponding rates for children of migrants who moved across provinces 
was only 44 per cent (GSO 2011d). 
Without “hộ khẩu”, migrants face a range of difficulties (Figure 4.7). The share of 
migrants reporting difficulties because of not having KT1 status is 42 per cent (GSO 
2006a). The most common difficulty for migrants having temporary residence status is 
access to loans. For example, to get a soft loan from the National Fund of Employment, 
a person needs a guarantee from the local communal people’s committee, which was 
available only for permanent residents in the commune. As a result, migrants have to turn 
to private lending at much higher cost (Dang 2009). Migrants have to cope with a list of 
difficulties already, and the household registration system adds to that list.  
The barrier of household registration system could not block rural-urban migration but 
imposes a cost on migrants (Dang 2003). We may look at children’s education to have an 
idea about such cost. Without the household registration, the average expense on 
education per student per year has been almost doubled (Table 4.7). The gap in schooling 
expense is even wider for attending public schools only (GSO 2013a). 
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Table 4.7 Comparision of average expense on education and training per schooling 
person by residence registration status 
 With household 
registration 
(thousand VND) 
Without 
household 
registration 
(thousand VND) 
Ratio of expense without 
household registration over 
expense with household 
registration 
2006 1,203 2,575 2.1 
2008 1,827 4,300 2.4 
2010 2,985 5,476 1.8 
2012 4,042 7,858 1.9 
Source: Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (GSO 2013a). 
The 2004 migration survey shows the income gap between non-migrants and migrants 
for different levels of education. On average, income of migrants is 21 per cent lower 
than that of non-migrants (GSO 2006a). This could come from the difficulty with job 
applications without household registration that forced migrants to accept lower-paid 
jobs. According to a survey of rural-urban migrants in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in 
2008, up to 70 per cent of migrants with temporary residence status were rejected jobs in 
the formal sector because they did not have “hộ khẩu” (Le et al. 2011).78 There is a sign 
of improvement on this matter as the authority of Ho Chi Minh City has allowed KT3 
people to apply for civil servant jobs in the city since August 2014 (Trung 2014).  
As moving is costly, the poorest cannot migrate (UNDP 2009). The household 
registration system in Vietnam has raised the cost of moving as discussed, thus narrowing 
the chances of migrating to find a better job and enjoy a better life to relatively well-off 
people. Hence, the system contributes to the labour market segmentation, not to mention 
the vulnerability of migrants.  
There are real concerns of over-crowded cities due to spontaneous migration. They 
include the over-loaded infrastructure (most importantly roads, schools, and hospitals), 
the development of slums, difficulty in crime control, pollution, etc. The point is that the 
household registration system is not a perfect solution. People still come to cities, do not 
register, and become a part of the “floating” population.79 The household registration 
system has deepened the urban-rural income gap, intensifying the dual economy situation, 
                                                 
78 Le et al. (2011) quoted an entrepreneur saying that the local authority required enterprises to recruit only 
local people, who have permanent residence status, to promote the local economy. 
79 For example, in Ho Chi Minh City, the share of unregistered migrants in the total city population might 
be up to 15 per cent (Le 2002 as cited by UNFPA 2007). 
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creating more incentives for rural residents to migrate (Dang 2009). The root cause of 
rural-urban migration is the urban-rural development gap, especially in job opportunities. 
Consequently, a sustainable solution for over-crowded cities must aim at regional balance 
in development, possibly through the development of satellite cities, industrial clusters in 
rural area, etc in combination with proactive city development plans.  
In May 2014, the National Assembly had discussed the possibility of using identity card 
to replace the household registration booklet and birth certificate in population 
management (Thai 2014). However, there is no discussion related to resident status or 
migration restrictions. In the next section, I use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model to simulate how the economy will react if migration restrictions are removed in 
Vietnam.  
 
4.3 The neoclassical model of a dual economy 
Lewis (1954) explains migration as a consequence of differences in wages between the 
subsistent sector and the modern sector in his model of dual economy. Todaro (1969) 
argues that the difference between expected urban and rural income, rather than the real 
wage gap, leads to the migration decision. And the most rational proxy of the expected 
increase in income following the rural-urban migration is the average urban-rural 
difference in wage.  
More recently, Zimmermann (1995) discusses pull and push migration. Although there 
are many other factors in the source and destination affecting the migration decision, the 
most important reason is still the hope for higher wage/income at the destination. Relative 
economic conditions also influence refugees who are pushed to migrate (Zimmermann 
1995). 
According to the results of the 2004 Vietnam nation-wide migration survey, 69 per cent 
of migrants report economic benefits as their main reason for moving, and 80 per cent of 
migrants have higher income after moving (UNFPA 2007). Noticeably, most rural 
migrants have jobs at home. This implies the urban-rural difference in income, rather than 
unemployment at the source, is driving migration.  
Hence, the theories developed by Lewis (1954) and Todaro (1969) are still relevant in 
Vietnam. They inspire me in building a general equilibrium model of a dual economy, 
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called DUAL, and applying the model to assess the impact of removing migration 
restrictions through closing the wage gap between urban and rural areas in Vietnam. This 
is an effort to contribute to the current literature as research on quantifying the economic 
wide effect of barriers to labour mobility is scarce (Clemens 2011) and there is no such 
work on Vietnam as far as I know. 
4.3.1 Model setup 
The focus of the DUAL model is internal migration between rural and urban areas. The 
model has two regions: rural and urban. Each region has two sectors: agriculture and non-
agriculture, producing two corresponding types of commodities. The number of sectors 
is restricted at two due to data constraints, especially those relating to the urban-rural 
divide. There is agriculture production in urban area to match with Vietnam’s situation, 
although this makes the model different from the theoretical models of Lewis (1954) and 
Todaro (1969).  
To keep the model focused and simple, it assumes a single static closed economy. Hence, 
the model abstracts from international labour migration and trade. Trade between regions 
is assumed costless. 
There are two factors of production: capital and labour. In the static economy, the total 
endowments of capital and labour are fixed, but both factors are mobile between the two 
regions. Capital mobility help equating rates of return between regions. Migration 
restrictions are represented by urban-rural wage gap. The gap plays the role of an indirect 
tax on labour migrating from rural to urban area. 
There are two types of labour: high skilled and low skilled, depending on their education 
and training. The high skilled is comparable to tertiary labour and the low skilled is the 
combination of secondary and primary labour in the 2007 social accounting matrix 
(SAM) (Arndt et al. 2010) that is used as data input for the model.80 The transformation 
between types of labour in the short term is not allowed. The urban-rural gap in wage is 
allowed to vary across types of labour and sectors. 
                                                 
80 Arndt et al. (2010) divides labour into tertiary, secondary, and primary based on the completed education 
level. However, it is unclear how labour with vocational training would be classified (secondary or 
primary). To avoid a potentially large inconsistency, secondary and primary labour are grouped into low 
skilled. 
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The model assumes price-taking households and firms with utility and production 
technique in Cobb-Douglas form, similar to Hosoe (2010). There are ten types of 
households in each region, by farm/non-farm and by quintiles, matching with the 
household classification in the 2007 SAM (Arndt et al. 2010). Heterogenous households 
enable evaluating the distributional impact of policy options.  
The channel of impact of removing migration restrictions is limited to narrowing the 
urban-rural wage gap. Other channels such as remittances, spillover effect of human 
capital accumulation, etc. are abstracted from the model.  
As the chapter is about labour misallocation, which should have a direct impact on output, 
the modelling effort concentrates on separating production into two regions. There is no 
home consumption, intermediate demand, saving/investment, government, and taxation 
in the model. In this respect, this model is similar to the simple model in Hosoe (2010).  
4.3.2 Model system 
Household problem 
Households maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint. As the utility 
function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, each household spends a fixed share of its 
income on each commodity. The household’s demand for each commodity is positively 
correlated with the household income and negatively correlated with the commodity 
price, as follows:  
QHr,h,s * PHs = r,h,s * YHr,h 
where r represents regions (urban and rural); h represents types of households (classified 
into farm/non-farm and income quintiles) and s represents commodities (agriculture and 
non-agriculture)..  
QHr,h,s is the amount of commodity s consumed by household h in region r. PHs is the 
marketed price of commodity s, applied to all households in both regions owing to free 
trade. YHr,h is the income of household h in region r.  
r,h,s is the income share of household h in region r spent on commodity s. With the 
assumption of no saving, households spend all of their income on commodities to 
maximize their utility, thus the sum of r,h,s over s equals unity. 
(4.1) 
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Producer problem  
As the technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, the production function after taking 
log is: 
𝐥𝐧𝐐𝐒𝐫,𝐬 = 𝐥𝐧𝐀𝐫,𝐬 + ෍ 𝛃𝐫,𝐬,𝐟 ∗ 𝐥𝐧𝐐𝐅𝐫,𝐬,𝐟
𝐟
 
where r represents regions (urban and rural); s represents sectors (agriculture and non-
agriculture); and f represents factor input (high skilled labour, low skilled labour, and 
capital).  
QSr,s is output of the representative firm in sector s in region r. Each firm is assumed to 
produce one type of commodity, so s is the index for both sector and commodity. QFr,s,f 
is the demand for factor f by the firm in sector s in region r. 
Ar,s is the efficiency parameter of production for sector s in region r. βr,s,f is the share 
parameter of output to factor f in sector s in region r. The production process is assumed 
constant to scale, which means the sum of βr,s,f over f equals unity. 
As each firm maximizes its profit, its factor demand positively relates to its output and 
output price, and negatively relates to its factor price: 
QFr,s,f = (PSs * βr,s,f * QSr,s)/ wr,s,f 
where PSs is the producer price in sector s, and wr,s,f is the price of factor f in sector s in 
region r. 
Market clearing and other constraints 
For equilibrium in the commodity market, the total demand must equal the total supply 
of each commodity: 
෍ ෍ 𝐐𝐇𝐫,𝐡,𝐬
𝐡𝐫
= ෍ 𝐐𝐒𝐫,𝐬
𝐫
 
With the assumption of full employment of factors, the total factor demand must equal 
the factor endowment: 
𝐐𝐅തതതത𝐟 = ෍ ෍ 𝐐𝐅𝐫,𝐬,𝐟
𝐬𝐫
 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.5) 
(4.4) 
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where QFതതതത୤ is the fixed total endowment of factor f in the economy. 
The marketed price of each commodity equals its producer price as there is no indirect 
tax in this model: 
PHs = PSs 
Each household has its endowment of factors which is sold to firms to obtain factor 
income. The share of each household in total factor income is assumed fixed:  
𝐘𝐅𝐫,𝐡,𝐟 = 𝐬𝐡𝐫𝐲𝐫,𝐡,𝐟 ∗ ෍ 𝐰𝐫,𝐬,𝐟 ∗ 𝐐𝐅𝐫,𝐬,𝐟
𝐬
 
where YFr,h,f is the income of household h in region r from factor f, and shryr,h,f is the 
share of that income in the total income from factor f in region r. The sum of shryr,h,f over 
h equals unity. 
Total income of each household is the sum of income from all factors owned by the 
household: 
𝐘𝐇𝐫,𝐡 = ෍ 𝐘𝐅𝐫,𝐡,𝐟
𝐟
 
The urban-rural wage gap is represented by the wedge in factor prices between regions: 
gaps,f  = wurban,s,f - wrural,s,f 
where gaps,f is the exogenous variable reflecting the wedge in factor prices. This wedge 
is allowed to vary across factors and sectors. I assume gaps,f > 0 for labour and gaps,f = 0 
for capital. 
In this closed economy, trade between regions sum to zero. Furthermore, as the model is 
abstracted from remittances, the value of goods traded out equals that of goods traded in 
for each region.81 Thus if we define  
𝐓𝐑𝐫,𝐬 = 𝐐𝐒𝐫,𝐬  −  ෍ 𝐐𝐇𝐫,𝐡,𝐬
𝐡
 
                                                 
81 This assumption could be relaxed if we had information about transfers between urban and rural areas. 
The 2007 Vietnam SAM (Arndt et al. 2010) has information about remittances from overseas to domestic 
households, but assumes no transfers between households. 
(4.6) 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
(4.7) 
(4.10)
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then 
෍ 𝐓𝐑𝐫,𝐬 = ෍ 𝐓𝐑𝐫,𝐬 = 𝟎
𝐬𝐫
 
As there is no government consumption, investment or external trade, the gross domestic 
product (GDP) coincides with the total household consumption:  
𝐆𝐃𝐏 =  ෍ ෍ 𝐘𝐇𝐫,𝐡
𝐡𝐫
 
The social welfare is defined as the minimum expenditure to attain the total utility (Hosoe 
2010). To reflect the change in social welfare, I use the Hicksian equivalent variation, 
which is the change in the minimum expenditure evaluated at the initial prices. The initial 
prices are set at one, thus: 
𝐄𝐕 =  ෍ ෍(𝐔𝐔𝟏𝐫,𝐡 ∗ ෑ𝐫,𝐡,𝐬
ି𝐫,𝐡,𝐬)
𝐬𝐡𝐫
−  ෍ ෍(𝐔𝐔𝟎𝐫,𝐡 ∗ ෑ𝐫,𝐡,𝐬
ି𝐫,𝐡,𝐬)
𝐬𝐡𝐫
 
where EV is the Hicksian equivalent variation, reflecting the change in social welfare. 
UU0r,h and UU1r,h are the utility of household h in region r at the base (initial stage) and 
the simulated scenarios respectively.82 
Although the equation block 4.11 includes four equations, one of them is redundant. In 
total, the model has 180 equations and 180 unknowns. The following section describes 
the process of applying the DUAL model to simulate the impact of removing migration 
restrictions in Vietnam. 
4.3.3 Data and calibration 
Most of the calibration involves preparing a national social accounting matrix that fits the 
dimensions of the model. The main data input is the Vietnam 2007 Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) developed by Arndt et al. (2010). The Vietnam 2007 SAM includes 62 
activities and commodities, six types of labour (by urban/rural and level of education), 
two types of capital (agriculture/non-agriculture), and 20 households (by urban/rural, 
                                                 
82 The derivation of Hicksian equivalent variation can be found in Hosoe (2010, pp.133-136). 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.11) 
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agriculture/non-agriculture and expenditure quintile). Hence, the Vietnam 2007 SAM has 
more activities than needed, but does not divide production accounts into urban/rural. 
The first step is to aggregate activities in the Vietnam SAM (Arndt et al. 2010) into 
agriculture and non-agriculture. Agriculture includes paddy rice, sugarcane, other annual 
crops, rubber, coffee, tea leaf, other perennial crops, cows and pigs, poultry, other 
livestock, forestry, fishery, and aquaculture. Non-agriculture includes all other activities. 
The second step is to drop unused accounts, including intermediate inputs, trade margins, 
government, production taxes, factor taxes, direct taxes, import tariffs, sales taxes, saving 
- investment, changes in stocks or inventories, and rest of world. This results in an 
unbalanced SAM.      
The cross entropy method, developed by Robinson et al. (2001), is used to generate a 
balanced SAM that is closest to the unbalanced one in the second step. Details on this 
step could be found in Truong (2014). 
The third step is to separate the national SAM into urban SAM and rural SAM. As the 
labour input and household accounts have the urban/rural dimension already, the urban 
accounts are moved to urban SAM and the rural accounts to rural SAM. The remaining 
accounts are then balanced accordingly. For example capital value added accounts are 
balanced with the respective household factor income.83 In turn, the activity accounts are 
balanced with the total value added from factors.  
Information from district-level socio economic data, rural, agricultural and fishery 
census, and enterprise surveys is used to check robustness (Table 4.8). There is a big 
difference between the calculated urban share in value added from capital used by 
agriculture producers and the urban share in capital used by agriculture enterprises from 
the enterprise survey. One explanation is that the enterprise survey does not cover farming 
households, who concentrate in the rural area, thus the urban share from the survey is 
likely overestimated. Other shares from SAMs are quite close to their corresponding 
indexes from other sources. 
                                                 
83  Capital accounts include agricultural land, livestock, fishery capital, capital used by agricultural 
enterprises, and capital used by non-agricultural enterprises. 
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Table 4.8 Urban shares from the estimated urban SAM and rural SAM in 
comparison with other sources of information (per cent) 
The estimated urban and rural 
SAMsa 
Urban 
shares  
Other sources Urban 
shares 
Total agriculture value added/ 
output 8.0 Total agriculture output
b 8.3 
Total non-agriculture value added/ 
output 64.1 Total non-agriculture output
b 69.1 
Total value added from capital 
used by agriculture producers  8.4 
Total capital used by 
agriculture enterprisesd 38.7 
Total value added from capital 
used by non-agriculture producers  60.5 
Total capital used by non- 
agriculture enterprisesd 58.6 
Total value added from 
agricultural land 5.3 
Total area of agricultural 
lande 2.7 
Total value added from livestock 8.4 Total output of living weight of livestockb 9.3 
Total value added from fishery 
capital 7.0 
Total fishery capital 
(aquacultural land and 
fishing boats)c 
10.4 
Note: The 2004 district-level socio economic data is the only source of district-level data. It is aggregated 
into urban and rural indexes, where provincial cities, provincial towns, and urban districts (“quận”) are 
counted as urban area, and rural districts (“huyện”) are counted as rural areas. Sector indexes are weighted 
averages of the available sub-sector ones.84  
Sources: Author’s calculations using aArndt et al. (2010), bGSO (2006b), cGSO (2007b) and dthe 2007 
enterprise survey; and ethe 2005 national land inventory (Mai 2007). 
The last step in estimating the urban and rural SAMs is to merge agricultural land, 
livestock, and fishery capital into agriculture capital account; and merge secondary and 
primary labour into low skilled labour. The capital accounts are then linked directly to 
household accounts (removing the enterprise accounts). 85  The final SAMs are in 
Appendix 4.4 and Appendix 4.5.  
The commodity accounts are not balanced, reflecting trade between regions. Urban 
regions import agricultural commodities and export non-agricultural commodities to rural 
                                                 
84 This might involve in stratified averaging. For example the urban shares of food crop, vegetable crop, 
industrial crop, fruit crop outputs are aggregated into the urban share of cultivation output. This index is 
used with the livestock one to calculate the index for agriculture (in narrowed definition), which is 
combined with forestry and fishery indexes to produce the index for agriculture (in broad definition). The 
weight used throught out the process is the respective share of the sub-sector in the sector’s gross output. 
85 Dropping accounts underestimates gross output. Thus we focus on the relative rather than absolute 
changes. 
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region. The net trade value between regions (exports plus imports) equals 10.9 per cent 
of the total output. 
Besides SAMs, we also need labour input by qualifications in each region to solve for the 
initial urban-rural wage gap. The information source of labour qualifications by 
education, sector, and regions (urban and rural areas) that is most compatible with the 
labour classification in the Vietnam 2007 SAM (Arndt et al. 2010) is the 2009 Census.86 
Other sources (for example the 2006 rural, agricultural and fishery census - AgroCensus, 
or the labour force surveys) use the professional and training classification. Thus I use 
the total labour by agriculture/ non agriculture and urban/ rural from the 2006 
AgroCensus, as we need the information at 2006-2007. These numbers are then 
disaggregated into education levels using the shares from the 2009 Census. The labour 
inputs for the model are in Table 4.9.    
Table 4.9 Labour by qualifications in urban and rural areas in 2006 (‘000 people) 
 Urban  Rural 
Total 
 Agriculture Non agriculture 
 Agriculture Non agriculture 
High skilled             145           2,337              1,651              845  4,978 
Low skilled            1,231          6,911            19,903           7,850  35,895 
Total          1,376           9,248            21,554           8,695  40,873 
Note: Labour in this table refers to persons of working age (age 15-60 for male and 15-55 for female). High 
skilled includes grade 12 or higher. Low skilled include primary education, secondary education and 
vocational training.  
Sources: Author’s calculations using 2009 Census data, GSO (2007b), and GSO (2012c). 
4.3.4 Scenarios 
There are three scenarios: the base scenario (S0), with no policy change and two simulated 
scenarios.  These are: narrowed wage gaps (S1) and skill upgraded labour (S2). 
Comparing these scenarios allows impact assessment of removing migration restrictions 
in comparison with training provision to improve labour skills. 
The base scenario reflects the economy as it is using the calibrated data described above. 
The calculated consumption spending shares r,h,s (equation 4.1), the efficiency 
                                                 
86 Labour in the Vietnam 2007 SAM (Arndt et al. 2010) is divided by education levels into primary labour 
(having some primary schooling - grades 1 to 4), secondary labour (having some secondary schooling - 
grades 5 to 11), and tertiary labour (having completed secondary school or higher education - grade 12 or 
higher). 
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parameters Ar,s, the output shares βr,s,f (equation 4.2), and the factor income share shryr,h,f 
(equation 4.7) are in Appendix 4.6, Appendix 4.7, and Appendix 4.8. 
The gaps between urban and rural wage rates are in Table 4.10. The urban/rural wage 
ratios are higher for the agricultural sector, especially for high skilled labour. The average 
wage of high skilled labour in urban agriculture is 13,004 thousand dong, while that 
number for rural agriculture is 4,697 thousand dong. Thus, the absolute difference in 
urban-rural average wages of high skilled labour in agriculture sector is 8,307 thousand 
dong. And the average wage of high skilled labour in urban agriculture is 2.77 times 
higher than that of high skilled labour in rural agriculture. This large gap could come from 
the significant regional skill gap even within the high skilled group. For example, 
according to the 2009 Census data, the urban ratio of agricultural labour with at least 
university education to high skilled agricultural labour (grade 12 or higher) is three times 
higher than the rural one. The difference for labour with at least master education is up to 
seven fold. 
Table 4.10 Urban-rural wage gaps by sector 
 Wage gap (thousand dongs) Urban/rural wage ratio 
 Agriculture Non agriculture Agriculture Non agriculture 
High skilled 8,307 5,624 2.77 1.08 
Low skilled 1,301 3,228 1.42 1.30 
Note: High skilled includes grade 12 or higher. Low skilled include primary education, secondary education 
and vocational training.  
Sources: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
Scenario S1 represents reducing urban-rural migration restrictions, which is expected to 
narrow the urban-rural wage gap. This policy option is simulated by reducing the wage 
gaps87 by 30 per cent (from the base ones as in the first and second columns of Table 
4.10). The gaps could not be closed completely as there are other factors contributing to 
the urban-rural wage gaps, especially the regional shares of skilled labour. As described 
in Table 4.4, the urban average wage in the enterprise sector is 37 per cent higher than 
the rural one, but that number decreases to 10.8 per cent after controlling for the difference 
in wage across industries and labour skill levels.  
                                                 
87 The wage gaps are made exogenous in the model to enable the simulations of removing migration 
restrictions, among other enabling policy such as improving rural – urban connectivity. 
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Another policy option to improve the wage - productivity relationship is to improve 
labour skills through training programs. It is reflected in scenario S2 through a shift of 
eight per cent of low skilled labour into high skilled (to increase QFതതതത୦୧୥୦ ୱ୩୧୪୪ୣୢ  and 
decrease  QFതതതത୪୭୵ ୱ୩୧୪୪ୣୢ accordingly). This is an ambitious move as the number of high 
skilled labour is expected to increase more than half or almost three million. A related 
policy is the program of “Providing Vocational Training for Rural Labourers to 2020”, 
which sets the target of training 11.2 million rural labourers during 2011-2020 and is 
expected to cost 26 trillion dong (Government of Vietnam 2009e).88 The simulation 
results are in the next section. 
4.3.5 Results 
Reducing migration restrictions to narrow the wage gap and upgrading labour skill both 
facilitate rural-urban migration and help to withdraw labour from agriculture. However, 
the impact of removing migration restrictions on migration and economic restructure is 
much bigger than that of upgrading labour skill. Nearly seven million rural labourers (a 
quarter of the total rural labour force) would migrate to urban areas and eight million 
labourers (one third of the agricultural labour force) could be withdrawn from agriculture 
if migration restrictions were removed (Table 4.11). 
Table 4.11 Demand for labour by sector and region (‘000 people) 
 Base S1 S2 
Urban 10,624  17,521 10,937  
Rural 30,249  23,352  29,936  
Rural-urban labour migration -   6,897  313  
Agriculture 22,930 15,106 22,668 
Non agriculture 17,943 25,767 18,205 
Labour withdrawn from agriculture - 7,824 262 
Note: Labour in this table refers to persons of working age (age 15-60 for male and 15-55 for female). 
Base: the base scenario. S1: narrowing the urban-rural wage gap by 30 per cent. S2: upgrading eight per 
cent of low skilled to high skilled. Rural-urban migration and labour withdrawn from agriculture are the 
simulated deviation of urban labour and non-agriculture labour respectively from the base scenario. 
Sources: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
                                                 
88 There is no information about the expected qualifications after training. However, there is a special 
module for short term vocational training, which means that the program focuses more on providing training 
for labour with no qualification. I assume that the share of labour upgraded from low skilled to high skilled 
accounts for a quarter of the total labour benefiting from the program. 
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The average wage is estimated to be reduced by 12 per cent if migration restrictions are 
removed (S1) and marginally increase if labour skill upgraded (S2) (Table 4.12). 
Providing training to improve labour skill alone (S2) has little impact on the average 
wage. One explanation is the sustained wage gaps limiting labour migration; the decrease 
in the wage for high skilled (as the supply of high skilled goes up) is made up with the 
increase in the wage for low skilled (as the supply of low skilled goes down).  
Table 4.12 Average wage by sector and region (deviation from the base scenario - per 
cent) 
 S1 S2 
Urban -44.28 -2.76 
Rural 7.86 1.00 
Agriculture 35.34 1.39 
Non agriculture -38.76 -1.44 
Total -11.86 0.04 
Note: S1: narrowing the urban-rural wage gap by 30 per cent. S2: upgrading eight per cent of low skilled 
to high skilled.  
Sources: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
Output increases in all three simulated scenarios. This contributes to the improvement of 
the overall labour productivity.89 Narrowing wage gap (S1) could enable 12 per cent 
increase in total output. The gain in output from labour skill upgrade (S2) is only 0.5 per 
cent (Table 4.13). In any case, total agricultural output increases despite labour withdrawn 
from agriculture owing to strong increases in urban agricultural output. On this evidence, 
we do not have to worry about food security when removing migration restrictions. This 
observation is similar to Brennan et al. (2012) who use a multi-region partial equilibrium 
model of Vietnam’s agricultural sector to analyse the impact of rural-urban migration. 
                                                 
89 Labour productivity is proxied by output per worker. In this static model, the total number of workers is 
unchanged, so the increase in labour productivity is proportional to the increase in output. 
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Table 4.13 Output by sector and region (deviation from the base scenario - per cent) 
 S1 S2 
Urban 23.37 0.96 
Rural 0.22 0.01 
Agriculture 7.38 0.31 
Non agriculture 13.37 0.55 
Total 11.92 0.49 
Note: S1: narrowing the urban-rural wage gap by 30 per cent. S2: upgrading eight per cent of low skilled 
to high skilled.  
Sources: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
Sectoral and regional outputs increase in both simulated scenarios (Table 4.13). The 
increases in outputs are significant if reducing migration restrictions (S1), but only 
marginal if upgrading labour skills (S2). As labour moves from rural to urban and from 
agriculture to non-agriculture, labour productivity in rural areas and the agricultural sector 
is improved strongly. Output per worker in the agricultural sector is expected to increase 
by 63 per cent and that in the rural areas to increase by 30 per cent if reducing migration 
restrictions (S1). This could facilitate poverty alleviation as the poor are concentrated in 
agriculture and rural areas.  
As the households are classified by income quintile, the income ratio of the highest 
quintile over the lowest one could be an indicator of inequality. The higher the ratio, the 
higher inequality. In that sense, inequality among urban non-farming households is 
striking high. Inequality among urban farming households and among urban non-farming 
households decreases in all simulated scenarios in comparison with the base scenario. 
The inequality among rural farming households and among rural non-farming 
households, however, increases a little (Table 4.14).  
Table 4.14 Income ratio of the fifth over the first quintile by group of households and 
region 
 Base S1 S2 Original SAM 
Urban farming households 8.84 8.53 8.82 9.88 
Urban non-farming households 101.71 94.12 101.04 126.19 
Rural farming households 2.03 2.08 2.04 2.35 
Rural non-farming households 7.70 7.88 7.71 9.17 
Note: Base: the base scenario. S1: narrowing the urban-rural wage gap by 30 per cent. S2: upgrading eight 
per cent of low skilled to high skilled. Original SAM: as provided by Arndt et al. (2010).  
Sources: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
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Removing migration restrictions and upgrading labour skill both improve total welfare 
(Table 4.15). The relative welfare gain, proxied by the Hicksian equivalent variations 
over GDP, is expected to reach 12 per cent if migration restrictions are removed, but only 
0.5 per cent if labour skill is upgraded. It is understandable that the vocational training 
program has little impact as it could only reach a small share of labour. 
Table 4.15 Welfare indicators 
 S1 S2 
Total utility (deviation from the base scenario - per cent) 13.17 0.54 
Hicksian equivalent variations 85.40 3.50 
Hicksian equivalent variations over the initial GDP (per cent) 11.92 0.49 
Note: Base: the base scenario. S1: narrowing the urban-rural wage gap by 30 per cent. S2: upgrading eight 
per cent of low skilled to high skilled.  
Sources: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
In short, narrowing the urban-rural wage gaps by removing migration restrictions could 
help improve Vietnam’s competitiveness as labour productivity is increased. It also brings 
about a relatively large welfare gain. The economic structure could be changed 
dramatically by withdrawing a large amount of labour out of agriculture. As the 
productivity in agriculture and rural area is expected to go up remarkably, the policy likely 
contributes to poverty alleviation and narrowing urban – rural inequality. Notably, this 
policy option does not directly require a budget as huge as the training program to upgrade 
labour skills, which has a much more limited impact. 
4.4 Conclusion and policy implications 
In Vietnam, the urban and rural areas are seemingly in different stages of development. 
The migration restrictions, notably those linked with the household registration system, 
contribute to that situation. The urban-rural wage gap is significant and cannot be 
explained fully by the gap in labour skills. Estimations using the enterprise survey data 
from 2000 to 2010 show that the average wage of unskilled urban workers is at least ten 
per cent higher than that of unskilled rural workers in the same industry. This wage gap 
is almost doubled for skilled labour. 
Vietnam is among a few countries maintaining formal restrictions on rural-urban 
migration. These restrictions distort the labour cost and bring about labour market 
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segmentation. It erodes the country’s competitiveness, which is currently based on 
favourable demographic conditions (Porter 2010). 
Significant gains from labour mobility are predicted by economic theory, as it allow 
people to make the best use of their talents (UNDP 2009). This is confirmed by 
calculations using the DUAL model. The model predicts that a quarter of the total rural 
labour force would migrate to urban areas and one third of agricultural labour would 
switch to the non-agricultural sector if migration restrictions were dismantled.90 Labour 
productivity, proxied by output per worker, is expected to increase by 12 per cent. 
Agricultural output is expected to increase too, supporting food security even when labour 
withdrawn from the sector. This policy option could raise total welfare significantly as 
well as enable poverty alleviation through improving labour productivity in agriculture 
and the rural sector. Importantly, the expected direct cost of this policy is low, but could 
magnify the positive impacts of the planned labour skill upgrading program. 
This research focuses on narrowing the urban-rural wage gap. The impact of migration 
through remittances is beyond of the scope of this study. However, the DUAL model 
could be modified to include urban-rural remittances if the micro data were available. 
UNDP (2009) concludes that migrants gain a lot, but they also distribute some of the 
gains to people in the place of destination and place of origin via different channels. 
Hence, relaxing migration restrictions might have greated impact on narrowing income 
inequality if remittances are taken into account.  
It should be stressed that the household registration system does not stop rural-urban 
migration completely. Moreover, retaining labour in rural area fuels inequality and keeps 
farmers’ income at a low level (Gallup 2002). And migration needs to be recognized as a 
movement for socio-economic development, matching with the Constitution, the Law on 
Residency and the Law on Labour (Dang 2009). 
Although over-crowded cities might put pressure on the current infrastructure, there are 
better ways to control migration than the household registration system. The concerns 
about slums at cities could be addressed by the proactive development of subsidized 
housing for low income people there. And for state management, a system of individual-
                                                 
90 The movement of labour in response to the wages gap is determined by the relevant elasticity in the 
production function. Because a Cobb-Douglas form is assumed, the elasticity depends on the factor share. 
An alternative specification of the production would generate different results. Likewise, the fall in average 
wages is determined by the choice of production function. 
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based identifiers might be much more efficient than the current household-based 
registration.  
The sustainable solutions must aim at equal urban and rural development. Economic 
incentives should be favoured rather than administrative instruments. Dang (2009) 
mentions the development of peri-urban centres and middle-sized cities, and non-farm 
job creation in rural area as effective ways to distribute labour from big cities. In other 
words, the concentration of people into several big cities need integrated macro policies, 
rather than specialized ones for migration and labour (Dang 2009). 
Vietnam is in the golden age of population. The high proportion of people of working age 
in the population would be advantageous only if they are mobilized in high value added 
activities. In contrast, if there are not enough jobs, the resulting high unemployment rate 
could lead to social upheavals. Therefore, the issue of labour misallocation is highly 
relevant at the moment. 
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Figure 4.1 Gross average nominal monthly wages of some selected Asian countries 
in 2010 (US dollars) 
  
Notes: The nominal wages in local currency units from the ILO global wage database are converted to US 
dollars using the corresponding average exchange rates from Asian Development Bank (2013).  
Source: International Labour Organization (2014), Asian Development Bank (2013). 
Figure 4.2 Share of labour force by employment status (per cent) 
 
Source: GSO (2011a), GSO (2014c). 
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Figure 4.3 Minimum wages in some selected Asian countries (US dollar per month) 
 
Notes: The minimum wages in local currency units from the ILO global wage database are converted to 
US dollars using the corresponding average exchange rates from Asian Development Bank (2013). The 
minimum wages of India and Vietnam are national representative, while those of the other four countries 
are regional. 91 
Source: International Labour Organization (2014), Asian Development Bank (2013). 
                                                 
91 The minimum wage from the ILO global wage database seems to be a representative one. In Vietnam, 
the effective minimum wage in 2007 was 450 thousand dong per month (28 US dollar) (Government of 
Vietnam 2006c). In 2010, there are different levels of minimum wage, based on region and ownership. The 
lowest level of minimum wage, which was applied to domestic-owned institutions in region IV, was 730 
thousand dong per month. The highest level of minimum wage, which was applied to foreign-owned 
institutions in region I, was 1340 thousand dong per month. Thus, the minimum wage in 2010 was in the 
range of 39 to 72 US dollar per month (Government of Vietnam 2009b, 2009c). India has a far more 
complicated system, with minimum wages set separately for different states, occupations, and levels of skill 
(Government of India 1948). 
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Figure 4.4 Nominal and real average monthly wage paid by urban and rural 
enterprises (million dong) 
 
Notes: Real wage is calculated using average consumer price index (in 2000 prices). Real wages from 2004 
to 2010 are adjusted using urban and rural spatial living-cost indexes.92 
Source: Author’s calculation using Vietnam enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010.93 
                                                 
92 The regional price deflators before 2004 are not publicly available. The rural price level used to address 
spatial difference in cost of living might be underestimated due to non-random geographic locations chosen 
for GSO’s frequent price collection. Those locations are more likely to include relatively accessible rural 
markets which have lower price level than those in remote areas (Gibson 2009). Thus the real rural wage 
is expected to be lower than estimated and the real urban - rural wage gap to be even more significant. 
93 Information about the enterprise survey data could be found in the section of data and measurement in 
Chapter 3. 
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Figure 4.5 Share of labour force by qualifications in urban and rural areas (per cent) 
 
Note: Vocational training includes primary, secondary vocational training and vocational college. 
Source: GSO (2011a), GSO (2014c). 
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Figure 4.6 Average monthly wage paid by rural and urban enterprises by share of 
skilled workers in 2001, 2007 and 2009 (million dong) 
 
Notes: Skilled workers are those completed doctoral, master, bachelor, college education or vocational 
training. Real wage is calculated using average consumer price index (in 2000 prices). Real wages in 2007 
and 2009 are adjusted using urban and rural spatial cost-living indexes. Labour qualifications in 2001 is for 
headquarters only, while the information in 2007 and 2009 is for the whole enterprise. 
Source: Author’s calculation using Vietnam enterprise survey data in 2001, 2007, and 2009. Consumer 
price indexes and spatial living-cost indexes from GSO (2014a). 
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Figure 4.7 Percentage of migrants reporting difficulties as a result of not having 
household registration (per cent) 
 
Notes: Migrants in the 2004 Vietnam migration survey are persons who moved within five years before 
the survey. The survey was conducted in regions with high in-migration rate (big cities, industrial zones, 
and the Central Highland). The sample size was 10,007 persons in the age group 15-59, including 4,998 
migrants and 5,009 non-migrants. 
Source: 2004 Vietnam migration survey (GSO 2006a). 
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Appendix 4.1 Results of estimating the urban-rural gap in wage using pooled OLS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Ln (real 
wage) 
Ln (real 
wage) 
Ln (real 
wage) 
Ln (real 
wage) 
     
Urban dummy 0.368*** 0.325*** 0.233*** 0.148*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) 
2001 year dummy  0.041*** 0.013* 0.021*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
2002 year dummy  0.075*** 0.070*** 0.062*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
2003 year dummy  0.207*** 0.146*** 0.125*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
2004 year dummy  0.160*** 0.122*** 0.128*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
2005 year dummy  0.270*** 0.253*** 0.212*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
2006 year dummy  0.380*** 0.337*** 0.348*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
2007 year dummy  0.448*** 0.439*** 0.421*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
2008 year dummy  0.525*** 0.368*** 0.446*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
2009 year dummy  0.612*** 0.552*** 0.623*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
2010 year dummy  0.725*** 0.660*** 0.694*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Urban # 2001 year   0.046*** 0.028*** 
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Urban # 2002 year   0.012 -0.004 
   (0.010) (0.009) 
Urban # 2003 year   0.099*** 0.081*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
Urban # 2004 year   0.066*** 0.008 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
Urban # 2005 year   0.034*** 0.014 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
Urban # 2006 year   0.075*** -0.001 
   (0.009) (0.008) 
Urban # 2007 year   0.025*** -0.032*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Urban # 2008 year   0.237*** 0.079*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Urban # 2009 year   0.098*** -0.050*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Urban # 2010 year   0.105*** -0.020** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant -0.408*** -0.825*** -0.769*** -1.462*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.035) 
Industry dummies (4-digit 
code) 
No No No Yes 
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No. of observations94 1,438,537 1,438,537 1,438,537 1,437,905 
R-squared 0.048 0.133 0.135 0.268 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: # represents interaction of variables. For example Urban # 2009 year is the interaction between the 
urban dummy and the 2009 year dummy. This interaction variable takes value 1 if the enterprise is in 
urban area and the year of survey is 2009. The interaction variable takes value 0 otherwise. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010. 
 
                                                 
94 The number of observations reported here is different from the one reported in Chapter 3 due to the 
differences in the number of missing observations between variables used in the two chapters. In this 
chapter, I mostly exploit information about labour, which has less missing observations than information 
relating to business performance. 
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Appendix 4.2 Results of estimating the urban-rural gap in wage using pooled OLS, 
controlling for labour qualifications  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln (real 
wage) 
Ln (real 
wage) 
Ln (real 
wage) 
    
Urban dummy 0.163*** 0.134*** 0.108*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
2007 year dummy 0.319*** 0.326*** 0.334*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2009 year dummy 0.490*** 0.491*** 0.486*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Urban # 2007 year -0.064*** -0.073*** -0.048*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Urban # 2009 year -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.033*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Share of skilled workers 0.243*** 0.197***  
 (0.005) (0.008)  
Urban # share of skilled workers  0.068***  
  (0.009)  
Share of university graduates and 
higher 
  0.681*** 
   (0.010) 
Share of college graduates   0.228*** 
   (0.016) 
Share of vocational school graduates   0.057*** 
   (0.009) 
Share of workers with vocational 
training 
  0.104*** 
   (0.006) 
Constant -1.652*** -1.636*** -1.624*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) 
Industry dummies (4-digit code) Yes Yes Yes 
    
No. of observations 247,735 247,735 247,735 
R-squared 0.200 0.200 0.215 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: # represents interaction of variables. For example Urban # 2009 year is the interaction between the 
urban dummy and the 2009 year dummy. This interaction variable takes value 1 if the enterprise is in 
urban area and the year of survey is 2009. The interaction variable takes value 0 otherwise. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data in 2001, 2007, and 2009. 
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Appendix 4.3 Categorization of citizens based on their household registration and 
their accessibility to social services 
Category Status Social service accessibility 
KT1 Residents with 
permanent household 
registration at place of 
current residence 
Purchase and sell land and housing and have 
land/house ownership certificates 
Access to public facilities and social services at 
current place of residence 
Access to formal financial loans 
Access to employment 
Access to public social services including 
education and health care only within their 
district of residence 
KT2 Intra-district migrants 
who have permanent 
household registration 
in the province/ city 
of current residence 
Purchase and sell land and housing and have 
land/house ownership certificates 
Access to public facilities and social services 
Limited access to formal financial loans 
Access to employment 
Access to education and health care only within 
the district where they are registered 
KT3 Migrants who do not 
have permanent 
registration at the 
place of current 
residence but have 
temporary registration 
for 6-12 months with 
the possibility of 
extension 
Access to public facilities and social services 
Lack of access to legal housing 
KT3 children can go to public schools only when 
they are not used to full capacity (by KT1 and 
KT2 children). If the schools are overcrowded, 
KT3 children have to go to private schools, 
where they have to pay higher school fees. 
Lack of access to financial loans/formal financial 
services 
KT4 Migrants who do not 
have permanent 
registration at their 
place of current 
residence but have 
temporary registration 
for 1-6 months 
Do not have the right to purchase land and 
access to public social services and financial 
loans 
Non-
registered 
residents 
Those who do not 
belong to any of the 
above category 
Do not have the right to purchase land and 
access to public social services and financial 
loans 
Source: Le et al. (2011). 
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Appendix 4.4 2007 Vietnam urban social accounting matrix (billion dong) 
 aAGR aNAGR cAGR cNAGR flab-u-h flab-u-l fcap hhd-uf1 hhd-uf2 hhd-uf3 hhd-uf4 hhd-uf5 hhd-un1 hhd-un2 hhd-un3 hhd-un4 hhd-un5 total 
aAGR   13,839               13,839 
aNAGR    348,286              348,286 
cAGR        715 1,332 2,303 2,806 5,836 345 1,276 4,479 9,943 23,921 52,955 
cNAGR        2,968 5,087 10,157 13,576 26,739 1,514 6,815 22,278 54,871 165,166 309,170 
flab-u-h 1,881 170,112                171,993 
flab-u-l 5,405 97,503                102,908 
fcap 6,554 80,670                87,224 
hhd-uf1     365 2,609 708           3,683 
hhd-uf2     1,336 3,862 1,219           6,418 
hhd-uf3     2,721 7,162 2,577           12,460 
hhd-uf4     4,980 8,099 3,303           16,382 
hhd-uf5     12,755 11,047 8,774           32,575 
hhd-un1     110 1,281 469           1,859 
hhd-un2     1,690 4,340 2,061           8,090 
hhd-un3     8,858 12,027 5,872           26,757 
hhd-un4     27,639 22,051 15,124           64,814 
hhd-un5     111,540 30,431 47,117           189,087 
total 13,839 348,286 13,839 348,286 171,993 102,908 87,224 3,683 6,418 12,460 16,382 32,575 1,859 8,090 26,757 64,814 189,087  
Note: aAGR - agricultural activity, aNAGR - non agricultural activity, cAGR - agricultural commodity, cNAGR - non agricultural commodity, flab-u-h - urban labour with tertiary 
education, flab-u-l - urban labour with secondary and primary education, fcap - capital, hhd-uf1 to hhd-uf5 - first (low) to fifth (high) quintile urban farming households, hhd-un1 to 
hhd-un5 - first (low) to fifth (high) quintile urban non-farming household. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Arndt et al. (2010).  
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Appendix 4.5 2007 Vietnam rural social accounting matrix (billion dong) 
 aAGR aNAGR cAGR cNAGR flab-r-h flab-r-l fcap hhd-rf1 hhd-rf2 hhd-rf3 hhd-rf4 hhd-rf5 hhd-rn1 hhd-rn2 hhd-rn3 hhd-rn4 hhd-rn5 total 
aAGR   159,457               159,457 
aNAGR    194,873              194,873 
cAGR        13,822 21,960 22,427 19,725 29,295 783 1,328 2,090 2,545 6,367 120,342 
cNAGR        26,185 38,355 43,999 47,337 52,003 1,322 2,833 4,966 7,148 9,841 233,989 
flab-r-h 7,753 56,727                64,480 
flab-r-l 61,518 85,407                146,925 
fcap 90,187 52,739                142,926 
hhd-rf1     3,367 21,182 15,458           40,008 
hhd-rf2     7,022 29,852 23,441           60,315 
hhd-rf3     10,501 29,759 26,166           66,426 
hhd-rf4     14,717 26,071 26,274           67,062 
hhd-rf5     19,779 28,106 33,413           81,298 
hhd-rn1     158 1,127 819           2,105 
hhd-rn2     577 1,782 1,802           4,161 
hhd-rn3     1,024 2,928 3,104           7,055 
hhd-rn4     2,503 3,032 4,159           9,693 
hhd-rn5     4,832 3,086 8,289           16,208 
total 159,457 194,873 159,457 194,873 64,480 146,925 142,926 40,008 60,315 66,426 67,062 81,298 2,105 4,161 7,055 9,693 16,208  
Note: aAGR - agricultural activity, aNAGR - non agricultural activity, cAGR - agricultural commodity, cNAGR - non agricultural commodity, flab-r-h - rural labour with tertiary 
education, flab-r-l - rural labour with secondary and primary education, fcap - capital, hhd-rf1 to hhd-rf5 - first (low) to fifth (high) quintile rural farming households, hhd-rn1 to hhd-
rn5 - first (low) to fifth (high) quintile rural non-farming household. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Arndt et al. (2010). 
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Appendix 4.6 The consumption spending shares r,h,s 
 Urban Rural 
 Agriculture Non agriculture Agriculture Non agriculture 
hhd-f1 0.19 0.81 0.35 0.66 
hhd-f2 0.21 0.79 0.36 0.64 
hhd-f3 0.19 0.82 0.34 0.66 
hhd-f4 0.17 0.83 0.29 0.71 
hhd-f5 0.18 0.82 0.36 0.64 
hhd-n1 0.19 0.81 0.37 0.63 
hhd-n2 0.16 0.84 0.32 0.68 
hhd-n3 0.17 0.83 0.30 0.70 
hhd-n4 0.15 0.85 0.26 0.74 
hhd-n5 0.13 0.87 0.39 0.61 
Note: hhd-f1 to hhd-f5 - first (low) to fifth (high) quintile farming households, hhd-n1 to hhd-n5 - first 
(low) to fifth (high) quintile non-farming household. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
 
Appendix 4.7 The efficiency parameters Ar,s and the output shares βr,s,f 
  Urban Rural 
  Agriculture Non agriculture Agriculture 
Non 
agriculture 
Ar,s 6.81 48.46 3.85 28.37 
βr,s,f for     
 High skilled labour 0.14 0.49 0.05 0.29 
 Low skilled labour 0.39 0.28 0.39 0.44 
 Capital 0.47 0.23 0.57 0.27 
Source: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
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Appendix 4.8 The factor income share shryr,h,f 
 Urban Rural 
 
High 
skilled 
labour 
Low 
skilled 
labour 
Capital 
High 
skilled 
labour 
Low 
skilled 
labour 
Capital 
hhd-f1 0.002 0.025 0.008 0.052 0.144 0.108 
hhd-f2 0.008 0.038 0.014 0.109 0.203 0.164 
hhd-f3 0.016 0.070 0.030 0.163 0.203 0.183 
hhd-f4 0.029 0.079 0.038 0.228 0.177 0.184 
hhd-f5 0.074 0.107 0.101 0.307 0.191 0.234 
hhd-n1 0.001 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.006 
hhd-n2 0.010 0.042 0.024 0.009 0.012 0.013 
hhd-n3 0.052 0.117 0.067 0.016 0.020 0.022 
hhd-n4 0.161 0.214 0.173 0.039 0.021 0.029 
hhd-n5 0.649 0.296 0.540 0.075 0.021 0.058 
Note: hhd-f1 to hhd-f5: first (low) to fifth (high) quintile farming households, hhd-n1 to hhd-n5: first (low) 
to fifth (high) quintile non-farming household. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the DUAL model. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
 
Abstract 
Misallocation of key resources – capital, land, and labour – has created inefficiencies and 
contributed to inequality in Vietnam. Relevant government policies have made the 
situation worse. The three case studies in this thesis show the causes and consequences 
of misallocation of resources. The primary cause is misguided policies that have their 
roots in the central planning period. More recently, Vietnam has recognized the need for 
structural reform, but a roadmap is needed to improve the chances of success. I propose 
prioritized changes in policies to alleviate resource misallocation and improve growth and 
equality. Importantly, given Vietnam has been increasingly integrated in a fast changing 
world, prompt action is a must, as missed opportunities could be costly. 
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Capital and labour are the key resources for growth. While these resources are scarce, 
making the best use of them is of utmost importance. The loss in gross output and 
aggregate productivity due to resource misallocation could be in the range of 30 to 50 per 
cent (Hsieh and Klenow 2009). The thesis includes three case studies on resource 
misallocation in Vietnam. This chapter summarizes findings from previous chapters and 
proposes further research on the topic. 
5.1 Main findings and recommendations 
Vietnam is at a crucial stage of development, in transition from a low income to a middle 
income country. However, the momentum for growth since the reforms in late 1980s and 
early 2000s seems to have stalled. The average annual GDP growth rate in 2008-2013 
was 5.7 per cent (GSO 2014a). Although this growth rate is relatively high compared with 
neighbouring countries, it was significantly lower than Vietnam’s average growth rate of 
7.3 per cent in 2000-2007 (GSO 2014a). The fast growth in the 2000s was investment-
led, with the ratio of gross investment to GDP up to 40 per cent. Vietnam could not 
maintain this high level of investment due to fiscal constraints on public expenditure and 
the fall in private investment as the economy turned down. Besides, the rapid increase in 
investment contributed to macroeconomic instability in late 2000s. Thus, the relevant 
question for Vietnam in the near future is how to allocate the available resources to the 
most efficient uses. 
This thesis finds evidence of resource misallocation in Vietnam between agriculture and 
non-agriculture sectors, between state-owned enterprises and other types of enterprises, 
and between urban and rural areas; then proposes policy changes to alleviate these kinds 
of resource misallocation.   
First, in the context of the global financial crisis in 2009, Vietnam’s stimulus package 
focus on reducing taxes and increasing government spending to boost total demand to 
alleviate negative external shocks, including but not limited to fall in export demand and 
foreign direct investment. The package helps improve total welfare, however at the cost 
of government savings and inflation risk. If there had been a shift in investment and 
government spending toward boosting the demand for agricultural goods, the poor, who 
are concentrated in agriculture, would have benefited more.  
In order to assess the impact of investment structural adjustment, I extend the model the 
1-2-3 CGE model of Devarajan et al. (1997) to include the agricultural sector. The 
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extended model is useful in evaluating the impact of external shocks and policy options 
on the whole economy in general and on the agriculture sector in particular. This 
characteristic is highly relevant in Vietnam, where most of the poor live in rural areas and 
earn their living from agriculture. Consequently, the extended model could help draw 
policy implications for inequality and poverty reduction in Vietnam. 
Second, state-owned enterprises have received preferential treatment in access to capital, 
though they do not outperform non-state enterprises in capital use. State-owned 
enterprises have become increasingly capital-intensive. They borrow from banks to 
finance their capital expansion. Hence, loss-making state-owned enterprises account for 
the majority of non-performing loans in the banking system.  
I use the enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 to estimate the rate of return on capital 
of different types of enterprises. The large scale panel data with more than 1.4 million 
observations allow the estimation of dynamic translog production functions for each of 
the 14 types of ownership and for state-owned enterprises, privately-owned enterprises, 
and foreign-invested enterprises in each of ten broad industries. As a result, I could 
compare the rate of return on capital among different stakeholders, controlling for labour 
input, firm fixed effects, and lagged values of output and inputs, while accommodating 
the unobserved impacts of intermediate inputs and a time trend. This is a compliment to 
the widely-cited macroeconomic statistics which show the investment inefficiency of the 
state sector as a whole. This does not necessarily refer to state-owned enterprises alone, 
as these are just a part of the state sector.  
State-owned enterprises were found to have had lower revenue per unit of capital than 
private-owned enterprises. Among state-owned enterprises, limited or joint stock 
companies with state capital accounting for more than 50 per cent of the charter capital 
had a higher rate of return on capital than the 100 per cent state-owned. While the most 
profitable state-owned enterprises tend to be retained instead of being equitized, our 
findings suggest equitization has helped to improve the efficiency of a particular 
enterprise.  
Of course, not all SOEs would be able to benefit from privatization. It is possible that the 
Government sold off the SOEs that were most likely to succeed. However, evidence 
suggests that the Government sold off the worst SOEs rather than the best. This could 
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help explain the improved performance of SOEs as a whole over the period for which 
data are available. 
Findings from this research suggest that policies aiming at improving capital efficiency 
should take the heterogeneity of state-owned enterprises into account. Central and local 
State-owned enterprises should be the key targets of the needed reform to improve the 
state sector’s capital efficiency as they appear to have the lowest marginal rates of return 
on capital. This supports the Government’s plan to restructure state-owned enterprises in 
2011-2015, which focuses on the big central state-owned enterprises.  
Notably, it seems that state capital is pouring into the mining and utilities and the financial 
intermediation industries as the share of state-owned enterprises in total capital of these 
industries has been high and increasing. Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises have the 
output elasticity of capital significantly lower than those of non-state enterprises in these 
two industries and in agriculture. Thus equitization in the mining and utitlities, financial 
intermediation, and agriculture is expected to improve the overall capital efficiency. 
However, policies for commercial state-owned enterprises and for the ones providing 
services that the private sector could not provide efficiently (such as in the utilities 
industry) should be differentiated as well. 
The most important policy to minimize resource misallocation between state and non-
state sectors is removing favourable treatments for state-owned enterprises that operate 
for profit. Without distortions, the limited capital would then flow to the most efficient 
users. State-owned enterprises would therefore have incentive to improve their own 
efficiency too. Besides, the role of state-owned enterprises as instruments in 
macroeconomic management has been criticized as creating distortion in input prices and 
resource allocation (Economic Committee of the National Assembly 2012). This results 
in ambiguity in the state management of state-owned enterprises and should be avoided. 
Third, Vietnam is among a few countries maintaining formal restrictions on rural-urban 
migration. The migration restrictions, notably those linked with the household registration 
system, contribute to the urban-rural divide in Vietnam. These restrictions distort the 
labour cost and bring about labour market segmentation. They erode the country’s 
competitiveness, which is largely based on favourable demographic conditions. 
The urban-rural wage gap is significant and cannot be explained fully by the gap in labour 
skills. Estimations using the enterprise survey data from 2000 to 2010 show that the 
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average wage of unskilled urban workers is at least ten per cent higher than that of 
unskilled rural workers in the same industry. This wage gap is almost doubled for skilled 
labour. 
A general equilibrium model of a closed economy with two regions is used to evaluate 
the impact of removing migration restrictions in Vietnam. The rural-urban migration 
restrictions are represented by the urban-rural wage gap. The model results indicate that 
a quarter of the total rural labour force would migrate to urban areas and one third of 
agricultural labour would switch to the non-agriculture sector if migration restrictions 
were dismantled. The gross output and labour productivity are predicted to increase as 
labour is redistributed more efficiently among regions and sectors. Agricultural output is 
expected to increase too, supporting food security even when labour is withdrawn from 
the sector. This policy option could raise total welfare significantly as well as enabling 
poverty alleviation through improving labour productivity in agriculture and the rural 
sector. Importantly, the expected cost of this policy is low, while its positive impacts on 
output and productivity are larger than those of the planned labour skill upgrading 
program. 
As a result, removing migration restrictions is recommended. Migration needs to be 
recognized as a movement for socio-economic development, matching with the 
Constitution, the Law on Residency and the Law on Labour (Dang 2009). Retaining 
labour in rural areas fuels inequality and keeps farmers’ income at a low level (Gallup 
2002). Moreover, the household registration system does not stop rural – urban migration. 
Rather, it creates a “floating population” in cities who are not registered and meet many 
difficulties due to their resident status.  
There are concerns about over-crowded cities and difficulties in migration management. 
The sustainable solution for congestion in big cities must aim at equal urban and rural 
development. Economic incentives should be favoured rather than administrative 
instruments. For state management purpose, a system of individual-based identifiers 
might be much more efficient than the current household-based registration.  
The three resource misallocations addressed in this thesis are inter-connected and 
contribute to the low labour productivity nationally. Capital has been channelled to state 
owned enterprises, which concentrate in industry and service, meaning less capital is 
available to the underinvested agriculture sector. The capital-intensive state-owned 
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enterprises are also not able to attract much labour out of rural areas and agriculture. The 
obstacles to rural-urban migration created by the household registration system keep 
labour staying in rural areas and earning their livelihood in agriculture. Underinvestment 
in agriculture restricted the mechanization and application of technological advances. The 
sector remains the most labour intensive with the lowest labour productivity. All of these 
have bad consequences for poverty reduction, as most of the poor are rural farmers.  
These misallocations should be dealt with soon. In a fast changing world into which 
Vietnam has been increasingly integrated, prompt actions are required as time is costly. 
This thesis is contributing to develop a roadmap for the near future, before Vietnam could 
progress to the green and knowledge-based development that some more advanced 
countries are aiming at. 
5.2 Limitations and further research 
There are several issues that could not be addressed within the scope of the thesis and 
could be topics for further research. Most importantly, the methodologies used to analyse 
the capital and labour misallocation in Vietnam could be applied to other developing 
countries that are likely facing distortions in factor markets.  
There are several potential extensions to each topic in the three core chapters. The shocks 
considered in chapter 2 (fluctuations in world prices, tax cuts, changes in government 
spending) are quite common and could be applied in other contexts. In such cases, the 
same model could be used to analyse their impacts. It could be also used to simulate 
impacts of other policy options, such as manipulating exchange rates. The model is static 
in its current form and could be developed into a dynamic one. This would allow one to 
explore the optimal rate and method to repay the debt incurred to sponsor the stimulus 
package. Parameters of the production functions could also be calibrated from Vietnam’s 
micro-based data. 
Secondly, the panel data in chapter 3 could be used to assess the effectiveness of 
equitization on firm performance in Vietnam, controlling for the initial conditions before 
equitization. The problem is that the heavily indebted state-owned enterprises might find 
difficulties in selling shares. Further research is needed to quantify the impact of other 
reforms such as incentive-based payment systems, share ownership by staff, deregulating 
prices, and introducing competition on the performance of state-owned enterprises. Such 
research would require an in-depth survey to complement the enterprise censuses. 
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State-owned enterprises have been criticized for extending beyond their core functions 
into areas such as real estate or finance. The panel data could help evaluate the impact of 
this expansion as the surveys collect information on labour, capital and revenue for up to 
four activities other than the main one. There are also issues for domestic privately-owned 
and foreign-invested enterprises that could be addressed using this data. 
For the efficient use of capital in Vietnam, the banking system should be the key target, 
as other channels of allocating capital are relatively modest. The restructuring of the 
banking sector is one of the three pillars of the overall restructuring master plan. The 
government set up the Vietnam Asset Management Company in 2013 to handle non-
performing loans in the banking system and has raised foreign bank ownership cap from 
15 to 20 per cent since early 2014 (Bloomberg (2014). These actions seem to be 
reasonable but their impact need more time to be revealed. 
The estimated coefficients of the translog production function for types of ownership in 
different industries were used to build a computable general equilibrium model that 
separates state and non-state sectors (Truong and Vanzetti 2012). This model helps 
quantify the possible economy-wide impact of transferring capital from state-owned to 
nonstate-owned enterprises and could be used for other exercises like assessing the impact 
of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership on state-owned enterprises or increasing the 
foreign ownership limit in banks 
Thirdly, the DUAL model in chapter 4 could be modified to include urban-rural 
remittances if the micro data were available. UNDP (2009) concludes that migrants gain 
a lot, but they also distribute some of the gains to people in the place of destination and 
place of origin via different channels. Hence, the estimated impact of relaxing migration 
restrictions on income distribution might be greater if remittances are taken into account.  
Last, but not least, the results from this thesis are the core to build a comprehensive 
general equilibrium model for Vietnam, characterized by agriculture, state-owned 
enterprises, and rural/urban areas. This model could be helpful in policy analysis in 
Vietnam’s transitional context. Vietnam is witnessing a growing inequality among state 
and non-state sectors, rural and urban areas, non-farming and farming households. The 
model if connected with household data and enterprise data would enable micro-
simulation analysis with various applications. 
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